[Vision2020] Eugenie Scott's Talk at U of I

[Michael]

John:

In this paragraph you are first saying giving examples of bad creation
science is legitimate, and then, in the next sentence, suggesting the very
same thing is not legitimate.

 

Me:

No, I said they 'can be' legitimate. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. I wrote:
"But this is only the case if it is done in a clearly argumentative way;
Scott's method was purely rhetorical." 

 

John:

Don't get emotional about people in the audience laughing with examples of
creation science or about assumed suggestions of imbecility. 

 

Me:

Not emotional at all. I was making a point about an objective feature of
Scott's rhetoric.

 

John:

There are some PhD scientists sympathetic to creation science, but very few
of them actually do creation research. None of them have produced valid
research results.

 

Me:

The nature of my criticism of Scott does not address the statistics on how
many brilliant PhD scientists who do creation research is not.  This is an
empirical claim I was not addressing, and it was a claim that Scott did
nothing to argumentatively settle either way.   

 

John:

False. The moths spend their time on trunks, branches, and trunk/branch
joints. If the moths rest more commonly under branches, this would only
require an adjustment of selection coefficients, but doesn't change the main
idea of differential bird predation. 

 

Me:

But Scott just laughed at a periphery here; your analysis suggests that
there is a potentially legitimate concern or argument on the part of the
Creationist, but also a legitimate argument against them here.  This was not
Scott's method; you exceed Scott's argumentative righteousness.   

 

I Originally Wrote:

My point was that the examples Scott gave were not found within publications
that were necessarily posing as scientific, academic journals.

 

John Writes In Response:

That would be because there is no creationist science to be found in true
academic journals.

 

Me:

I think we have lost my original point here.

 

John:

Scott is wrong because what she says goes against the work of Johnson?

He is wrong. There are more than two viable options. <snip>

Now you have me confused. In the same sentence you are saying Johnson is not
using the flawed strategy, but also trying to convince people of that
strategy. <snip> Scott did not just cry 'false alternative'. She explained
why it was so.

 

Me:

I'm not sure how this addressed my argument regarding Phil Johnson, his
wedge strategy, and the claim of false alternative.  Scott did just cry
'false alternative;' she did so numerous times.  Instead of addressing each
time, I simply addressed what she said about Phil Johnson.  She simply
stated that Phil Johnson asserts a wedge between Evolution and Creation;
Creation must be true since Evolution is false.  However, this could only be
a 'false alternative' fallacy if it was a one step argument.  Johnson would
just have to assert (as Scott implies he does) that the true explanation of
origins has to be either Evolution or Creation as a starting premise or a
starting assumption, and then proceed to 'argue' for the fact that Evolution
is false, which then gives you the conclusion of Creation.  This would be
committing a false alternative fallacy.  But this is not, from what I
remember, Johnson's argument.  Johnson's argument is two stepped.  First he
argues for, he does not assume, the fact that we have really only two
options before us. And further, he argues for the fact that these really are
two separate options; not agreeing with Donovan, he argues for the fact that
you can't be an Evolutionist and a Creationist at the same time. Once he has
argued for this conclusion (as I recollect) he then proceeds to argue for
the fact that Evolution is false.  To critique Johnson, one must show why
his arguments for the fact that Evolution and Creation are the only two
options and why they are mutually exclusive.  Simply asserting that Johnson
starts off with a false alternative doesn't deal with his argument. It is a
straw man.  And this is precisely what Scott did. 

 

 

Michael Previously Wrote:

> In fact, this is almost always the way discussion

and argument works. The 

> historical and cultural context of this broad debate

very naturally limits 

> the two options to creationism and evolution.

 

John Writes In Response:

I don't see why that would be true. Can you explain?

 

Me:

The important distinction here is between logical possibility and probably
possibility, or conceivable possibility or plausible possibility.  Only
philosophers care about all the different possible worlds one can conceive
of.  Scientists only care about plausible worlds; in other words, they want
to test hypotheses that they think just might end up being true.  In the
case of a broad cultural and political debate about origins, it makes no
sense to multiple the logically possible origins of man; rather, one would
propose those logically possible origins that also seem relevant, or
plausible, or probable.  If Scott cries, "Ah, false alternative, there is a
third option: all is an allusion; there really isn't a world that involved;
solipsism just might be true."  The reasonable American scientist/agnostic
should say, What?!  I don't care about the logical possibility of solipsism,
I want to test the two PLAUSIBLE OR RELEVANT OR DISPUTED hypothesis.  I want
to debate what the scientific community finds relevant or plausible.  There
is no false alternative here. This is the way all debates or experimentation
go: we rule out many implausible logical possibilities at the start for
productivity and efficiency; in part it is due to lack of creativity or
interest in a certain path of inquiry or hypothesis formation.   

 

PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM & METHEDOLOGICAL NATURALISM

John Writes:

Agreed. Why is that a problem? <snip>

Were we even attending the same lecture? I don't know where you are getting
this from. This is not what she said. She said science operates in the
natural world and this is independent of a person's spiritual life. <snip>
Science does not deal in the paranormal. However, science routinely DOES
deal with normal non-physical causes. I give you Economics, Sociology,
Psychology, Behavioral Ecology,... <snip> How could you ever know that you
can never know something?

 

John Goes On And Quotes What I Originally Wrote:

"However, Philosophical Naturalism is the thesis that all there is in the
world to know can be fully knowable via Naturalistic explanation.  There is
nothing in the world that does not permit scientific understanding.  This is
why Scott shunned the idea that there was anything we "just can't know" via
science.  This is what was so important about how she answered the question
regarding the mystery of the human mind.  She was clear that the mind is not
mysterious; there is nothing about the mind that cannot be understood
through science and natural, physical explanation.  This is an explicit and
clear statement of what is called Philosophical Materialism, or to use her
terminology, Philosophical Naturalism.  When the mystery of the Mind is
proposed, of essential reference is not just the nervous system and neurons,
but human experience, subjectivity, individuality, intentionality along with
those items of reality that seem to attach themselves to all this, such as
beauty, love, morality, and 'meaning.'  All of these things, according to
Philosophical Materialism, can be fully explained, and therefore 'reduced'
to physical description via scientific explanation.  This is a point of view
at war with a Christian view and even plain old folk-traditional thought."

 

John Continues and Writes In Response:

The concepts you list here are routinely scientifically studied in the
fields I listed above.

 

Me:

It is evident that you have not grasped the real difference between
Methodological and Philosophical Naturalism.  This is a common problem for
scientists, since it is the fuzzy acceptance of Philosophical Naturalism in
the name of Methodological Naturalism that Analytic Philosophers find
important to illuminate and criticize.  All of the above is answered by
pointing out the fact that although certain aspects of 'mind' can be the
subject of scientific explanation, there are other aspects, such as
subjective consciousness, that in principle cannot be; for example, the
scientist can't get what it is like to look at a test tube in his test tube.
Scott was clear that you can.   I'm not asserting anything uncommon to
current academic discussion in philosophy.  

 

Thanks!

Michael Metzler

 

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