[Vision2020] Gary Larson on one of today's headlines

[Melynda Huskey]

In pursuance of Moffett's First Axiom, I'll wade in here (but I promise to 
keep it reasonably brief!).

Wayne writes:

"When searching for "the truth" it may be useful to understand that some 
statements are neither true nor false.  For example:

" 'The square root of blue recrystalizes sodomy.' "

"Just because words can be strung together in an apparently syntactically 
correct sentence doesn't mean the sentence has a comprehensible, literal, 
testable meaning."

This example demonstrates an interesting property of language:  it can be 
used to construct syntactically correct nonsense statements--thus allowing 
us to derive rules of syntax for individual languages, and even, 
potentially, basic principles about language itself.

Wayne goes on to say,

"In your quest for "the truth" you might watch out for these kind of 
assertions.  Religion, philosophy, politics, etc. are rife with such 
statements.  These assertions are generally recognizable by the practical 
impossibility of being neither unequivocally confirmable nor falsifiable or 
for the establishment of any significant probability of thier truth.  The 
latter two cases is often especially the case."

But here I believe you're drawing a false conclusion, Wayne.  There is a 
categorical difference between syntactically flawless nonsense sentences, 
which by their nature are not intended to contain meaning for speakers, and 
sentences which do not contain literal or testable meanings, but which have 
some contingent and deferred meaning for speakers.  Your implication, of 
course, is that such statements as "In the beginning was the Word" are 
simply nonsense, on a par with your "square root of blue," while other 
statements are verifiably true--say, "You just can't prove the existence of 
God."

As a student of post-modern French linguistics and theory, I have to smile 
at the notion that any language at all is literal or testable.  There is a 
certain naivete in the belief that some words are more literal than others.  
The free play of the signifier means that all meaning is contingent, 
endlessly dependent on a chain of connotations without any ultimate 
referents outside the system of language.  What seems quite demonstrably a 
fact contained in a literally true sentence to you is itself as subject to 
slippage, incoherence, and misprision as any prophetic utterance by Habbakuk 
or Nahum.

Secondarily, it seems to me quite dangerous to assert that language must be 
subject to tests of literality in order to be comprehensible.  Since there 
is no meaningful connection between a signifier and a signified, what can 
literality mean?  Inherent in the notion of literal, testable, language is 
the premise that some kinds of experience are more "real" than others, and 
that you or I can determine the reality of another person's experience by 
comparing it to our own.  I find both of these ideas nearly impossible to 
defend, owing to the circularity of the proof, "I experienced it, therefore 
it is real."

Hurrah for Derrida!

Melynda Huskey