[Vision2020] A Warrior Places Blame at Top

[Tom Hansen]

>From the April 3, 2006 edition of the Army times -

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A warrior places blame at the top
By Major General John D. Eaton (Retired)

During World War II, American soldiers en route to Britain before D-Day were
given a pamphlet on how to behave while awaiting the invasion. The most
important quote was: "It is impolite to criticize your host; it is
militarily stupid to criticize your allies."

By that rule, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is not competent to lead
America's armed forces.

First, his failure to build coalitions with U.S. allies from what he
dismissively called "old Europe" has imposed far greater demands and risks
on American soldiers in Iraq than necessary. Second, he alienated his allies
in our own military, ignoring the advice of seasoned officers and denying
subordinates any chance for input.

In sum, he has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and
tactically and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has
happened to America's mission in Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld must step down.

In the five years he has presided over the Pentagon, I have seen group-think
become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and
civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership.

I thought we had a glimmer of hope last November when Marine Gen. Peter
Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, faced off with Rumsfeld on the
question of how our soldiers should react if they witnessed illegal
treatment of prisoners by Iraqi authorities. (Pace's view was that our
soldiers should intervene, while Rumsfeld's position was that they should
simply report the incident to superiors.)

Unfortunately, the general subsequently backed down and supported the
secretary's call to have the rules clarified, giving the impression that our
senior man in uniform is just as intimidated by Rumsfeld as was his
predecessor, Air Force Gen. Richard Myers.

Rumsfeld has put the Pentagon at the mercy of his ego, his Cold Warrior's
view of the world and his unrealistic confidence in technology to replace
manpower. As a result, the Army finds itself severely undermanned - cut to
10 active divisions but asked by the administration to support a foreign
policy that requires at least 12 or 14.

Only now-retired Gen. Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff when President
Bush was elected, had the courage to challenge the downsizing plans. So
Rumsfeld retaliated by naming Shinseki's successor more than a year before
his scheduled retirement, effectively undercutting his authority. The rest
of the senior brass got the message, and nobody has complained since.

Now the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review shows that Rumsfeld also
fails to understand the nature of protracted counterinsurgency warfare in
Iraq and the demands it places on ground forces. The document, amazingly,
does not call for enlarging the Army; rather, it increases only special
operations forces by a token 15 percent, maybe 1,500 troops.

Rumsfeld has also failed in terms of operations in Iraq. He rejected the
so-called Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and sent just enough
tech-enhanced troops to complete what we called Phase III of the war -
ground combat against the uniformed Iraqis. He ignored competent advisers
like Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni and others who predicted that the Iraqi
forces might melt away after the state apparatus self-destructed, leading to
chaos.

It is all too clear that Shinseki was right: Several hundred thousand men
would have made a big difference then, as we began Phase IV - country
reconstruction. There was never a question that we would make quick work of
the Iraqi army.

The true professional always looks to the "what's-next" phase.
Unfortunately, the supreme commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, either didn't heed
that rule or succumbed to Secretary Rumsfeld's bullying. We won't know which
until some bright historian writes the true story of Rumsfeld and the
generals he took to war, an Iraq version of the Vietnam War classic
"Dereliction of Duty," by H.R. McMaster.

Last, you don't expect a secretary of defense to be criticized for tactical
ineptness. Normally, tactics are the domain of the soldier on the ground.
But in this case, we all felt what L. Paul Bremer, the former viceroy in
Iraq, has called the "8,000-mile screwdriver" reaching from the Pentagon.

Commanders in the field had their discretionary financing for things like
rebuilding hospitals randomly cut; money to pay Iraqi construction companies
to build barracks was withheld; contracts for purchasing military equipment
for the new Iraqi army were rewritten back in Washington.

Donald Rumsfeld demands more than loyalty. He wants fealty. And he has hired
men who give it. Consider the new secretary of the Army, Francis Harvey,
who, when faced with the compelling need to increase the service's size, has
refused to do so. He is instead relying on the shell game of hiring
civilians to do jobs that had previously been done by soldiers, and thus
keeping the force strength static on paper. This tactic may help for a bit,
but it will likely fall apart in the next budget cycle, with those positions
swiftly eliminated.

So, what to do?

First, President Bush should accept the offer to resign that Rumsfeld says
he has tendered more than once, and hire a man who will listen to and
support the magnificent soldiers on the ground. Perhaps a proven Democrat
like Senator Joseph Lieberman could repair fissures that have arisen both
between parties and between uniformed men and the Pentagon big shots.

More vital in the longer term, Congress must assert itself. Too much power
has shifted to the executive branch, not just in terms of waging war but
also in planning the military of the future. Congress should remember it
still has the power of the purse; it should call our generals, colonels,
captains and sergeants to testify frequently, so that their opinions and
needs are known to the men they lead. Then, when they are asked if they have
enough troops - and no soldier has ever had enough of anything, more is
always better - the reply is public.

Our most important, and sometimes most severe, judges are our subordinates.
That is a fact I discovered early in my military career. It is,
unfortunately, a lesson Rumsfeld seems incapable of learning.

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Comments by Army Times editor:

The writer, who retired from a 33-year Army career Jan. 1, was in charge of
training the Iraqi military from 2003 to 2004, and is a former head of the
Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning, Ga. This column first
appeared in The New York Times.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, contacted by Army Times, declined to
comment on General Eaton's column.

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Seeya round town, Moscow.

Tom Hansen
Moscow, Idaho

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"In America, anybody can become president.  
That's one of the risks you take . . ."

- Adlai Stevenson

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