[Vision2020] an issue worthy of discussion?
Dale Courtney
dale@courtneys.us
Fri, 1 Aug 2003 17:28:14 -0700
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Mike Curley wrote an excellent, well thought out post to Vision2020 -- which
I forwarded on to Jack Wenders (who wrote the Letter to the Editor on Thrs).
Posts such as Mike's are enjoyable to get!
I will respond to Mike, but first I wanted to forward the off-list response
from Prof. Jack Wenders.
This Email is a response to Mike's posting on Vision2020
(http://lists2.fsr.net/pipermail/vision2020/2003-August/003715.html).
Best,
Dale
_____
Dale,
I agree that this is a very thoughtful response.
While Mike says that he's not one of those who thinks the teachers are
overpaid/underworked (the same thing), he presents no evidence on this
point. As you know, I prefer to look at comparable pay in comparable
public/private schools like Mike Podgursky does, rather than to annualize,
like you do. But whatever one does on this point, the answer comes out about
the same: generally, public school teachers are paid above-market wages, as
indicated by the general, perennial, surplus and very low turnover. What
teachers "deserve" and what is "fair" are moral points best left to the
moral philosophers. The real issue is what must be paid to get the kind and
quality one wants, and that's a market, not a moral, consideration. Perhaps
we could end this discussion by saying that all teachers "deserve" to be
paid $200,000/ year. With that settled, we can then get down to the
nitty-gritty detail of seeing what the market is for actual teachers. (On a
larger issue, I simply don't understand why some people, and I'm not
accusing Mike of this, insist on equating moral worth with pay, and vice
versa. Larry Flynt makes millions per year, and is a moral cripple. And some
who do, in my view, very tough, demanding, and beneficial work seem to often
be paid little. That, unfortunately, is how things work out in the market
and one should not get involved in drawing any cosmic, moral, conclusions.)
Maybe "merit pay" is not a good word to use either, because of its moral
connotation. I happen to think that teachers of math, some science, and good
English teachers need to be paid more because you are going to have to do
that to keep them from going to employment outside of teaching because these
skills are more valuable there. Merit, in the narrow sense, has nothing to
do with it. [Accountant Profs at UI (and everywhere) usually get paid more
than economic profs, not because they are more meritorious, but because
that's the way the market is, and if you didn't pay them more you would have
no accounting department.]
Note that the over/underpay issue has two separate dimensions: are
individuals paid above market wages? (Yes, probably by about 20%, in
general). Is the mix of teachers wrong? (Yes, resulting in another 20% too
much being paid for faculty in total.)
Mike disagrees with the former, and doesn't really address the latter. I
think the evidence is over-whelming that there are too many teachers packed
at the top of Moscow's grid: that's because the whole grid is so lucrative
that no one, especially those of below average ability who couldn't get
similar paying work elsewhere, has any incentive to leave. NINETY-SEVEN of
present teachers were there in 1993-4. Very low turnover is a sure sign of
a) too high pay, b) too steep a salary gradient, and c) stagnation--not enuf
new blood.
The alternative is what goes on at most universities, and I can see no
reason why the same general plan couldn't work in lower education. Let me
see if I can find the section in my book that deals with this.
I found it:
"4. Addendum on the Market for University Professors.
It is useful to briefly contrast the market for public school
teachers and that of university faculty. By university or college faculty, I
mean those who teach at four-year higher education institutions, as opposed
to community colleges. (The latter, also highly unionized like the public
schools, have much more in common with high schools, and I have no personal
experience with what goes on there.)
The market for university faculty has several structural features
that differentiate it from the market for public school teachers.
First, there is much more competition at the retail level of higher
education. Every college student leaving secondary school has a wide choice
of higher education institutions, and most apply to several. Compulsory
attendance at a monopoly local school is a concept completely foreign to
higher education. The result is that colleges and universities are under
much more pressure to attract and keep students.
Second, private colleges are much more abundant, and even the public
schools in the same state compete with one another for both students and
faculty. This is not to say that the general higher education market has not
been affected by the presence of public colleges, which are heavily
subsidized, but I merely note that students exercise much more choice than
they do in the public school system, and all colleges must be sensitive to
that.
Third, unions and collective bargaining are much less important in
higher education, except for the community colleges, and they are
constrained by much more competition in the retail market for students.
