[Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

Wed Nov 2 11:52:59 PST 2005

Note to the one or two people who might actually read this or part of this post:  It will not display correctly in plain text mode, but hopefully will using HTML.

Michael,

If you are to argue with what I write, at least do not attribute arguments to me that I haven't made.

Example:  You say:

"I'm not sure if all philosophers with PhD's who have given their lives to this subject matter need to 'retake Logic 101.'"

I made no such claim about all philosophers.  What I argued (and you agreed with) is saying that evil exists does not preclude (nor prove) the existence of some kind of god.

The arguments I discussed were:

[1]   The problem that asserting that an alleged god has foreknowledge and the assertion it created freewill engenders for the concept of a god also alleged to be omnipotent (including omniscience) and omnibenevolent (perfectly good).

[2]   The problem of evil which shows the problem (a contradiction) of asserting the existence an omnipotent, omnibenevolent god on one hand and the reality of evil on the other.

Historically and logically [1] and [2] have been related in this way:  The alleged granting of freewill to humankind by an alleged omnipotent, omnibenevolent god is often an attempt to "explain away" the problem of evil - it is not god who creates evil but evil results from humankind's misuse of freewill.  If you followed the classical argument about predestination I paraphrased at the start of this discussion, you will see that such an attempt is not successful.  More on this point just below.

To respond generally to your points:

[1]   Suppose Giovanni was walking down the street and saw a normal five year old child who had splashed gasoline all around and on itself and was preparing to strike a match.  Would it be good for Giovanni to stop the child before it engulfed itself in flames?  Would it not be evil for Giovanni not to intervene but to merely observe what would happened without an attempted intervention?

Worst yet, suppose Giovanni saw a curious child playing in a dry grassy field.  Suppose then Giovanni gave that child a can of gasoline and some matches.  Suppose Giovanni knew the curious nature of the child would most likely result in actions of the child which would set itself and the field afire.  Would not the word "evil" apply to Giovanni?

If you answered "No" to the above question, then we live in different worlds and further dialogue between us would not be fruitful.

How is the above example related to the problems of freewill/predestination and the problem of evil?  Read on.

[2]   Suppose some alleged omnipotent god created the universe and humankind.  Further, suppose:

That this god gave humankind freewill, which this god, being omnipotent, knew humankind would misuse.  God, being omniscient, knew that this misuse would result in colossal suffering, misery, injustice, and many other things which in ordinary language are called "evil".  Was this not an "evil" action?

[3]   Suppose some alleged omnipotent god created the universe and humankind.  Further, suppose:

That this god did not give humankind freewill, which god, being omniscient, knew what the results would be.  This god, being omniscient, knew his predestination of everything would result in colossal suffering, misery, injustice, and other things which in ordinary language are called "evil".  Was this not an "evil" action?

In a nutshell, whether you answered the above questions in [2] and [3] above "Yes" or answered them "No", the result is the same:

If you answered "No", you are asserting that the actions of this alleged god in [2] and [3] above are not evil.  Thus, there is a clear equivocation between the use of the word "evil" in [1] above and [2] and [3] above.  If the word "evil" is used to apply to Giovanni's knowingly and intentionally placing a child in harms way, then there is a change of usage of "evil", therefore the meaning of "evil", to not apply "evil" to some alleged god's knowingly and intentionally placing humankind in harms way.

If you answered "Yes" to the questions in [2] and [3] above, then you cannot assert that this alleged god is perfectly good (omnibenevolent).  His knowingly and intentionally acting in a way that created evil is a fly in the ointment of his alleged perfect goodness - something is not perfect by definition if it has even a single flaw in it.

To finish the argument:  If you try to assert that this alleged god did not knowingly and intentionally cause evil because it/she/him did not know what the results it its/hers/his creation would be, then you have lost omniscience and thus omnipotence.

Either a "Yes" or "No" answer to the above questions results in demonstrating that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent god is not a logical possibility - it exposes a fatal contradiction in such a hypothesis.

