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<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Joe,<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Ok, here we go!<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>I.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>JC: It is more than this. The internalist says that reasons are
essential to<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>genuine knowledge. The externalist says otherwise. This is a
fundamental<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>disagreement. Knowledge without reason strikes me as a contradiction. …<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>The worry by internalists like myself is that Plantinga is satisfied
with <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>'dumb luck,' getting it right without knowing 'why,' winning the
lottery, <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>so to speak. Why think that such dumb luck counts as genuine
knowledge?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>MM: But I think this misses my point in quoting BonJour. BonJour
says in essence, “you externalists can have the word
‘knowledge.’ In fact, you can even have
‘justification.’ I don’t care about all of those
‘vexed’ issues. What I care about is old fashioned
‘critical epistemology;’ I want to know what reasons we have for
our beliefs.” And I think this is the more fundamental paradigm
clash: do we really have to have discursive ‘reasons’ for all our
beliefs? The skeptic himself is not historically in the business of
‘conceptual analysis,’ but rather just enjoys critical
epistemology, concluding that we just don’t really have any reasons for
any (or most) of our beliefs. But this is not all there is for the
skeptic; this alone doesn’t mean much. The skeptic more
fundamentally has strong internalist intuitions: not having good reasons for a
belief means the rejection, at some important level, of that belief. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>But why do a thing like that? In other words, why go with this
strong internalist assumption? For example, how much importance must you
place on the internalist assumption with respect to your belief in God.
You don’t know why you believe in God; all you know is that it seems
there is a God to you, one whom blesses you with life and existence, one to
whom you are thankful. But following the skeptic’s method, which I
think is consistent with a strong internalist assumption, you would have to (on
some level) withhold this growing belief, along with your thankfulness, and
along with your understanding that the life given to you is a
‘blessing.’ But this goes back to a point I’ve made
before: IF God exists, and if this God decided he wanted you to believe things
about him, wouldn’t he have the power to create and sustain this belief
within you? And if so, would this God be bound to submit to the
internalist’s assumption and make sure he gives you sufficient reasons
for believing he exists? Why would God be bound to do this? This
seems to be particularly the case with a God who gives me beliefs in the
existence of other minds like mine! We have a hard enough time coming up
with any good reason at all for thinking other people have minds like us, and
thus, that other people even really exist. So having belief in an
invisible person without the ability to argumentatively demonstrate this
invisible person exists would seem to be the way the world works. I can’t
even give a good argument that my wife exists that will satisfy the determined
internalist.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Further, according to Plantinga’s externalism or a classical
orthodox view, believing in God isn’t dumb luck; in fact, it is precisely
the opposite. Coming up with a belief in God is not the result of my
playing an epistemic lottery game. Rather, the belief is given to me by
God, implanted and sustained in me just as my belief that there really is an external
world was planting in me when I was four years old. But the internalist
is trying to reason his/her way to heaven. The internalist believes in a
system of epistemic works. “If I can’t justify my belief according
to the resources of my own internal mind, then I can’t win the right to
hold my belief. I can’t justify myself” But the common man,
and the Christian, believe in an epistemology of grace. “I have this
wonderful belief; it has been given to me and I am grateful for it. What
a blessing, thank you. It is God who justifies me in having this belief; I
cannot justify myself.” <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>III.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>JC: How can you have a design without a designer? If Plantinga intended<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>something more inclusive, then he would have used other terminology.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Aristotle never talked about design, though he did talk about 'proper<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>function.' (See below as well.)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>MM: The reference to Aristotle is interesting. But I’m not
up on Aristotle’s analysis of proper function. It seems Plantinga would
take issue with Aristotle at this point; he claims that naturalistic analysis
usually deals with the concept of mere ‘function.’ The
concept of proper function is absent; Plantinga thinks this is because adding
the word ‘proper’ is inexplicable without the additional notion of
‘design plan.’ So then the question becomes: does one merely assume
‘a designer’ by proposing the idea of ‘proper function’
(and not the additional concept of ‘design plan’). I
don’t think so; this is because the concept is such an intuitive and
natural concept, one that comes about in one’s mind as an independent
piece of conceptual furniture. Before the further analysis, it stands on its
own just fine. Perhaps the concept of design plan is built into the
notion, but that just makes the ‘argument’ for the existence of God
all the easier to come by. This is why Plantinga’s approach does
not assume theism, but rather merely talks about notions that appear to imply
theism. But notice the important difference between these two
things. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>I think you are correct, however, about reasoning directly from
Plantinga’s fully formed definition of knowledge to the existence of a
designer. Perhaps a literal reference to ‘design’ does
assume a designer. Perhaps you are right that anyone who looks at their
body and mental function, and concludes that their body and mind are actually
‘designed’ somehow, are implicitly concluding with the existence of
a designer. For me, thinking I’m designed is pretty natural, but perhaps
the committed naturalist is able to get away from such folk intuitions. Given
the approach I just outlined, I don’t think this mutes Plantinga’s
argument. We can either stop Plantinga’s definition of knowledge short of
‘according to design plan’ and try to figure out its appropriate
replacement with the naturalist (good luck); or we can just cut to the chase,
as I believe Plantinga does, and simply ask the naturalist to make sense out of
the very intuitive idea of the PROPER function of….say, my heart or my
eye. If we want to keep the idea of proper function and if the naturalist
just can’t have this idea without either taking the “intentional
stance” or becoming a theist, then we have something that looks a lot
like a good argument for the existence of God.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>V.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>JC: I am not limiting the concept of 'knowledge' in any way. … I
limit my investigation to the <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>problem of skepticism and the concept of propositional 'knowledge.' No<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>doubt in limiting myself in this way, I concede that I do not and will
not<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>know everything. I can live with that! … I might as wellhave fun
while doing so!<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>MM: Clark (the fellow you cited) makes a good point here however, which
I’ll tinker with to fit my own purposes: what if I can’t
sufficiently justify the proposition that my wife has a mind like me.
This seems a bit esoteric, but it is actually very practical; I actually
don’t know if I can sufficiently justify (discursively) the proposition
that my wife has a mind like me! What does this mean? Well, the
heck with propositional knowledge in this case if propositional knowledge must
entail such sufficient rational justification. I at least “know my
wife.” Perhaps I don’t hold a belief that I know my wife in
this way, but thankfully I don’t have to know that I know my wife to
simply know my wife. I’m glad that I can at least love my wife and
have a relationship with her even if the skeptic ends up being right.
Considering that the important thing about theism is knowing God and not
knowing a proposition about God, doesn’t this other form of personal
knowledge become important? <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Whew! That’s all for now. I’m off to go get a
beer that I might not know is really there. But I hope it is….. :
-)<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Thanks for the enjoyable challenge Joe. I’d like to
know…err…I’d like to get your thoughts about this.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>Michael Metzler<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 face=Arial><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
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