While both the AFT and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) have chapters on many, if not most, college campuses, many have
little economic bargaining power and primarily serve as vocal, but impotent,
outlets for dissidents. Unions represent about 28% of faculty in public four
year colleges, but only 8-9% at four-year private colleges. (NCES. 2001b,
Table 2.3) Due to greater competition in the retail student market,
unionization seems to have little or no effect on university faculty
salaries there. (Ashrat. 2000, Barbezat. 1989, Kessering. 1991, and Rees.
1993.) The largest estimate of union impacts were 7 to 14%, but that was for
community colleges where unionization is much higher than in the four-year
institutions. (Monks. 2000)
Finally, detailed mandates from state legislatures and state departments of
education that directly affect university faculty are rare for public higher
education and non-existent for private schools. These features alone assure
that the market for university faculty is much more market driven.
But most important, in the market for college faculty, hiring, retention,
pay, and evaluation are concentrated at the department level where
conditions in different subject matter fields are taken into account. In
smaller colleges, there are fewer departments and different fields may be
housed together for administrative purposes. This sometimes becomes is a
problem when market conditions vary among fields in the same administrative
unit. When a new professor is to be hired, the department head gathers
information about the national market to see what kind of compensation and
job description is going to have to be offered to hire a new professor. This
information will be passed on to his Dean or Provost who gives the final
approval and allocates the funds to fill the position. Market conditions
vary widely from field to field--liberal arts faculty are typically in
plentiful supply, science, engineering and business professors much less so-
and the salary allocated for new faculty varies accordingly. Incoming new
PhDs in, say, history are paid much less than in engineering, science,
computer science, business, etc. A recent survey of state universities
showed business full professors paid an average of 39.3 percent more than
comparable English professors. At the new assistant professor level, the
differential was 82.3 percent. (Ehrenberg. 2002, Table 8.2) At the
University of Idaho, faculty in engineering and business are paid 42.5
percent more than their counterparts in education and the non-science fields
in liberal arts. This is a very important feature of the university faculty
market that distinguishes it from the public school teachers' market. There
is an automatic meeting of the market in a particular field that does not
exist at the public school level. Salaries adjust, albeit slowly, to
differences in supply and demand among the various fields, in contrast to
what happens in the public schools with the universal salary grid which
creates a permanent shortage of math and science teachers.
Salary raises are also primarily determined at the department level,
and of necessity are also attuned to external market conditions. Most
professors have the option of going elsewhere if their pay and other job
dimensions get too far out of line with the external market. How raise money
is divided up among colleges and departments is attuned to the differing
market conditions in each. Sometimes there are across-the-board and merit
components, with only the latter discretionary to the department head. The
AAUP and AFT almost always argue for across-the-board pay raises as much as
possible, and if they had their way they would impose a salary grid similar
to that in the public schools. These groups are usually dominated by liberal
arts faculty, as opposed to engineering, business, and science faculty, and
they adamantly oppose using market criteria for pay determination because
that usually leaves them, personally, on the short end of the allocations.
But on most campuses, these groups are very weak and are primarily debating
societies hung up on academic freedom and tenure. (By the way, the existence
of tenure undoubtedly lowers the supply price of faculty, which is
undoubtedly translated into lower faculty compensation. )
Tenure in higher education is normally not granted to a beginning
professor until after a seven year probationary period. Newly hired senior
faculty may be granted tenure immediately because they have proven
themselves in their previous positions. Not all faculty are in tenure-track
positions, and relative to the public schools a much larger percentage of
teaching is done by faculty in these non-tenured positions. Teaching
assistants, lecturers, adjuncts, and instructors are normally non-tenured
positions. In addition, if a department is in danger of becoming top-heavy
in the senior ranks, junior faculty are not tenured simply for this reason
and not because of inadequate performance. Some universities have rules, by
department, that limit the number of faculty in tenured positions, and these
are designed to keep a flow of fresh faculty flowing from the graduate
schools to the lower ranks and prevent the faculty from becoming top-heavy
with expensive senior faculty. The possibility that 80-90% of faculty would
be tenured, as it often is in public schools, is simply unheard of in higher
education. Finally, absent a salary grid with automatic pay raises, tenure
is much less of a sinecure than in the public schools. Tenured faculty who
go to sleep, or become unproductive, over time usually find themselves paid
much less than there counterparts with the same education and longevity.
