[Vision2020] Eugenie Scott's Talk at U of I
josephc at mail.wsu.edu
josephc at mail.wsu.edu
Thu Oct 13 14:37:57 PDT 2005
Michael,
You wrote:
> Yes, Scott made a similar assertion. Scott also pointed out that this was
> scientific orthodoxy since William Paley's 1802 publication called "Natural
> Theology," and that Darwin held to just this view until he thought he found
> another possible alternative explanation. Of course, Kant showed that the
> argument doesn't work very well as a deductive argument (fairing as well as
> most deductive arguments of this kind). However, as a more subtle inductive
> matter, the question of whether or not this sort of inference is a non
> sequitur is just one of the issue of contemporary debate. A 'logical
basis'
> usually looks a bit different from an 'implication.' As someone like Alvin
> Plantinga would point out however, another option would be to see belief in
> God as properly basic: something immediately produced 'because' of the
> 'evidence' presented to the senses of the complexity and beauty of the
> world, but not discursively 'based upon' propositional evidence derived
from
> such experience. I'm sure, Bob, that you don't mean that there is no
> 'logical connection' at all between the idea of a Creator God and the
> 'design' features of the world..
1/ In response to Bob Dickow you seem to be mixing up the cosmological
argument and the teleological argument (or argument from design, or design
argument). Kant criticizes both but only the design argument is relevant
to the issue you note above, e.g., concluding that God exists based on
"features of the world."
2/ No one ever asserted that the design argument was a deductive argument.
Neither Paley, nor Kant, nor anyone else. It was always regarded as an
inductive argument, or an argument by analogy (as it was regarded in
Paley's time). Kant may have noted that the design argument was not a
deductive argument but he didn't "show" that it was not a deductive
argument.
3/ Of the three classic arguments for God's existence (the third being the
ontological argument), the design argument is the most difficult one to
refute. However, Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) does a very
good job of showing that the argument has several problems. More to the
point, as Hume also notes, even if one can show that the argument
establishes the existence of something, there is little reason to think
that it establishes the existence of God as traditionally understood.
There is no reason to assume that the creator of the universe is
benevolent, or omnipotent, or even one as opposed to many. To borrow an
example from Hume, if we were to find a beautiful house in the middle of
the woods we might reasonably assume that it was created by something. But
there would be little reason to assume that the creator was a moral being
and we would most likely suppose that a team of lesser creatures created
the house than to suppose that one omnipotent person did.
4/ Similar remarks apply to Plantinga's theory. It is arguable that Hume
himself held a view similar to Plantinga's, e.g. that the existence of God
was a natural, basic belief. For Hume, though, God's existence was quite
independent of the moral law. Thus, it is not clear how Plantinga's view
is going to get you what you want, if what you want is a reason to accept
the existence of the traditional Christian God.
I'm not suggesting that Plantinga and other's do not have replies to Hume
and other critics. I happen to think that in the end Hume and the critics
win out but I'd be happy to discuss this in more detail with you at some
future point.
Joe Campbell
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