[Vision2020] Iraq on the brink of civil war?
Joan Opyr
auntiestablishment@hotmail.com
Sun, 4 Apr 2004 21:19:07 -0700
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Is Iraq slipping into civil war? It's certainly beginning to look that w=
ay. A long-dreaded second front opened this past weekend; according to a=
nother piece in the NY Times, not a single checkpoint manned by the much-=
touted, U.S.-trained Iraqi policemen held. Next stop? The Kurds in the =
north declare their independence, opening front #3.
The June 30th handover to the Iraqi Civil Authority will probably take pl=
ace as scheduled, but it will be a farce. We're in this for the long, bl=
oody, demoralizing haul.
=20
Joan Opyr/Auntie Establishment
-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
Forwarding from washingtonpost.com: =20
Protests Unleashed by Cleric Mark a New Front in War
By Anthony Shadid and Sewell Chan
BAGHDAD, April 4 -- By unleashing mass demonstrations and attacks in Ba=
ghdad and southern Iraq on Sunday, a young, militant cleric has realized =
the greatest fear of the U.S.-led administration since the occupation of =
Iraq began a year ago: a Shiite Muslim uprising.
Fighting with U.S. troops raged into the night in a Baghdad slum, and hos=
pitals reportedly took in dozens of casualties. But even before sunset, t=
here was a sense across the capital that a yearlong test of wills between=
the American occupation and supporters of Moqtada Sadr had turned decisi=
ve, and its implications reverberated through Iraq.
The unrest signaled that the U.S. military faces armed opposition on two =
fronts: in scarred Sunni towns such as Fallujah and, as of Sunday, in a S=
hiite-dominated region of the country that had remained largely acquiesce=
nt, if uneasy about the U.S. role. If put down forcefully, a Shiite upris=
ing -- infused with religious imagery, and symbols drawn from Iraq's colo=
nial past and the current Palestinian conflict -- could achieve a momentu=
m of its own.
During the last year, Sadr has appealed to poor and disenfranchised Shiit=
es, the majority of Iraq's population, with a relentless anti-occupation =
message. A junior cleric, the 30-year-old's authority is far overshadowed=
by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the country's leading religious figure. =
Sadr and his followers remain distinctly unpopular in the Shiite holy cit=
y of Najaf, where the more established clergy hold sway. But he commands =
a street following in Baghdad and the long-neglected cities of the south,=
and his militia of several thousand men has grown in strength and influe=
nce.
Hours into Sunday's violence, Sadr publicly called for an end to the pro=
tests, and it was unclear whether his followers would persist in a fight =
with an overwhelmingly more powerful U.S. military. But the calculus of I=
raq's politics had already appeared to shift.
"Just give the order, Moqtada, and we'll repeat the 1920 revolution," sup=
porters chanted in Baghdad, a reference to a Shiite-led uprising against =
the British occupation that has grown in political mythology to serve as =
Iraq's founding act. Across town, outside the headquarters of the U.S.-le=
d administration, Sheik Hazm Aaraji warned, "The people are prepared for =
martyrdom."
The unrest Sunday followed a series of calibrated moves by each side tha=
t appeared to be designed to test the resolve of the other.
The latest round of tension began March 28, with the U.S. closure of Sadr=
's al-Hawza newspaper. With an estimated circulation of 10,000, the weekl=
y was mainly marketed at mosques loyal to Sadr's followers and, for month=
s, had printed articles that U.S. officials deemed inflammatory. The clos=
ure sent thousands of protesters into the streets, many of them marching=
in military cadence in Baghdad and Najaf and wearing the black uniforms =
of Sadr's militia, which is known as the Mahdi Army.
Supporters of Sadr suggested that a show of force would discourage U.S. o=
fficials from broadening the crackdown. In his Friday sermon, Sadr appear=
ed to call for attacks on U.S. forces, crossing a line that he had carefu=
lly avoided for months. Citing what he called attacks by "the occupiers,"=
he told followers, "Be on the utmost readiness and strike them where you=
meet them."
Early Saturday morning, one of Sadr's top aides, Mustafa Yaqoubi, a famil=
iar face in Sadr's office in Najaf, was detained. U.S. officials said he =
was held along with 12 people for the killing of a moderate Shiite cleri=
c from one of Iraq's most prestigious religious families. The cleric, Abd=
ul-Majid Khoei, was hacked to death on April 10, 2003, a day after the fa=
ll of Baghdad. U.S. officials said the warrants were issued months ago an=
d offered no explanation about why they were not executed until Saturday.