These faculty also often find themselves with higher teaching,
administrative, and committee work loads than their more productive
counterparts. In the public schools, early tenure combined with the salary
grid often ensures a permanently mediocre faculty.
This does not mean that decentralized hiring and pay determination
always work out well. Presidents and/or Provosts sometimes do not use market
criteria in allocating either hiring or raise monies. This results,
temporarily, in more pay equality among differing departments and colleges,
with some being paid too little and others paid too much relative to market
conditions. If such a condition persists, it inevitably results in a
shortage, or quality deterioration, in the engineering, science and business
faculty. But given the mobility of professors, pay discrepancies relative to
the market are usually straightened out pretty fast, or else quality
suffers, as it has with math and science teachers in public schools where
market adjustments are thwarted by the salary grid. In contrast with what
you hear from the public school education establishment, I have never heard
anyone argue for higher salaries generally at a university because there was
a "shortage" in the engineering college.
As we have seen, public school pay scales are above-market, and
there is a general surplus in the lower education teachers' market. In this
market, private schools respond by picking the better teachers and are able
to get them by paying less. They are able to undercut the salary umbrella
held up by public school pay scales. They hire better teachers because they
are under pressure to compete for students by giving parents what they want,
and they offer non-economic benefits to do so. Public schools, having
geographical monopolies, are not under anywhere near the same pressure to
compete for students, so they have no incentive to hire teachers with the
credentials that produce better students. The result is that private schools
in lower education hire better teachers at about 60-65% of the total pay of
public school teachers--half of the differential because they pay individual
teachers less, and the other half because they employ a more economical mix
of teachers.
In higher education, the structure of both the faculty and student
markets is much more competitive. Both faculty and students have, and
exercise, more choice. Alternatives are cheaper. In this market, both public
and private colleges have to structure their product to attract students,
although the importance of this is less for the public colleges as they
typically are subsidized by public funds. Given the difficulty in competing
with the public colleges on the basis of tuition alone, private colleges
differentiate their product from that of the public colleges in order to
attract students, research monies, and alumni support. The product, of
course, is very complex. It is not only the quality of education offered,
but also has the dimensions of research, prestige, identity, selectiveness
and character of the student body, satisfaction of alumni, and so on.
Private colleges are thus under pressure to select faculty that further the
production of the complex product that they must offer to compete both with
each other and with the public colleges. Further, private colleges must
select the kind of faculty they want in a much more competitive market than
private schools in lower education. In a tighter market, private colleges
must, on average, pay more for their faculty than the public colleges, and
the evidence bears this out. In the college categories dominated by
so-called prestigious, selective, private colleges--high end, comprehensive,
graduate schools, and the smaller private liberal arts colleges (categories
I and IIB under the AAUP classification system)--private non-sectarian
colleges pay their faculties 25% and 15% more than their public counterparts
respectively. In the less prestigious, comprehensive colleges (AAUP category
IIA), private schools pay only 6% more. Competition has also forced benefits
to be roughly equal at public and private colleges (26.8 and 25.8% of
salary, respectively). (AAUP. 2002, Table 4) While some of these differences
may be due to a differing mix of faculty across fields, some results from
the fact that in lower education there is a perennial surplus in the faculty
market, and in higher education the faculty market is much more competitive.
In the former, the private schools can pay less for the faculty they want,
in the latter the private colleges pay more.
It is worth noting that community colleges, which are much more
unionized (50-57%) than the four year colleges and universities, are the
only places in higher education where public faculty salaries exceed those
of private colleges, albeit by a modest amount--about 5%. (AAUP. 2002, Table
4) This difference is probably under-stated because the public community
colleges concentrate more on remedial and vocational work which may require
lower paying faculty. Also, public sector benefits are also universally
higher. Clearly the union effect, and the fact that public community
colleges operate much more like the public schools, have a substantial
influence on pay there.
Thus, the market for university faculty is competitive, and flexible,
largely due to high mobility by professors at the margin and the general
lack of any university-wide setting of salaries. The result is that
university faculty pay is much more closely attuned to the market than it is
in the public schools. It isn't perfect, but it's much better. The reason
why public school teachers' pay is more out of tune with the market is (a)
the existence of the salary grid, (b) union power and collective bargaining,
(c) much less competition among schools at the retail level, and (d) public
school funding is 100% tax money and therefore much more amenable to top
down politics and mandates. The Colleges and Universities are certainly not
perfect, and have some of these problems too, but they are more market
oriented than the public schools. Foreign students flock to the US for a
higher education, rather than staying abroad where private colleges and
universities are fewer and the public ones are often managed, and
politicized, like our public schools."
