[Vision2020] Mistakes in Iraq Numerous

[Tom Hansen]

>From today's (March 22, 2006) Spokesman Review with a special thanks to
Trudy Rubin of the Philadelphia Inquirer

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Mistakes in Iraq Numerous
By Trudy Rubin

Three years after we invaded Iraq, President Bush is trying to rally the
U.S. public around a war gone sour.

His pep talks are painful to watch because so many of Iraq's troubles are
the consequence of U.S. actions. They stem from the administration's failure
to produce, or conduct, a coherent strategy for the postwar. Bush officials
are belatedly trying to rectify some of their worst errors, though they
rarely admit they made any. "We have... refined our approach as conditions
changed" is the oblique phrase the White House uses to describe several
180-degree turns in Iraq policy.

I believe the time is right to review the key mistakes that helped land Iraq
where it is today, and to name the officials who made them. After all, if
you don't confront past errors, how can you rectify them - or avoid making
them again?

Let's start with Mistake Number One: an embrace of transformational theory
over obvious reality. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had a theory
about a new lean, mean, swiftly moving military. Generals who warned that
postwar stability would require more troops were dismissed out of hand.
Former deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz had a theory that postwar
Iraq would resemble "post-liberation France." If you believe that Iraq is
like France, and former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi is a latter-day Charles de
Gaulle, you should be writing fantasy novels, not overseeing military
operations.

Wolfowitz is gone, but Rumsfeld remains. Do we know if reality trumps dreams
in today's Department of Defense?

Mistake Number Two: the failure to establish order in Baghdad after taking
the city. When massive looting followed the U.S. entry, Rumsfeld dismissed
it as the untidiness of freedom. Every Iraqi I knew was on the phone asking
me why the Americans didn't institute a curfew.

In several visits to Iraq during the last three years, I've been told by
Iraqi officials that the unchecked looting gave the green light to would-be
insurgents and Arab terrorists by indicating that Americans couldn't control
Baghdad. Much early looting was organized by Baathists to create havoc, in
hopes they would be welcomed back to power. That's still their strategy;
Iraq is still suffering from this mistake.

Mistake Number Three: abolishing the entire Iraqi army without severance or
pensions. I was at the Baghdad news conference where occupation czar Paul
Bremer announced this move and my jaw dropped - tens of thousands of Iraqi
officers with guns who had followed American orders not to fight were
suddenly jobless. Many told me in interviews that they were furious; I'm
sure some joined the insurgents.

I recently asked Bremer why he waited weeks to offer pensions, by which time
many of these officers were beyond reconciliation. He said the Pentagon
first had to check how many officers would be collecting benefits. Can
bureaucratic pettiness be responsible for giving the insurgency such a leg
up? Bremer made his move with full concurrence of the Pentagon civilian
leadership.

Mistake Number Four: a misconceived plan for training Iraqi security forces.
U.S. officials focused on police training for the first year because, as
they told me, the police are the first line of defense in a "normal"
country. But Iraq was hardly normal; it needed an army to fight the
insurgency. Yet we didn't start serious training of an Iraqi army until June
2004.

Mistake Number Five: no Sunni strategy. Back in fall 2003, many Sunni tribal
leaders were waiting to be wooed by U.S. officials. But there was no
coherent Pentagon strategy to win hearts and minds (Rumsfeld was seriously
uninterested in nation-building). Sunni leaders in restive Anbar province
were often alienated by raids on their homes, dismissive treatment, and
arrests of women. U.S. officials are now trying to persuade these same Sunni
leaders to turn against the insurgents - but now it is a far more difficult
sell.

Mistake Number Six: a strange belief that once Saddam fell, Iraq would morph
into a democracy. Wolfowitz confused Iraq with France; other U.S. officials
made a comparison with Eastern Europe. None recognized that Sunnis, Shiites
and Kurds would vote almost exclusively for their own religious and ethnic
parties and have great difficulty sharing power. And Iraqi security forces
were bound to split along the same lines as the people of Iraq.

Mistake Number Seven: a failure to understand that Iran would be a key power
broker in Iraq, because a majority of Iraqis belonged to the same Shiite
sect of Islam as Iranians, and needed Tehran as an ally against the Sunnis.
The President couldn't call for Iran regime change and not expect Tehran to
make trouble for America in Iraq.

In recent months, the administration has had to confront its mistakes: It is
trying to pull together Iraqi politicians, retrain the Iraqi army, woo the
Sunnis, and even talk to Tehran. Let's hope these policy revisions succeed,
because otherwise we and the Iraqis will pay big-time.

But the Bush team's mistakes haunt U.S. efforts. And the odds of success are
far slimmer than they might have been three years ago.

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Seeya round town, Moscow.

Tom Hansen
Moscow, Idaho

"If I wanted to overhear every tedious scrap of brain static rattling around
in your head, I'd read your blog."

- Bill Maher