The detention of Yaqoubi prompted protests by thousands on Sunday across =
southern Iraq. As the fighting surged in Baghdad and the southern cities =
of Najaf and Amarah, Sadr issued a statement calling on his followers to =
stop the protests, saying they were futile. But he added: "Intimidate you=
r enemy. . . . It is not possible to remain silent before their violation=
s." =20
U.S. officials insisted Sunday that they had not decided whether to crack=
down on Sadr's group. But L. Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator of =
Iraq, suggested that the violence would have consequences.
"A group of people in Najaf have crossed the line," Bremer said at a news=
conference. "This will not be tolerated. This will not be tolerated by t=
he coalition, this will not be tolerated by the Iraqi people, and this wi=
ll not be tolerated by the Iraqi security forces."
For months, occupation authorities have been divided over how to respond =
to Sadr's challenge.
Since last summer, U.S. authorities had tried to persuade Iraq's more sen=
ior and moderate clergy to rein in Sadr, whom one senior official describ=
ed at the time as "a populist, a critic and a rabble-rouser." "We're watc=
hing him and some of the big [ayatollahs] are watching us, and we're both=
hoping the other does something," the official said.
Part of the reservation was motivated by the fear of a Shiite backlash. S=
ince the start of the occupation, the desire to maintain Shiite support -=
- or at least acquiescence -- has served as one of the administration's k=
ey objectives.
At least in public, Sadr's profile had appeared to fade in recent months,=
as Sistani played a more assertive role in Iraqi politics and criticized=
various U.S. plans for Iraq's political transition. Given Sistani's stat=
ure among the country's Shiites, Sadr had refrained from direct criticis=
m of him. But in private, his followers express resentment of Sistani's i=
nfluence. They view their movement as Arab and nationalist, and endorse a=
far greater role for the clergy in politics and social affairs than Sist=
ani has espoused.
In part, the rivalry dates back to Sadr's father, Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, wh=
o competed with Sistani for influence and was assassinated in 1999. Sadr =
has claimed the mantle of his revered father. =20
Sadr kept a lower profile after a clash in October between U.S. troops an=
d his followers in Baghdad, but his movement's militia grew in size and i=
nfluence. Numbering just 500 in August and often ridiculed for its ragtag=
quality, its membership has since grown to as many as 10,000 men, armed =
with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and light weapons.
With security deteriorating in the south, the militia has vied for author=
ity with the larger Badr Organization, a militia operated by a leading Sh=
iite party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Other=
, smaller militias belong to the Dawa party, another Shiite group with a =
long history in Iraq, and a mystical cleric named Sarkhi Hassani. One of =
Sistani's representatives, Abdel-Mehdi Salami, a ranking Shiite cleric, i=
s believed to be organizing armed followers in Karbala, another city sac=
red to Shiites.
The rising influence of the Mahdi Army, along with accusations of their i=
ntimidation, death threats and illegal detentions, has alarmed U.S. offic=
ials, who fear it will compete for power after the U.S. administration of=
Iraq ends June 30. In recent weeks, pressure has grown within the occupa=
tion administration to crack down on militias, particularly Sadr's, befor=
e they gain more power.
"We were so patient and now you can see the result," said Abu Heidar Ghal=
ib Garawi, a leader of the Mahdi Army in Kufa, a city near Najaf. "You ca=
n see the rage of the people. What do you think? Will they [occupation au=
thorities] respond with oppression or will they respond to the demands?"
Correspondent Karl Vick in Kufa contributed to this report.