Jack
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<DIV><!-- Converted from text/plain format --><FONT face=3DArial><FONT=20
color=3D#800000><FONT size=3D2>Mike Curley wrote an <U>excellent</U>, =
well thought=20
out post to Vision2020 -- which I <SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003>forwarded on to Jack Wenders (who wrote =
the Letter=20
to the Editor on Thrs).</SPAN> <SPAN =
class=3D794582200-02082003>Posts such as=20
Mike's are enjoyable to get!</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial><FONT color=3D#800000><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003>I will respond to Mike, b</SPAN>ut first I =
wanted to=20
forward <SPAN class=3D794582200-02082003>the </SPAN>off-list =
response=20
from Prof. Jack Wenders<SPAN class=3D794582200-02082003>.=20
</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial><FONT color=3D#800000><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003></SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial><FONT color=3D#800000><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003>This Email is a </SPAN>response to =
Mike<SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003>'s posting on Vision2020 (<A=20
href=3D"http://lists2.fsr.net/pipermail/vision2020/2003-August/003715.htm=
l">http://lists2.fsr.net/pipermail/vision2020/2003-August/003715.html</A>=
).=20
</SPAN></FONT></FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 size=3D2></FONT> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 =
size=3D2>Best,<BR>Dale</FONT><BR>
<HR>
</DIV>
<DIV> <SPAN =
class=3D794582200-02082003>Dale,</SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D794582200-02082003></SPAN><SPAN=20
class=3D794582200-02082003></SPAN> </DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D794582200-02082003> </SPAN>I agree =
that this=20
is a very thoughtful response. </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV> While Mike says that he's not one of those who =
thinks=20
the teachers are overpaid/underworked (the same thing), he presents no =
evidence=20
on this point. As you know, I prefer to look at comparable pay in =
comparable=20
public/private schools like Mike Podgursky does, rather than to =
annualize, like=20
you do. But whatever one does on this point, the answer comes out about =
the=20
same: generally, public school teachers are paid above-market wages, as=20
indicated by the general, perennial, surplus and very low turnover. What =
teachers "deserve" and what is "fair" are moral points best left =
to the=20
moral philosophers. The real issue is what must be paid to get the kind =
and=20
quality one wants, and that's a market, not a moral, consideration. =
Perhaps we=20
could end this discussion by saying that all teachers "deserve" to be =
paid=20
$200,000/ year. With that settled, we can then get down to the =
nitty-gritty=20
detail of seeing what the market is for actual teachers. (On a larger =
issue, I=20
simply don't understand why some people, and I'm not accusing Mike of =
this,=20
insist on equating moral worth with pay, and vice versa. Larry Flynt =
makes=20
millions per year, and is a moral cripple. And some who do, in my view, =
very=20
tough, demanding, and beneficial work seem to often be paid little. =
That,=20
unfortunately, is how things work out in the market and one should not =
get=20
involved in drawing any cosmic, moral, conclusions.) </DIV>
<DIV><X-TAB></DIV>
<DIV> </X-TAB>Maybe "merit pay" is not a good word to =
use=20
either, because of its moral connotation. I happen to think that =
teachers of=20
math, some science, and good English teachers need to be paid more =
because you=20
are going to have to do that to keep them from going to employment =
outside of=20
teaching because these skills are more valuable there. Merit, in the =
narrow=20
sense, has nothing to do with it. [Accountant Profs at UI (and =
everywhere)=20
usually get paid more than economic profs, not because they are more=20
meritorious, but because that's the way the market is, and if you didn't =
pay=20
them more you would have no accounting department.]</DIV>
<DIV><X-TAB></DIV>
<DIV> </X-TAB>Note that the over/underpay issue has =
two=20
separate dimensions: are individuals paid above market wages? (Yes, =
probably by=20
about 20%, in general). Is the mix of teachers wrong? (Yes, resulting in =
another=20
20% too much being paid for faculty<U> in total</U>.)</DIV>
<DIV><X-TAB></DIV>
<DIV> </X-TAB>Mike disagrees with the former, and =
doesn't=20
really address the latter. I think the evidence is over-whelming that =
there are=20
too many teachers packed at the top of Moscow's grid: that's because the =
whole=20
grid is so lucrative that no one, especially those of below average =
ability who=20
couldn't get similar paying work elsewhere, has any incentive to leave.=20
NINETY-SEVEN of present teachers were there in 1993-4. Very low turnover =
is a=20
sure sign of a) too high pay, b) too steep a salary gradient, and c)=20
stagnation--not enuf new blood.</DIV>
<DIV><X-TAB></DIV>
<DIV> </X-TAB>The alternative is what goes on at most=20
universities, and I can see no reason why the same general plan couldn't =
work in=20
lower education. Let me see if I can find the section in my book that =
deals with=20
this.</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial color=3D#800000=20
