[Vision2020] re: Eugenie Scott's Talk at U of I

[josephc at mail.wsu.edu]

Michael,

Thanks for the reply! I promise to keep corresponding with you but only if
you stop calling me ‘Dr. Campbell.’ It just makes me feel old! I
appreciate the show of respect -- very much, in fact -- but I still prefer
‘Joe.’

I have a rather lengthy set of responses to points that you’ve raised in
your last reply. Here is a brief outline of my points (for those
uninterested in the details). A more detailed explanation of the points
follows.

1/ My main criticisms against Plantinga are aimed at his externalist
theory of warrant (or justification), not his religious epistemology.

2/ One cannot use Plantinga’s epistemology to argue for the existence of
God, as you suggest, for God’s existence is built into the very foundation
of his theory.

3/ For this and other reasons, Plantinga’s theory is far from religiously
neutral. Nor is it unconcerned with providing an adequate response to the
skeptic, as you suggest.

You write: Plantinga “argues that ‘proper function’ provides a better
analysis of what makes our beliefs warranted than does the more classical
formulation of internal evidential justification.”

I can agree with you and Plantinga that his view is better than CLASSICAL
foundationalism, which holds that a “proposition p is rational if and only
if p is self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible or if p can be
inferred from a set of propositions that are self-evident, evident to the
senses, or incorrigible.” (Kelly James Clark, “Religious Epistemology,”
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But classical foundationalism and externalist theories like Plantinga’s
are not the only options. I prefer fallible foundations theories (like
those offered by Hume, Reid, Wittgenstein, and Moore) or other
non-foundationalist, internalist theories (like Peter Klein’s infinitism)
over externalist foundations theories like Plantinga’s.

Perhaps some background is in order. According to Plantinga: “a belief has
warrant [or justification] for one if and only if that belief is produced
by one’s properly functioning cognitive faculties in circumstances to
which those faculties are designed to apply; in addition, those faculties
must be designed for the purpose of producing true beliefs.” (Clark, op.
cit.)

Thus, for Plantinga if a belief is the result of cognitive faculties that
are functioning properly, etc., then the belief is justified (or
warranted). One need not even believe (let alone have evidence for the
belief) that one’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly, etc. in
order for justification (or warrant) to be conferred. All that matters is
that they are functioning properly, etc.

Plantinga offers an externalist theory of justification (or warrant), for
he allows that justification (or warrant) may be conferred by conditions
that are independent of the internal beliefs and experiences of the
knowing subject. What matters is that one’s beliefs are the result of
cognitive faculties that are functioning properly; one need not have
knowledge, or evidence, or even a belief that this is so in order for
justification (or warrant) to be conferred.

I prefer an internalist theory according to which “only reasons can
justify a belief.” (Klein, “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of
Reasons”) Thus, my reasons for rejecting Plantinga’s theory are quite
general: I think that ALL externalist theories of justification (or
warrant) are faulty.

An important critic of externalist theories is UW Philosophy professor,
Larry BonJour (“Externalist Versions of Foundationalism,” The Structure of
Empirical Knowledge (Harvard UP, 1985)). Bonjour asks: “why should the
mere fact that an external relation obtains mean that [someone’s] belief
is epistemically justified when the relation in question is entirely
outside his ken?” (BonJour, p. 42) In other words, external relations like
‘proper function’ are not enough. One must have beliefs that one’s
cognitive faculties are properly functioning, or at least fail to have the
belief that they are not. Either way, our other beliefs play a role in
determining whether or not a particular belief is justified (or
warranted). As BonJour notes, “external or objective reliability is not
enough to offset subjective irrationality.” (BonJour, p. 41)

To make the point clearer, let me borrow an example from BonJour (pp.
38–41). Suppose that clairvoyance is in at least some cases an example of
a reliable belief forming process. Thus, beliefs that are a result of
clairvoyance are, at least sometimes, more likely to be true than not.
More specifically, suppose that my premonitions about the future are such
that they are “produced by [my] properly functioning cognitive faculties
in circumstances to which those faculties are designed to apply” and “in
addition, those faculties [are] designed for the purpose of producing true
beliefs.” But suppose also that this is not true of most people. Most
people’s premonitions about the future are in fact false yet mine are the
result of cognitive faculties that are properly functioning. I come to
have the true belief that I will win the lottery if I play numbers
corresponding to the birthdays of my siblings. Is this belief justified
(or warranted)? I don’t think so. I have plenty of reason to suspect that
such beliefs are unjustified (or unwarranted) and absolutely no reason to
suspect that my beliefs are any different. This strikes me as a definitive
counterexample to any externalist theory of justification (or warrant).
And there is no discussion here, at all, of Plantinga’s religious
epistemology.

You write: “the context of [Plantinga’s] work is not primarily the task of
‘answering the skeptic.’  Perhaps Plantinga would simply say, ‘why do a
thing like that?’”

If you look closely at the recent history of epistemology it is clear that
support for externalist theories is due, in part, because they
(apparently) provide an adequate response to the argument for skepticism.
This is true of Alvin Goldman’s reliabilism, the predecessor to
Plantinga’s theory. Just because he does not discuss skepticism does not
mean that it isn’t lurking in the background as a large motivating factor
of his theory.

You write: “Further, the analysis of proper function provides yet another
argument for the existence of God, since naturalistic accounts cannot seem
to get us (according to Plantinga) the intuitive idea of ‘proper function’
to begin with, which is why Plantinga's definition of knowledge needs to
include ‘according to the design plan’ in its necessary and sufficient
conditions.”

I admit that Plantinga provides a valid argument for God’s existence but
only because it begs the very question at issue. You are correct that
Plantinga defines ‘proper function’ in such a way that if our cognitive
faculties are properly functioning, then there must be a creator of the
universe. But one cannot then use the fact that our beliefs are the result
of cognitive faculties that are properly functioning as a REASON for
believing in the existence of God. This is a clear example of arguing in a
circle.

One way to realize this is to note that the concept of ‘proper function’
may be defined in a way that is consistent with evolution theory, or some
theistically neutral concept of ‘function’ like the one endorsed by
Aristotle. To rephrase Clark’s definition noted above, one might say that
“a belief has warrant [or justification] for one if and only if that
belief is produced by one’s properly functioning cognitive faculties in
circumstances to which those faculties HAVE EVOLVED NATURALLY to apply; in
addition, those faculties must HAVE EVOVLED NATURALLY to produce true
beliefs.” (I use caps for emphasis here.) Clearly, this analysis of proper
function does not provide “yet another argument for the existence of God.”

The above point should settle the matter as to whether Plantinga’s cart
(religious epistemology) comes before his horse (epistemology in general)
or vice versa.

Lastly, I didn’t mean to suggest a “minimalist analysis of communal belief
sharing.” What I meant to suggest is that a satisfactory foundations
theory of knowledge will allow for basic beliefs that can equally account
for or are equally critical of the diversity of opinions that are in fact
present amongst the peoples of the world. There is something inherently
dogmatic about an epistemology that allows for knowledge of a monotheistic
Christian God yet rules out the possibility of knowing that either
polytheism or atheism is true. All three theories strike me as being on an
epistemic par and an adequate theory of knowledge should reflect this
fact.

Thanks again, Michael!

Joe Campbell