[Vision2020] Bush Adviser's Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leader

[Tom Hansen]

>From today's (November 29, 2006) New York Times -

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Bush Adviser's Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leader 
By MICHAEL R. GORDON

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 - A classified memorandum by President Bush's national
security adviser expressed serious doubts about whether Prime Minister Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki had the capacity to control the sectarian violence in Iraq
and recommended that the United States take new steps to strengthen the
Iraqi leader's position.

The Nov. 8 memo was prepared for Mr. Bush and his top deputies by Stephen J.
Hadley, the national security adviser, and senior aides on the staff of the
National Security Council after a trip by Mr. Hadley to Baghdad. 

The memo suggests that if Mr. Maliki fails to carry out a series of
specified steps, it may ultimately be necessary to press him to reconfigure
his parliamentary bloc, a step the United States could support by providing
"monetary support to moderate groups," and by sending thousands of
additional American troops to Baghdad to make up for what the document
suggests is a current shortage of Iraqi forces.

The memo presents an unvarnished portrait of Mr. Maliki and notes that he
relies for some of his political support on leaders of more extreme Shiite
groups. The five-page document, classified secret, is based in part on a
one-on-one meeting between Mr. Hadley and Mr. Maliki on Oct. 30. 

"His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive
reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force
positive change," the memo said of the Iraqi leader. "But the reality on the
streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on,
misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet
sufficient to turn his good intentions into action."

An administration official made a copy of the document available to a New
York Times reporter seeking information on the administration's policy
review. The Times read and transcribed the memo. 

The White House has sought to avoid public criticism of Mr. Maliki, who is
scheduled to meet with Mr. Bush in Jordan on Wednesday. The latest surge of
sectarian violence in Baghdad and the Democratic victories in the midterm
elections are prompting calls for sharp changes in American policy. Such
changes are among options being debated by the Iraq Study Group, the
bipartisan panel led by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton. 

Aides to President Bush, who was attending a NATO summit today in Riga,
Latvia, scrambled to put the best face on the memo. 

"The president has confidence in Prime Minister Maliki," the White House
press secretary, Tony Snow, told reporters, adding that the administration
"is working with the prime minister to improve his capabilities in terms of
dealing with the fundamental challenges in Iraq."

Two senior administration officials, who insisted on anonymity in exchange
for talking about a classified memo, said it was unclear whether Mr. Maliki
has seen the memo, but suggested its contents would be no surprise to the
Iraqi prime minister, who has been in regular consultation with Mr. Bush. 

One official said a "key aspect" of the upcoming meetings in Jordan would be
for the two leaders to determine "where we can accelerate and expand Prime
Minister Maliki's capacity" to deal with the issues outlined in the memo.
"That will be a dominant subject," the official said.

Even so, the memo will undoubtedly color the meeting between the two leaders
when they see one another in Jordan Wednesday night. Despite the memo's
suggestion that the prime minister may be ignorant of what is going on, or
misrepresenting his intentions, the officials insisted the president has
concluded Mr. Maliki's intentions are good. "The judgment is that it's a
capability issue," one official said.

Earlier, a senior administration official had discussed the memorandum in
general terms after being told The New York Times was preparing an article
on the subject. The official described the document as "essentially a trip
report" and not a result of the administration's review of its Iraq policy,
which is still under way. 

He said the purpose of the memo "was to provide a snapshot of the challenges
facing Prime Minister Maliki and how we can best enhance his capabilities,
mindful of the complex political and security environment in which he is
operating."

The American delegation that went to Iraq with Mr. Hadley included Meghan L.
O'Sullivan, the deputy national security adviser, and three other members of
the National Security Council staff. The memo, prepared after that trip, has
been circulated to cabinet-level officials who are participating in the
administration's review of Iraq strategy.

There is nothing in the memo that suggests the Bush administration is
interested in replacing Mr. Maliki as prime minister. But while Mr. Bush has
stated that he has confidence in the Iraqi leader, the memo questions
whether Mr. Maliki has the will and ability to establish a genuine unity
government, saying the answer will emerge from actions he takes in the weeks
and months ahead. 

"We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister
Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being
promoted by others," the memo says. "Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share
the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia
hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions
are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq."