size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV>I found it:</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 size=3D2></FONT><FONT =
face=3DArial color=3D#800000=20
size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV>"<FONT color=3D#000000><U>4. Addendum on the Market for University=20
Professors.</U></FONT><BR><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT =
color=3D#000000><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>It is useful to briefly contrast the market for public school =
teachers=20
and that of university faculty. By university or college faculty, I mean =
those=20
who teach at four-year higher education institutions, as opposed to =
community=20
colleges. (The latter, also highly unionized like the public schools, =
have much=20
more in common with high schools, and I have no personal experience with =
what=20
goes on there.)</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT =
color=3D#000000><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>The market for university faculty has several structural =
features that=20
differentiate it from the market for public school=20
teachers.<BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>First, there is =
much more=20
competition at the retail level of higher education. Every college =
student=20
leaving secondary school has a wide choice of higher education =
institutions, and=20
most apply to several. Compulsory attendance at a monopoly local school =
is a=20
concept completely foreign to higher education. The result is that =
colleges and=20
universities are under much more pressure to attract and keep=20
students.<BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>Second, =
private=20
colleges are much more abundant, and even the public schools in the same =
state=20
compete with one another for both students and faculty. This is not to =
say that=20
the general higher education market has not been affected by the =
presence of=20
public colleges, which are heavily subsidized, but I merely note that =
students=20
exercise much more choice than they do in the public school system, and =
all=20
colleges must be sensitive to =
that.<BR><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>Third, unions and collective bargaining are much less important =
in=20
higher education, except for the community colleges, and they are =
constrained by=20
much more competition in the retail market for students. While both the =
AFT and=20
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) have chapters =
on many,=20
if not most, college campuses, many have little economic bargaining =
power and=20
primarily serve as vocal, but impotent, outlets for dissidents. Unions =
represent=20
about 28% of faculty in public four year colleges, but only 8-9% at =
four-year=20
private colleges. (NCES. 2001b, Table 2.3) Due to greater competition in =
the=20
retail student market, unionization seems to have little or no effect on =
university faculty salaries there. (Ashrat. 2000, Barbezat. 1989, =
Kessering.=20
1991, and Rees. 1993.) The largest estimate of union impacts were 7 to =
14%, but=20
that was for community colleges where unionization is much higher than =
in the=20
four-year institutions. (Monks. 2000)<BR><X-TAB></X-TAB>Finally, =
detailed=20
mandates from state legislatures and state departments of education that =
directly affect university faculty are rare for public higher education =
and=20
non-existent for private schools. These features alone assure that the =
market=20
for university faculty is much more market driven.<BR><X-TAB></X-TAB>But =
most=20
important, in the market for college faculty, hiring, retention, pay, =
and=20
evaluation are concentrated at the department level where conditions in=20
different subject matter fields are taken into account. In smaller =
colleges,=20
there are fewer departments and different fields may be housed together =
for=20
administrative purposes. This sometimes becomes is a problem when market =
conditions vary among fields in the same administrative unit. When a new =
professor is to be hired, the department head gathers information about =
the=20
national market to see what kind of compensation and job description is =
going to=20
have to be offered to hire a new professor. This information will be =
passed on=20
to his Dean or Provost who gives the final approval and allocates the =
funds to=20
fill the position. Market conditions vary widely from field to =
field--liberal=20
arts faculty are typically in plentiful supply, science, engineering and =
business professors much less so- and the salary allocated for new =
faculty=20
varies accordingly. Incoming new PhDs in, say, history are paid much =
less than=20
in engineering, science, computer science, business, etc. A recent =
survey of=20
state universities showed business full professors paid an average of =
39.3=20
percent more than comparable English professors. At the new assistant =
professor=20
level, the differential was 82.3 percent. (Ehrenberg. 2002, Table 8.2) =
At the=20
University of Idaho, faculty in engineering and business are paid 42.5 =
percent=20
more than their counterparts in education and the non-science fields in =
liberal=20
arts. This is a very important feature of the university faculty market =
that=20
