[Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

[Michael]

Wayne Fox Writes:

  

"The existence of evil is not an argument for the existence or nonexistence
of some god.  If there is a god, then this god may be indifferent to
humankind, totally or partially amoral, have a totally different conception
of good/evil, or be partially or totally evil in the terms of humankind.  If
some people are seriously arguing that evil exists means there is no god of
some kind, they need to retake Logic 101.  The question of the existence or
nonexistence of an object with certain qualities whether it be a black hole,
a unicorn, or some alleged god is a matter of reasoning and verifiable
evidence, not just fanciful and/or linguistically nonsensical speculation."

 

Me: 

Wayne, you are correct. The problem of evil is not necessarily an argument
for or against the existence of some actual god.  Rather the problem of evil
is an argument against any god who is all knowing, all good, and all
powerful.  Of course, the Christian God must be all three of these things,
so if it is shown that any god who is all knowing, all good, and all
powerful does not exist, then you have by default an argument also against
the Christian God.  And since human beings are usually not concerned about
whatever dozens of 'logical possibilities' might be out there (see
discussion with Ted), the non-existence of the Christian God is typically
the ultimate goal behind this sort of argumentation. I'm not sure if all
philosophers with PhD's who have given their lives to this subject matter
need to "retake Logic 101."  I'm beginning to wonder who really is for or
against contemporary academia, the secularist or the fundamentalist?  Have
fundamentalists successfully taken over our public schools at the graduate
level already?  But I now speak merely rhetorically, so I'll go on.

  

Wayne Writes:

However, all of what you argue below is irrelevant to the central point of
my post, which is:

  

If god did not know, then it/she/him is not omniscient.

  

If god did know, then it/she/him is not omnibenevolent.

 

Me:

I'm not sure how all I wrote is irrelevant to this central point. Your claim
here is that if god-x knows the evil in the world, then god-x cannot be
truly good.  Obviously the assumed premises here are 1) a truly good god-x
is also all powerful, and 2) a truly good god-x would use this power to keep
evil non-existent.  Also obvious is that it is this second assumed premise
that does all the work for you.  In fact, this argument is so stream-lined
and simple (in its archaic deductive form), it would seem that we should
just state the argument by stating this premise: a truly good god-x would
use this power to keep evil non-existent.  The existence of evil is clearly
a premise accepted by all people normally participating in this particular
discussion. Therefore a god-x who is all good and all powerful cannot exist.
Certainly, we need not worry ourselves about the logical possibility of a
god-x who doesn't know anything, just as we need not worry about Zeus or
Athena, or other logically possible metaphysical oddities. So to stream line
the argument even further, at the expense of removing all the beauty of its
more historical and complex form, here's the gist of the argument: an all
good (and all powerful) god-x would not permit all this evil in the world.
Therefore, an all good (all powerful) god-x must not exist.  The real
contention here is obviously the moral one.  And if it were not the
Christian God that was ultimately in the cross-hairs, we would not be
currently having this discussion to begin with.  Thus, the primary
contention boils down to this: the goodness claimed by the Christian God is
called into question by all the evil in the world.  The suffering, the
blood, and the torment rebuke the claim to goodness Christians make for this
so-called God.  

 

This deductive form of the argument has apparently been abandoned for about
20 years among philosophers because of the issue of 'free-will.'  The
logical possibility of the freedom of the will of man I guess reeks havoc to
the deduction; but this is beyond my understanding.  Since most philosophers
are concerned about the more interesting inductive approach, I haven't found
the deductive form a fascinating field of study. The free-will problem is
with regard to the "all powerful" attribute of god-x, but I'm willing to
grant that there is no important 'limit' to the power of God regarding the
problem of evil.  So it is the "all good" attribute we now must confront.
You say that any all good god-x could not permit evil, and so therefore the
particular Christian God could not permit evil.  In response, I say that
regardless of how all the other logical possible god-x's fair on this
matter, the Christian god-x could permit evil.  In other words, God's
goodness is not incompatible with a sovereign permission and sustaining of
evil in the world. In turn, of course, if the Christian God's goodness is
not incompatible with evil, then your more general claim about any god-x
could not be true.  Only one possible god-x would refute your claim.