In describing the Oct. 30 meeting between Mr. Hadley and Mr. Maliki, it
says: "Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni and Kurdish partnership,
and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who
wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so." It
said the Iraqi leader's assurances seemed to have been contradicted by
developments on the ground, including the Iraqi government's approach to the
Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia known in Arabic as Jaish al-Mahdi and headed by
Moktada al-Sadr.

"Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the
prime minister's office to stop military action against Shia targets and to
encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq's most effective
commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all
ministries - when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM)
killings - all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad."

Among the concerns voiced in the memo was that Mr. Maliki was surrounded by
a small group of advisers from the Shiite Dawa Party, a narrow circle that
American officials worry may skew the information he receives.

The memo outlines a number of short-term steps Mr. Maliki could undertake to
establish control. The Iraqi leader has recently indicated his intention to
take some of those steps, like announcing his intention to expand the size
of the Iraqi Army and declaring that Iraq will seek an extension of the
United Nations mandate that provides for the deployment of the American-led
multinational force in Iraq. The United Nations Security Council voted on
Tuesday to extend that mandate.

The memo also lists steps the United States can take to strengthen Mr.
Maliki's position. They include efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to use its
influence with the Sunnis in Iraq and encourage them to turn away from the
insurgency and to seek a political accommodation.

Addressing Mr. Bush, the memo said one option was for the president to
"direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a
leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which
Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action." Although the memo did not offer
specifics, this appeared to be an allusion to a more active American role in
the Arab-Israeli peace process. Recently, Israel's prime minister, Ehud
Olmert, has reached out to the Palestinians and has said he wants to move
ahead with peace talks. But the memo's authors also contemplate the
possibility that Mr. Maliki's position may be too tenuous for him to take
the steps needed to curb the power of Shiite militias, to establish a more
diverse and representative personal staff and to arrest the escalating
sectarian strife.

In that case, the memo suggests, it may ultimately be necessary for Mr.
Maliki to recast his parliamentary bloc, a step the United States could
support by pressing moderates to align themselves with the Iraqi leader and
providing them with monetary support.

The memo refers to "the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad," a seeming
acknowledgment that there is a substantial shortfall of troops in the Iraqi
capital compared with the level needed to provide security there, in part
because the Iraqi government has not dispatched all the forces it has
promised. An American brigade generally numbers about 3,500 troops, though
Iraqi units can be smaller. While Democrats have advocated beginning troop
withdrawals as a means of putting pressure on Mr. Maliki, the memo suggests
that such tactics may backfire by stirring up opposition against a
politically vulnerable leader.

"Pushing Maliki to take these steps without augmenting his capabilities
could force him to failure - if the Parliament removes him from office with
a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi militia (JAM) causes elements
of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture and leads to major Shia
disturbances in southern Iraq," the memo says. 

The memo lists a number of possible steps to build up Mr. Maliki's
capability. They include asking Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior
American commander, to develop a plan to strengthen the Iraqi leader.

This could involve the formation of a new National Strike Force,
significantly increasing the number of American advisers working with the
Iraqi National Police, a force that has been infiltrated by Shiite militias,
and putting more Iraqi forces directly under Mr. Maliki's control.

In addition, the memorandum suggests that Mr. Bush ask the Pentagon and
General Casey "to make a recommendation about whether more forces are needed
in Baghdad."

The administration appears to have already begun carrying out some of the
steps recommended in the document. Among them was a trip over the weekend by
Vice President Dick Cheney to Saudi Arabia as part of an effort to seek help
from Sunni Arab powers in encouraging Sunni groups in Iraq to seek a
political compromise with Mr. Maliki.

The senior administration official who agreed to discuss the memo would do
so only on condition of anonymity. The official said some of the steps
projected in the document were being carried out. 

The official also stressed that the administration retains confidence in the
Iraqi leader. "What we are seeing is that he had the right intentions and is
willing to act," the senior official said. "Our own review has opened a
consultative process on where Maliki wants to take the government. A
successful strategy has to be one that is driven by the Iraqis."

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Seeya round town, Moscow.

Tom Hansen
Moscow, Idaho

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"In America, anybody can become president.  
That's one of the risks you take . . ."

- Adlai Stevenson

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