=20
Would you like to send this article to a friend? Go to =20
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<HTML><BODY STYLE=3D"font:10pt verdana; border:none;"><DIV>Is Iraq slippi=
ng into civil war? It's certainly beginning to look that way. =
A long-dreaded second front opened this past weekend; according to =
another piece in the NY Times, not a single checkpoint manned by the=
much-touted, U.S.-trained Iraqi policemen held. Next stop? T=
he Kurds in the north declare their independence, opening front #3.</DIV>=
<DIV> </DIV> <DIV>The June 30th handover to the Iraqi Civil Authori=
ty will probably take place as scheduled, but it will be a farce. W=
e're in this for the long, bloody, demoralizing haul.</DIV> <DIV>&nb=
sp;</DIV> <DIV>Joan Opyr/Auntie Establishment</DIV> <DIV>----------------=
-----------------------------------------------------------</DIV> <DIV>&n=
bsp;</DIV> <DIV>Forwarding from washingtonpost.com: <BR><BR>Protests=
Unleashed by Cleric Mark a New Front in War<BR><BR>By Anthony Shadid&nbs=
p; and Sewell Chan<BR><BR> BAGHDAD, April 4 -- By unleashing mass d=
emonstrations and attacks in Baghdad and southern Iraq on Sunday, a young=
, militant cleric has realized the greatest fear of the U.S.-led administ=
ration since the occupation of Iraq began a year ago: a Shiite Muslim upr=
ising.<BR><BR>Fighting with U.S. troops raged into the night in a Baghdad=
slum, and hospitals reportedly took in dozens of casualties. But even be=
fore sunset, there was a sense across the capital that a yearlong test of=
wills between the American occupation and supporters of Moqtada Sadr had=
turned decisive, and its implications reverberated through Iraq.<BR><BR>=
The unrest signaled that the U.S. military faces armed opposition on two =
fronts: in scarred Sunni towns such as Fallujah and, as of Sunday, in a S=
hiite-dominated region of the country that had remained largely acquiesce=
nt, if uneasy about the U.S. role. If put down forcefully, a Shiite upris=
ing -- infused with religious imagery, and symbols drawn from Iraq's colo=
nial past and the current Palestinian conflict -- could achieve a momentu=
m of its own.<BR><BR>During the last year, Sadr has appealed to poor and =
disenfranchised Shiites, the majority of Iraq's population, with a relent=
less anti-occupation message. A junior cleric, the 30-year-old's authorit=
y is far overshadowed by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the country's leadi=
ng religious figure. Sadr and his followers remain distinctly unpopular i=
n the Shiite holy city of Najaf, where the more established clergy hold s=
way. But he commands a street following in Baghdad and the long-neglected=
cities of the south, and his militia of several thousand men has grown i=
n strength and influence.<BR><BR>Hours into Sunday's violence, Sadr publi=
cly called for an end to the protests, and it was unclear whether h=
is followers would persist in a fight with an overwhelmingly more powerfu=
l U.S. military. But the calculus of Iraq's politics had already appeared=
to shift.<BR><BR>"Just give the order, Moqtada, and we'll repeat the 192=
0 revolution," supporters chanted in Baghdad, a reference to a Shiite-led=
uprising against the British occupation that has grown in political myth=
ology to serve as Iraq's founding act. Across town, outside the headquart=
ers of the U.S.-led administration, Sheik Hazm Aaraji warned, "The people=
are prepared for martyrdom."<BR><BR>The unrest Sunday followed a series =
of calibrated moves by each side that appeared to be designed=
to test the resolve of the other.<BR><BR>The latest round of tension beg=
an March 28, with the U.S. closure of Sadr's al-Hawza newspaper. With an =
estimated circulation of 10,000, the weekly was mainly marketed at mosque=
s loyal to Sadr's followers and, for months, had printed articles that U.=
S. officials deemed inflammatory. The closure sent thousands of pro=
testers into the streets, many of them marching in military cadence in Ba=
ghdad and Najaf and wearing the black uniforms of Sadr's militia, which i=
s known as the Mahdi Army.<BR><BR>Supporters of Sadr suggested that a sho=
w of force would discourage U.S. officials from broadening the crackdown.=
In his Friday sermon, Sadr appeared to call for attacks on U.S. forces, =
crossing a line that he had carefully avoided for months. Citing what he =
called attacks by "the occupiers," he told followers, "Be on the utmost r=
eadiness and strike them where you meet them."<BR><BR>Early Saturday morn=
ing, one of Sadr's top aides, Mustafa Yaqoubi, a familiar face in Sadr's =
office in Najaf, was detained. U.S. officials said he was held along with=
12 people for the killing of a moderate Shiite cleric from one of =
Iraq's most prestigious religious families. The cleric, Abdul-Majid Khoei=
, was hacked to death on April 10, 2003, a day after the fall of Baghdad.=
U.S. officials said the warrants were issued months ago and offered no e=
xplanation about why they were not executed until Saturday.<BR><BR>The de=
tention of Yaqoubi prompted protests by thousands on Sunday across southe=
rn Iraq. As the fighting surged in Baghdad and the southern cities of Naj=