To state the obvious:  The above analysis is to demonstrate that in the ordinary use of the word "evil" (of which I gave an ostensive definition by using a concrete example), some being who is benevolent and could prevent an evil, would prevent an evil.

You make the claim that:

"This deductive form of the argument has apparently been abandoned for about 20 years among philosophers because of the issue of 'free-will.'"

I doubt that this statement is true.  Perhaps you can produce a survey of philosophical and theological literature for the last 20 years to demonstrate it.  I know from casual reading that not all philosophers, theologians, etc have abandoned the deductive approach in matters of the existence and nature of various alleged gods.  Certainly there have been recent so-called inductive attempts at demonstrating the existence of god and/or its properties.  Such attempts are not limited to the last 20 years or even the last 2,000 years.

The deductive approach has been abandoned by some Christian and Islamic apologists mainly because there are no satisfactory answers to the problem of evil, the problem predestination/freewill, and/or similar problems which do not entail sacrificing either omnipotence or omnibenevolence.

The major problem with your claim cited above is that induction also requires the use of deduction.  Inductive processes rely heavily and are dependent upon deductive processes.

Induction, in a nutshell, works thusly:

Observations are made, data is collected, etc.  A theory/model is developed during this process (such development also continually uses deductive processes, but for brevity, I leave it to you to discover this).

The first test for a theory/model is for internal logical consistency (freedom from contradictions) - discovering contradictions is a deductive process.  An inductive theory/model is not a plausible inductive model if it is internally contradictory.  [That is why any inductive theory/model asserting an omnipotent, omnibenevolent god cannot even get to the next step.]

The purpose of the theory/model is [1] to explain the data/observations (although there is some disagreement what this means or whether this is an essential function of a theory/model) and [2] to predict further expected observations, whether to confirm/disconfirm the theory and/or to apply it in some desired manner.

The second - n tests of an inductive theory/model are deducing expected observations from it and then seeing if those observations occur.

If some of the further expected observations are made, then the theory/model is said to have received some degree of confirmation.

However, if the further expected observations do not occur, but different contradictory observations are made, then the theory/model is disconfirmed.  It then must either be modified to accommodate the unexpected observations or abandoned.  This is a clear application of the deductive process known as Modus Tollens.  [If A implies B, and not B is true, then not A is true.]

A theory/model is not inductive model unless future observations are deducible from it, observations which can, in principle, occur or not occur.  If there are no future observations predicted that could, in principle, possibly be false, the theory/model is not an inductive one since there is no practical or logical way to disconfirm the theory.  [If you like, I could repost the Theory of the Odg as an example of a pseudo-inductive theory.]

Declarative statements, theories, models are knowledge claims requiring logical consistency and in the case of statements outside of axiomatic or quasi-axiomatic systems, some kind of observational confirmation to be rationally believed.  

Personally, I do not chose nor psychologically need to chose to believe any of the current knowledge claims about supernatural beings, powers, etc because, unlike statements about, birds, areas, the composition of soil on Mars, etc, there is no way to test the probability of the truth of such claims except by testing them for contradictions (which is what part of this discussion is about). Personally, I do not chose to regulate my behavior or attempt to regulate the behavior of others on assertions about the nature of some supernatural being(s), which statements, as of the present, are without a whit of rational proof.  However, there is always the possibility that future theories/models and observations will shed some light on the nature of the now or future alleged supernatural beings.

There is an interesting analysis of an inductive theory/model asserting the existence of a powerful, but not all-powerful god with certain other traits including benevolence.  I could also post that, but it is very likely you would not find it at all comforting the current state of your spiritual safari.

Perhaps, before you get too enamored of applying inductive methodology to supernatural phenomena/superstitions, you might learn a bit more about it.  Perhaps you could do this by taking Dr. Joseph Campbell's Philosophy of Science course.  Such a venture may or may not be soul-satisfying, but it would allow you to understand some of the tools you are attempting in your spiritual quest.  It may also provide you with some welcome growth.

If you have a basic knowledge of symbolic logic, I could recast the statements of the problem of evil and the problem of freewill/predestination given before in a form to which you could apply the sentential calculus (a decidable system) to test their validity.

