[Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

Tue Nov 1 20:18:43 PST 2005

Michael, et al,

The existence of evil is not an argument for the existence or nonexistence of some god.  If there is a god, then this god may be indifferent to humankind, totally or partially amoral, have a totally different conception of good/evil, or be partially or totally evil in the terms of humankind.  If some people are seriously arguing that evil exists means there is no god of some kind, they need to retake Logic 101.  The question of the existence or nonexistence of an object with certain qualities whether it be a black hole, a unicorn, or some alleged god is a matter of reasoning and verifiable evidence, not just fanciful and/or linguistically nonsensical speculation.

However, all of what you argue below is irrelevant to the central point of my post, which is:

If god did not know, then it/she/him is not omniscient.

If god did know, then it/she/him is not omnibenevolent.

Further, there is a great hypocrisy and fallacy in rejecting the deductive approach:  In order to reject it, you must use it.  Further, in rejecting the deductive approach [specifically reductio ad absurdum and modus tollens], you are rejecting tools upon whose application in great part all mathematics, science, and everyday practical knowledge is discovered and used.  If logic is not applicable to statements about some alleged god, then knowledge thereof, in the ordinary meaning of "knowledge", is not possible.

Anticipating other comments:

If some alleged god is knowable, then so far humankind hasn't an inkling based upon the millions of different contradictory religious claims of its/her/his properties.

If some alleged god is unknowable, then there is no way by definition to test or even to validly claim the truth of any statement about it/her/him.

Statements about god are either [1] true, [2] false, or [3] nonsensical.

[2]    If they are contradictory, they are false.

[3]    If they are nonsensical, they are not verifiable and perhaps not even comprehensible except in a syntactical context.

[1]    So far, there is no agreement about the truth of statements of the existence or the properties of many alleged gods.  Worst yet, unlike statements about gravity, herpes, and/or continental drift there is no agreed upon valid , fruitful method to test the truth of such statements about the existence or the properties of these alleged gods except possibly by the vote of authoritarian or popular sentiment, a hardly reliable method.

Continuing:

Your last paragraph below (and the attempts by many philosophers and theologians) is a classical example of equivocation -- using "good" in one way when referring to humankind and another way when referring to some alleged god.  

[Equivocation:  http://www.datanation.com/fallacies/equiv.htm]

If you think that a person creating a baby in order to torture it is not evil, then you are using the word quite differently than what is generally meant by "evil" when humankind use the word.  The equivocation is in saying creating a baby in order to torture it is evil for humans, but not evil for some alleged god who allegedly created us and who also allegedly tortures us (Example: when a baby dies in screaming agony of leukemia or when this alleged god allegedly sends the majority of his human creations to suffer the extreme misery of eternal combustion).  As in the examples given in the link above, you are using "good" and "evil" in two different ways in your argument.

As a note, the problem of predestination and god's foreknowledge is related to the problem of evil, but is not isomorphic to it.

Here is a classic statement of the problem of evil:

[A]    If God is omnibenevolent and had the power to do so, it would prevent evil from existing.

[B]    If God is omnipotent, it has the power to do anything, including the power to prevent evil from existing.

[C]    God is omnibenevolent and omnipotent.

Therefore,

[D]    God would prevent evil from existing.

Therefore,

[1]    Evil does not exist.

On the other hand:

[E]    Babies dying of leukemia screaming in agony is an evil.
[F]    Old folks unable to control their bowels is an evil.
[G]    The extermination by Hitler of about 6,000,000 Jews is an evil.
[H]    Repeatedly raping then murdering a young child is an evil.

Therefore,

[2]    Evil exists.

Note that [1] and [2] are contradictory, hence one or the other is false.

In my opinion, given the ordinary usage of the word "evil", only someone quite delusional would deny [E] - [H], their basis in fact, and therefore [2].

Hence, [1] [Evil does not exist] is false.

Therefore, since [A] and [B] are merely and clearly definitions, then [C] God is omnibenevolent and omnipotent is also false.

Notice again please, this is not an argument for the nonexistence of all alleged gods.  It is only a demonstration that a alleged omnibenevolent, omnipotent god cannot exist (just as a person with exactly 1 arm and exactly five arms cannot exist).  For example, the god of the Zoroastrians is not claimed to be omnipotent.  Unlike the definition of most Christian sects' god,the problem of evil does not disprove (nor give any probability for) the Zoroastrian's god's existence.

Also please note that if it is alleged that some god is omnipotent, then that god has the power to deceive or to prevent any knowledge of itself.  That means, that those who allege an omnipotent (or even a vastly powerful god) are prevented from certain or even probable knowledge thereof, since there is no way of knowing whether they are being deceived or are in error.  [Although ignorance, hubris,  egomania, and/or megalomania do not prevent some from asserting their superiority to their alleged omnipotent god by claiming certain or probable knowledge of it/her/him.]

Art Deco (Wayne A. Fox)
deco at moscow.com

----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Michael 
  To: vision2020 at moscow.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 4:30 PM
  Subject: [Vision2020] Is John Calvin an Intolerista?

  Wayne,

  That was a good summary of the argument from the problem of evil.  However, over the last decade or so most philosophers (as I hear) have been uneasy with such a deductive approach.  The reason is that, well, it doesn't really work as well as one might have originally expected.  Now, the project is primarily inductive.  The nature and extent of evil in the world provides 'evidence' for the fact that God does not exist; but of course, as is always the case with constructing an evidential argument, it is not difficult for one additional piece of evidence to come in and change the direction of what they call the inductive 'strength.'  If I sit around all day long and look at pictures of children mutilated by murderous parents, the evidence for the fact that a good and all knowing God does not exist would probably begin seeming a bit strong.  So strong in fact, I might be inclined to think that 'I know' that God does not exist.  After all, when considered in a more abstract and timeless fashion, the argument from the problem of evil does begin to make a lot of sense. 

  However, I also might be inclined to put the pictures down, take a deep breath, and remind myself of the grand Christian Drama; I might begin retelling to myself the history of the cosmos from a Christian point of view.  What I will find there, very likely, is a God who permits, yet also passionately eradicates, evil:  A God who hates murderers and will punish them; a God who will raise these broken children up from the grave; a God who suffered the same treatment that these little children did when he came to the world.  This sort of evidence can begin seeming even stronger if combined by a traditional experience of repentance.  In other words, one might come to believe that the evil is not just 'out there' to be compared to God, but in one's self.  If there is a problem with evil in me, then a proposal for a solution to this problem might very well seem a bit more reasonable.  This is particularly the case if I begin feeling 'guilty' for evil in me.  But 'guilty' before whom?  Or perhaps I begin feeling 'thankful' for all the good and beautiful things in the world.  But 'thankful' to whom? All these sorts of factors can come in and start making the existence of God not only possible, but even likely for me-for some, almost necessary.  

  However, one thing that struck me reading through your deductive way of setting up the argument was the reference to the kind of God Christian's believe.   God is 'all good,' but I've noticed a wild variance between what biblical Christianity and secular observers mean by 'all good' to begin with.  I think there might be a bit of begging the question in your argument, for example, if you assume at the beginning that a God is all good only if he would not permit evil.  But it seems strange to me to assume the nature of true eternal 'goodness' going into the question of whether or not God exists.  This reminds me of a discussion I had with Nick Gier many years ago..

  Yours,

  Michael Metzler

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