 

And this last point is important given some of your claims about the problem
of evil.  Even if the Christian God were not in your cross hairs, all I must
do to refute your more general claim about god-x is propose one logically
possible god-x who's goodness is compatible with evil.  Now, the fact that
the Christian God is not some sort of "alleged" deity, proposed religion, or
metaphysical hypothesis needs to be stressed.  The Christian God is not
something thought up by a philosophy graduate student in the last few years.
This is the Hebraic, ancient religion that goes back further than western
philosophy and that spans the course of much of the world's recorded history
and culture.  It is something that has commanded kinds, brought arrogant men
to their knees, and is claimed to indwell the hearts of children. So
ultimately, we should not accept an analysis of the Christian God as if 'he'
were merely some new scientific, 'alleged' hypothesis, up for scrutiny by
the minds of weak and finite people.  With that qualification strongly noted
however, I reiterate that all I need to do, for the sake of argument, is
propose a logically possible god who's goodness is not incompatible evil,
and your deductive argument fails.  

 

Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate, merely on the logical level, to
discuss the uniqueness of only the Christian God.  Perhaps there is no other
god-x will do.  Perhaps you have successfully mounted an argument against
Allah, or the Great Unicorn.  I'm right with you; I'd be happy to help
further the cause. I'm sure that Allah and the Great Unicorn don't weather
your argument very well. However, I think the unique character of the
Christian God, as revealed in church tradition, the testimony of believers,
and the scriptures, is immune to your deduction.  His goodness is compatible
with evil; in fact the nature of His goodness is immensely compatible with
the world's evil.  The world's evil is what will display the goodness,
glory, grace, truth, and mercy of the eternal God forever.  

 

Wayne Writes:    

"Further, there is a great hypocrisy and fallacy in rejecting the deductive
approach:  In order to reject it, you must use it.  Further, in rejecting
the deductive approach [specifically reductio ad absurdum and modus
tollens], you are rejecting tools upon whose application in great part all
mathematics, science, and everyday practical knowledge is discovered and
used.  If logic is not applicable to statements about some alleged god, then
knowledge thereof, in the ordinary meaning of "knowledge", is not possible."

 

Me:

Actually, I don't think this is true of deduction.  Most our acquired
knowledge and most of the arguments we are able to really 'make stick' are
inductive in nature. Certainly, math is highly axiomatic, but science is
primarily inductive. Deductive syllogisms are very simple, and in
disagreement and debate, it is always one of the premises that is found to
be wanting, the truth of which is usually decided through inductive means.
Also, to say that the deductive approach to a particular argument doesn't
work does not in any way call into question 'deduction' itself.  It just
means that induction is going to have to ultimately settle the matter.  But
this will have to just play itself out naturally; for now, I'm willing to go
with the deductive way you've laid out your argument, but this just means I
have to dispute one of the premises, namely, that goodness and evil are
incompatible for any god-x.  I will do this by 'proposing' a particular
god-x for which this is not true.

   

  

Wayne Wrote:

 

"If some alleged god is knowable, then so far humankind hasn't an inkling
based upon the millions of different contradictory religious claims of
its/her/his properties."

 

Me:

I'm not following you here Wayne.  However, I think Ted and I have already
taken this up a little bit, but we're still waiting for Ted's response
(which he informed me he still plans to give).  Just because everybody in
the world does not believe a statement is not necessarily evidence for the
fact that the statement is not true.  In fact, just the opposite is the
case.  Most statements we currently take as true about science, medicine,
politics, and religion have not been thought true by most people (as far as
I can tell).   

  

  

Wayne Wrote:    

Your last paragraph below (and the attempts by many philosophers and
theologians) is a classical example of equivocation -- using "good" in one
way when referring to humankind and another way when referring to some
alleged god.  

  

Me: 

I really don't think you have yet established equivocation on my part.  I
compared contemporary secular intuitions about what is 'good' for something
like a Christian God with classical Christian intuitions about what is
'good' for something like a Christian God. We can disagree about what would
truly be 'good' without equivocation. 

 

Thanks,

Michael Metzler

 

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