I suspect all but one or two Vision 2020 users grow weary of this thread.

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Michael 
  To: vision2020 at moscow.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 10:19 PM
  Subject: [Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

  Wayne Fox Writes:

  "The existence of evil is not an argument for the existence or nonexistence of some god.  If there is a god, then this god may be indifferent to humankind, totally or partially amoral, have a totally different conception of good/evil, or be partially or totally evil in the terms of humankind.  If some people are seriously arguing that evil exists means there is no god of some kind, they need to retake Logic 101.  The question of the existence or nonexistence of an object with certain qualities whether it be a black hole, a unicorn, or some alleged god is a matter of reasoning and verifiable evidence, not just fanciful and/or linguistically nonsensical speculation."

  Me: 

  Wayne, you are correct. The problem of evil is not necessarily an argument for or against the existence of some actual god.  Rather the problem of evil is an argument against any god who is all knowing, all good, and all powerful.  Of course, the Christian God must be all three of these things, so if it is shown that any god who is all knowing, all good, and all powerful does not exist, then you have by default an argument also against the Christian God.  And since human beings are usually not concerned about whatever dozens of 'logical possibilities' might be out there (see discussion with Ted), the non-existence of the Christian God is typically the ultimate goal behind this sort of argumentation. I'm not sure if all philosophers with PhD's who have given their lives to this subject matter need to "retake Logic 101."  I'm beginning to wonder who really is for or against contemporary academia, the secularist or the fundamentalist?  Have fundamentalists successfully taken over our public schools at the graduate level already?  But I now speak merely rhetorically, so I'll go on.

  Wayne Writes:

  However, all of what you argue below is irrelevant to the central point of my post, which is:

  If god did not know, then it/she/him is not omniscient.

  If god did know, then it/she/him is not omnibenevolent.

  Me:

  I'm not sure how all I wrote is irrelevant to this central point. Your claim here is that if god-x knows the evil in the world, then god-x cannot be truly good.  Obviously the assumed premises here are 1) a truly good god-x is also all powerful, and 2) a truly good god-x would use this power to keep evil non-existent.  Also obvious is that it is this second assumed premise that does all the work for you.  In fact, this argument is so stream-lined and simple (in its archaic deductive form), it would seem that we should just state the argument by stating this premise: a truly good god-x would use this power to keep evil non-existent.  The existence of evil is clearly a premise accepted by all people normally participating in this particular discussion. Therefore a god-x who is all good and all powerful cannot exist.  Certainly, we need not worry ourselves about the logical possibility of a god-x who doesn't know anything, just as we need not worry about Zeus or Athena, or other logically possible metaphysical oddities. So to stream line the argument even further, at the expense of removing all the beauty of its more historical and complex form, here's the gist of the argument: an all good (and all powerful) god-x would not permit all this evil in the world.  Therefore, an all good (all powerful) god-x must not exist.  The real contention here is obviously the moral one.  And if it were not the Christian God that was ultimately in the cross-hairs, we would not be currently having this discussion to begin with.  Thus, the primary contention boils down to this: the goodness claimed by the Christian God is called into question by all the evil in the world.  The suffering, the blood, and the torment rebuke the claim to goodness Christians make for this so-called God.  

  This deductive form of the argument has apparently been abandoned for about 20 years among philosophers because of the issue of 'free-will.'  The logical possibility of the freedom of the will of man I guess reeks havoc to the deduction; but this is beyond my understanding.  Since most philosophers are concerned about the more interesting inductive approach, I haven't found the deductive form a fascinating field of study. The free-will problem is with regard to the "all powerful" attribute of god-x, but I'm willing to grant that there is no important 'limit' to the power of God regarding the problem of evil.  So it is the "all good" attribute we now must confront.  You say that any all good god-x could not permit evil, and so therefore the particular Christian God could not permit evil.  In response, I say that regardless of how all the other logical possible god-x's fair on this matter, the Christian god-x could permit evil.  In other words, God's goodness is not incompatible with a sovereign permission and sustaining of evil in the world. In turn, of course, if the Christian God's goodness is not incompatible with evil, then your more general claim about any god-x could not be true.  Only one possible god-x would refute your claim.

