[Vision2020] More On Plantinga

[Michael]

Joe,

 

Ok, here we go!

 

I.

JC: It is more than this. The internalist says that reasons are essential to

genuine knowledge. The externalist says otherwise. This is a fundamental

disagreement. Knowledge without reason strikes me as a contradiction. .

The worry by internalists like myself is that Plantinga is satisfied with 

'dumb luck,' getting it right without knowing 'why,' winning the lottery, 

so to speak.  Why think that such dumb luck counts as genuine knowledge?

 

MM: But I think this misses my point in quoting BonJour.  BonJour says in
essence, "you externalists can have the word 'knowledge.'  In fact, you can
even have 'justification.'  I don't care about all of those 'vexed' issues.
What I care about is old fashioned 'critical epistemology;' I want to know
what reasons we have for our beliefs."  And I think this is the more
fundamental paradigm clash: do we really have to have discursive 'reasons'
for all our beliefs?  The skeptic himself is not historically in the
business of 'conceptual analysis,' but rather just enjoys critical
epistemology, concluding that we just don't really have any reasons for any
(or most) of our beliefs.  But this is not all there is for the skeptic;
this alone doesn't mean much.  The skeptic more fundamentally has strong
internalist intuitions: not having good reasons for a belief means the
rejection, at some important level, of that belief.  

 

But why do a thing like that?  In other words, why go with this strong
internalist assumption?  For example, how much importance must you place on
the internalist assumption with respect to your belief in God.  You don't
know why you believe in God; all you know is that it seems there is a God to
you, one whom blesses you with life and existence, one to whom you are
thankful.  But following the skeptic's method, which I think is consistent
with a strong internalist assumption, you would have to (on some level)
withhold this growing belief, along with your thankfulness, and along with
your understanding that the life given to you is a 'blessing.'  But this
goes back to a point I've made before: IF God exists, and if this God
decided he wanted you to believe things about him, wouldn't he have the
power to create and sustain this belief within you?  And if so, would this
God be bound to submit to the internalist's assumption and make sure he
gives you sufficient reasons for believing he exists?  Why would God be
bound to do this?  This seems to be particularly the case with a God who
gives me beliefs in the existence of other minds like mine!  We have a hard
enough time coming up with any good reason at all for thinking other people
have minds like us, and thus, that other people even really exist.  So
having belief in an invisible person without the ability to argumentatively
demonstrate this invisible person exists would seem to be the way the world
works. I can't even give a good argument that my wife exists that will
satisfy the determined internalist.

 

Further, according to Plantinga's externalism or a classical orthodox view,
believing in God isn't dumb luck; in fact, it is precisely the opposite.
Coming up with a belief in God is not the result of my playing an epistemic
lottery game.  Rather, the belief is given to me by God, implanted and
sustained in me just as my belief that there really is an external world was
planting in me when I was four years old.  But the internalist is trying to
reason his/her way to heaven.  The internalist believes in a system of
epistemic works. "If I can't justify my belief according to the resources of
my own internal mind, then I can't win the right to hold my belief. I can't
justify myself"  But the common man, and the Christian, believe in an
epistemology of grace. "I have this wonderful belief; it has been given to
me and I am grateful for it.  What a blessing, thank you. It is God who
justifies me in having this belief; I cannot justify myself." 

 

III.

JC: How can you have a design without a designer? If Plantinga intended

something more inclusive, then he would have used other terminology.

Aristotle never talked about design, though he did talk about 'proper

function.' (See below as well.)

 

MM: The reference to Aristotle is interesting.  But I'm not up on
Aristotle's analysis of proper function. It seems Plantinga would take issue
with Aristotle at this point; he claims that naturalistic analysis usually
deals with the concept of mere 'function.'  The concept of proper function
is absent; Plantinga thinks this is because adding the word 'proper' is
inexplicable without the additional notion of 'design plan.' So then the
question becomes: does one merely assume 'a designer' by proposing the idea
of 'proper function' (and not the additional concept of 'design plan').  I
don't think so; this is because the concept is such an intuitive and natural
concept, one that comes about in one's mind as an independent piece of
conceptual furniture. Before the further analysis, it stands on its own just
fine.  Perhaps the concept of design plan is built into the notion, but that
just makes the 'argument' for the existence of God all the easier to come
by.  This is why Plantinga's approach does not assume theism, but rather
merely talks about notions that appear to imply theism.  But notice the
important difference between these two things.  

 

I think you are correct, however, about reasoning directly from Plantinga's
fully formed definition of knowledge to the existence of a designer.
Perhaps  a literal reference to 'design' does assume a designer.  Perhaps
you are right that anyone who looks at their body and mental function, and
concludes that their body and mind are actually 'designed' somehow, are
implicitly concluding with the existence of a designer.  For me, thinking
I'm designed is pretty natural, but perhaps the committed naturalist is able
to get away from such folk intuitions.  Given the approach I just outlined,
I don't think this mutes Plantinga's argument. We can either stop
Plantinga's definition of knowledge short of 'according to design plan' and
try to figure out its appropriate replacement with the naturalist (good
luck); or we can just cut to the chase, as I believe Plantinga does, and
simply ask the naturalist to make sense out of the very intuitive idea of
the PROPER function of..say, my heart or my eye.  If we want to keep the
idea of proper function and if the naturalist just can't have this idea
without either taking the "intentional stance" or becoming a theist, then we
have something that looks a lot like a good argument for the existence of
God.

 

V.

JC: I am not limiting the concept of 'knowledge' in any way. . I limit my
investigation to the 

problem of skepticism and the concept of propositional 'knowledge.' No

doubt in limiting myself in this way, I concede that I do not and will not

know everything. I can live with that! . I might as wellhave fun while doing
so!

 

MM: Clark (the fellow you cited) makes a good point here however, which I'll
tinker with to fit my own purposes:  what if I can't sufficiently justify
the proposition that my wife has a mind like me.  This seems a bit esoteric,
but it is actually very practical; I actually don't know if I can
sufficiently justify (discursively) the proposition that my wife has a mind
like me!  What does this mean?  Well, the heck with propositional knowledge
in this case if propositional knowledge must entail such sufficient rational
justification. I at least  "know my wife."  Perhaps I don't hold a belief
that I know my wife in this way, but thankfully I don't have to know that I
know my wife to simply know my wife.  I'm glad that I can at least love my
wife and have a relationship with her even if the skeptic ends up being
right.  Considering that the important thing about theism is knowing God and
not knowing a proposition about God, doesn't this other form of personal
knowledge become important?  

 

Whew!  That's all for now.  I'm off to go get a beer that I might not know
is really there. But I hope it is...  : -)

 

Thanks for the enjoyable challenge Joe.  I'd like to know.err.I'd like to
get your thoughts about this.

 

Michael Metzler

 

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