distinguishes it from the public school teachers' market. There is an =
automatic=20
meeting of the market in a particular field that does not exist at the =
public=20
school level. Salaries adjust, albeit slowly, to differences in =
supply and=20
demand among the various fields, in contrast to what happens in the =
public=20
schools with the universal salary grid which creates a permanent =
shortage of=20
math and science teachers.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT =
color=3D#000000><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>Salary raises are also primarily determined at the department =
level, and=20
of necessity are also attuned to external market conditions. Most =
professors=20
have the option of going elsewhere if their pay and other job dimensions =
get too=20
far out of line with the external market. How raise money is divided up =
among=20
colleges and departments is attuned to the differing market conditions =
in each.=20
Sometimes there are across-the-board and merit components, with only the =
latter=20
discretionary to the department head. The AAUP and AFT almost always =
argue for=20
across-the-board pay raises as much as possible, and if they had their =
way they=20
would impose a salary grid similar to that in the public schools. These =
groups=20
are usually dominated by liberal arts faculty, as opposed to =
engineering,=20
business, and science faculty, and they adamantly oppose using market =
criteria=20
for pay determination because that usually leaves them, personally, on =
the short=20
end of the allocations. But on most campuses, these groups are very weak =
and are=20
primarily debating societies hung up on academic freedom and tenure. (By =
the=20
way, the existence of tenure undoubtedly lowers the supply price of =
faculty,=20
which is undoubtedly translated into lower faculty compensation.=20
)<BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>Tenure in higher =
education is=20
normally not granted to a beginning professor until after a seven year=20
probationary period. Newly hired senior faculty may be granted tenure=20
immediately because they have proven themselves in their previous =
positions. Not=20
all faculty are in tenure-track positions, and relative to the public =
schools a=20
much larger percentage of teaching is done by faculty in these =
non-tenured=20
positions. Teaching assistants, lecturers, adjuncts, and instructors are =
normally non-tenured positions. In addition, if a department is in =
danger of=20
becoming top-heavy in the senior ranks, junior faculty are not tenured =
simply=20
for this reason and not because of inadequate performance. Some =
universities=20
have rules, by department, that limit the number of faculty in tenured=20
positions, and these are designed to keep a flow of fresh faculty =
flowing from=20
the graduate schools to the lower ranks and prevent the faculty from =
becoming=20
top-heavy with expensive senior faculty. The possibility that 80-90% of =
faculty=20
would be tenured, as it often is in public schools, is simply unheard of =
in=20
higher education. Finally, absent a salary grid with automatic pay =
raises,=20
tenure is much less of a sinecure than in the public schools. Tenured =
faculty=20
who go to sleep, or become unproductive, over time usually find =
themselves paid=20
much less than there counterparts with the same education and longevity. =
These=20
faculty also often find themselves with higher teaching, administrative, =
and=20
committee work loads than their more productive counterparts. In the =
public=20
schools, early tenure combined with the salary grid often ensures a =
permanently=20
mediocre faculty.<BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>This =
does not=20
mean that decentralized hiring and pay determination always work out =
well.=20
Presidents and/or Provosts sometimes do not use market criteria in =
allocating=20
either hiring or raise monies. This results, temporarily, in more pay =
equality=20
among differing departments and colleges, with some being paid too =
little and=20
others paid too much relative to market conditions. If such a condition=20
persists, it inevitably results in a shortage, or quality deterioration, =
in the=20
engineering, science and business faculty. But given the mobility of =
professors,=20
pay discrepancies relative to the market are usually straightened out =
pretty=20
fast, or else quality suffers, as it has with math and science teachers =
in=20
public schools where market adjustments are thwarted by the salary grid. =
In=20
contrast with what you hear from the public school education =
establishment, I=20
have never heard anyone argue for higher salaries generally at a =
university=20
because there was a "shortage" in the engineering college.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT =
color=3D#000000><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>As we have seen, public school pay scales are above-market, and =
there is=20
a general surplus in the lower education teachers' market. In this =
market,=20
private schools respond by picking the better teachers and are able to =
get them=20
by paying less. They are able to undercut the salary umbrella held up by =
public=20
school pay scales. They hire better teachers because they are under =
pressure to=20