  And this last point is important given some of your claims about the problem of evil.  Even if the Christian God were not in your cross hairs, all I must do to refute your more general claim about god-x is propose one logically possible god-x who's goodness is compatible with evil.  Now, the fact that the Christian God is not some sort of "alleged" deity, proposed religion, or metaphysical hypothesis needs to be stressed.  The Christian God is not something thought up by a philosophy graduate student in the last few years.  This is the Hebraic, ancient religion that goes back further than western philosophy and that spans the course of much of the world's recorded history and culture.  It is something that has commanded kinds, brought arrogant men to their knees, and is claimed to indwell the hearts of children. So ultimately, we should not accept an analysis of the Christian God as if 'he' were merely some new scientific, 'alleged' hypothesis, up for scrutiny by the minds of weak and finite people.  With that qualification strongly noted however, I reiterate that all I need to do, for the sake of argument, is propose a logically possible god who's goodness is not incompatible evil, and your deductive argument fails.  

  Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate, merely on the logical level, to discuss the uniqueness of only the Christian God.  Perhaps there is no other god-x will do.  Perhaps you have successfully mounted an argument against Allah, or the Great Unicorn.  I'm right with you; I'd be happy to help further the cause. I'm sure that Allah and the Great Unicorn don't weather your argument very well. However, I think the unique character of the Christian God, as revealed in church tradition, the testimony of believers, and the scriptures, is immune to your deduction.  His goodness is compatible with evil; in fact the nature of His goodness is immensely compatible with the world's evil.  The world's evil is what will display the goodness, glory, grace, truth, and mercy of the eternal God forever.  

  Wayne Writes:    

  "Further, there is a great hypocrisy and fallacy in rejecting the deductive approach:  In order to reject it, you must use it.  Further, in rejecting the deductive approach [specifically reductio ad absurdum and modus tollens], you are rejecting tools upon whose application in great part all mathematics, science, and everyday practical knowledge is discovered and used.  If logic is not applicable to statements about some alleged god, then knowledge thereof, in the ordinary meaning of "knowledge", is not possible."

  Me:

  Actually, I don't think this is true of deduction.  Most our acquired knowledge and most of the arguments we are able to really 'make stick' are inductive in nature. Certainly, math is highly axiomatic, but science is primarily inductive. Deductive syllogisms are very simple, and in disagreement and debate, it is always one of the premises that is found to be wanting, the truth of which is usually decided through inductive means. Also, to say that the deductive approach to a particular argument doesn't work does not in any way call into question 'deduction' itself.  It just means that induction is going to have to ultimately settle the matter.  But this will have to just play itself out naturally; for now, I'm willing to go with the deductive way you've laid out your argument, but this just means I have to dispute one of the premises, namely, that goodness and evil are incompatible for any god-x.  I will do this by 'proposing' a particular god-x for which this is not true.

  Wayne Wrote:

  "If some alleged god is knowable, then so far humankind hasn't an inkling based upon the millions of different contradictory religious claims of its/her/his properties."

  Me:

  I'm not following you here Wayne.  However, I think Ted and I have already taken this up a little bit, but we're still waiting for Ted's response (which he informed me he still plans to give).  Just because everybody in the world does not believe a statement is not necessarily evidence for the fact that the statement is not true.  In fact, just the opposite is the case.  Most statements we currently take as true about science, medicine, politics, and religion have not been thought true by most people (as far as I can tell).   

  Wayne Wrote:    

  Your last paragraph below (and the attempts by many philosophers and theologians) is a classical example of equivocation -- using "good" in one way when referring to humankind and another way when referring to some alleged god.  

  Me: 

  I really don't think you have yet established equivocation on my part.  I compared contemporary secular intuitions about what is 'good' for something like a Christian God with classical Christian intuitions about what is 'good' for something like a Christian God. We can disagree about what would truly be 'good' without equivocation. 

  Thanks,

  Michael Metzler

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