af and Amarah, Sadr issued a statement calling on his followers to stop t=
he protests, saying they were futile. But he added: "Intimidate your enem=
y. . . . It is not possible to remain silent before their violations." <B=
R><BR>U.S. officials insisted Sunday that they had not decided whether to=
crack down on Sadr's group. But L. Paul Bremer, the civilian administrat=
or of Iraq, suggested that the violence would have consequences.<BR><BR>"=
A group of people in Najaf have crossed the line," Bremer said at a news =
conference. "This will not be tolerated. This will not be tolerated by th=
e coalition, this will not be tolerated by the Iraqi people, and this wil=
l not be tolerated by the Iraqi security forces."<BR><BR>For months, occu=
pation authorities have been divided over how to respond to Sadr's challe=
nge.<BR><BR>Since last summer, U.S. authorities had tried to persuade Ira=
q's more senior and moderate clergy to rein in Sadr, whom one senior offi=
cial described at the time as "a populist, a critic and a rabble-rouser."=
"We're watching him and some of the big [ayatollahs] are watching us, an=
d we're both hoping the other does something," the official said.<BR><BR>=
Part of the reservation was motivated by the fear of a Shiite backlash. S=
ince the start of the occupation, the desire to maintain Shiite support -=
- or at least acquiescence -- has served as one of the administration's k=
ey objectives.<BR><BR>At least in public, Sadr's profile had appeared to =
fade in recent months, as Sistani played a more assertive role in Iraqi p=
olitics and criticized various U.S. plans for Iraq's political transition=
Given Sistani's stature among the country's Shiites, Sadr had ref=
rained from direct criticism of him. But in private, his followers expres=
s resentment of Sistani's influence. They view their movement as Arab and=
nationalist, and endorse a far greater role for the clergy in politics a=
nd social affairs than Sistani has espoused.<BR><BR>In part, the rivalry =
dates back to Sadr's father, Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, who competed with Sista=
ni for influence and was assassinated in 1999. Sadr has claimed the mantl=
e of his revered father. <BR><BR>Sadr kept a lower profile after a clash =
in October between U.S. troops and his followers in Baghdad, but his move=
ment's militia grew in size and influence. Numbering just 500 in August a=
nd often ridiculed for its ragtag quality, its membership has since grown=
to as many as 10,000 men, armed with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars =
and light weapons.<BR><BR>With security deteriorating in the south, the m=
ilitia has vied for authority with the larger Badr Organization, a militi=
a operated by a leading Shiite party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic=
Revolution in Iraq. Other, smaller militias belong to the Dawa party, an=
other Shiite group with a long history in Iraq, and a mystical cleric nam=
ed Sarkhi Hassani. One of Sistani's representatives, Abdel-Mehdi Salami, =
a ranking Shiite cleric, is believed to be organizing armed followers in =
Karbala, another city sacred to Shiites.<BR><BR>The rising influenc=
e of the Mahdi Army, along with accusations of their intimidation, death =
threats and illegal detentions, has alarmed U.S. officials, who fear it w=
ill compete for power after the U.S. administration of Iraq ends June 30.=
In recent weeks, pressure has grown within the occupation administration=
to crack down on militias, particularly Sadr's, before they gain more po=
wer.<BR><BR>"We were so patient and now you can see the result," said Abu=
Heidar Ghalib Garawi, a leader of the Mahdi Army in Kufa, a city near Na=
jaf. "You can see the rage of the people. What do you think? Will they [o=
ccupation authorities] respond with oppression or will they respond to th=
e demands?"<BR><BR>Correspondent Karl Vick in Kufa contributed to this re=
port.<BR><BR> <BR><BR><BR>Would you like to send this article=
to a friend? Go to <BR>http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/admin/em=
ailfriend?contentId=3DA50349-2004Apr4&sent=3Dno&referrer=3Demaila=
rticle<BR><BR><BR>Visit washingtonpost.com today for the latest in:<BR><B=
R>News - http://www.washingtonpost.com/?referrer=3Demailarticle<BR><BR>Po=
litics - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/?referrer=3Demaila=
rticle<BR><BR>Sports - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/sports/?refer=
rer=3Demailarticle<BR><BR>Entertainment - http://www.washingtonpost.com/w=
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BR>Technology - http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/technology/?referrer=
=3Demailarticle<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>Want the latest news in your inbox? Ch=
eck out washingtonpost.com's e-mail newsletters:<BR><BR>http://www.washin=
gtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?node=3Dadmin/email&referrer=3Demailarticle<BR=
><BR><BR><BR>=A9 2004 The Washington Post Company<BR><BR></DIV></BODY></H=
TML><br clear=3Dall><hr>Get more from the Web. FREE MSN Explorer downloa=
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p>
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