compete for students by giving parents what they want, and they offer=20
non-economic benefits to do so. Public schools, having =
geographical=20
monopolies, are not under anywhere near the same pressure to compete for =
students, so they have no incentive to hire teachers with the =
credentials that=20
produce better students. The result is that private schools in lower =
education=20
hire better teachers at about 60-65% of the total pay of public school=20
teachers--half of the differential because they pay individual teachers =
less,=20
and the other half because they employ a more economical mix of=20
teachers.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT =
color=3D#000000><X-TAB> =20
</X-TAB>In higher education, the structure of both the faculty and =
student=20
markets is much more competitive. Both faculty and students have, and =
exercise,=20
more choice. Alternatives are cheaper. In this market, both public and =
private=20
colleges have to structure their product to attract students, although =
the=20
importance of this is less for the public colleges as they typically are =
subsidized by public funds. Given the difficulty in competing with the =
public=20
colleges on the basis of tuition alone, private colleges differentiate =
their=20
product from that of the public colleges in order to attract students, =
research=20
monies, and alumni support. The product, of course, is very complex. It =
is not=20
only the quality of education offered, but also has the dimensions of =
research,=20
prestige, identity, selectiveness and character of the student body,=20
satisfaction of alumni, and so on.<BR><X-TAB></X-TAB>Private colleges =
are thus=20
under pressure to select faculty that further the production of the =
complex=20
product that they must offer to compete both with each other and with =
the public=20
colleges. Further, private colleges must select the kind of faculty they =
want in=20
a much more competitive market than private schools in lower education. =
In a=20
tighter market, private colleges must, on average, pay<U> more</U> for =
their=20
faculty than the public colleges, and the evidence bears this out. In =
the=20
college categories dominated by so-called prestigious, selective, =
private=20
colleges--high end, comprehensive, graduate schools, and the smaller =
private=20
liberal arts colleges (categories I and IIB under the AAUP =
classification=20
system)--private non-sectarian colleges pay their faculties 25% and 15% =
more=20
than their public counterparts respectively. In the less prestigious,=20
comprehensive colleges (AAUP category IIA), private schools pay only 6% =
more.=20
Competition has also forced benefits to be roughly equal at public and =
private=20
colleges (26.8 and 25.8% of salary, respectively). (AAUP. 2002, Table 4) =
While=20
some of these differences may be due to a differing mix of faculty =
across=20
fields, some results from the fact that in lower education there is a =
perennial=20
surplus in the faculty market, and in higher education the faculty =
market is=20
much more competitive. In the former, the private schools can pay =
less for=20
the faculty they want, in the latter the private colleges pay=20
more.<BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>It is worth noting that =
community colleges, which are much more unionized (50-57%) than the four =
year=20
colleges and universities, are the only places in higher education where =
public=20
faculty salaries exceed those of private colleges, albeit by a modest=20
amount--about 5%. (AAUP. 2002, Table 4) This difference is probably =
under-stated=20
because the public community colleges concentrate more on remedial and=20
vocational work which may require lower paying faculty. Also, public =
sector=20
benefits are also universally higher. Clearly the union effect, and the =
fact=20
that public community colleges operate much more like the public =
schools, have a=20
substantial influence on pay=20
there. <BR><X-TAB> </X-TAB>Thus, the =
market=20
for university faculty is competitive, and flexible, largely due to high =
mobility by professors at the margin and the general lack of any =
university-wide=20
setting of salaries. The result is that university faculty pay is much =
more=20
closely attuned to the market than it is in the public schools. It isn't =
perfect, but it's much better. The reason why public school teachers' =
pay is=20
more out of tune with the market is (a) the existence of the salary =
grid, (b)=20
union power and collective bargaining, (c) much less competition among =
schools=20
at the retail level, and (d) public school funding is 100% tax money and =
therefore much more amenable to top down politics and mandates. The =
Colleges and=20
Universities are certainly not perfect, and have some of these problems =
too, but=20
they are more market oriented than the public schools. Foreign students =
flock to=20
the US for a higher education, rather than staying abroad where private =
colleges=20
and universities are fewer and the public ones are often managed, and=20
politicized, like our public schools.</FONT>"</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#800000 size=3D2></FONT><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Jack</DIV><FONT size=3D2></FONT></BODY></HTML>
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