[Vision2020] Islamic Or Democratic Secular Iraq?

[Ted Moffett]

Visionaries:

The official US line of propaganda is that the US will eventually allow Iraq 
to choose its own leaders and government.  But if this means Iraq will adopt 
an Islamic style government, will the US allow this?  One of the main 
reasons we occupy Iraq is to neutralize the potential for anti-US 
fundamentalist Islamic control of one of the most oil rich regions of the 
world.  And playing Sunni and Shiite Islamic groups against each other in 
Iraq is an excellent ploy to block a unified Islamic government there.  
However, there are signs that the Sunni and Shiite Islamic factions, who 
otherwise are enemies of each other, are cooperating against a common enemy, 
the USA.  This would portend a difficult road ahead for US plans to erect a 
government sympathetic with US strategy.

See article below:

>~ Hearts and Minds ~
> 
>Iraqi Clerics Unite in Rare Alliance
>U.S. Fears Shiite, Sunni Cooperation Will Bolster Resistance
>By Anthony Shadid


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4453-2003Aug16.html

>NAJAF, Iraq, Aug. 16 -- A popular Sunni Muslim cleric has provided 
>grass-roots and financial support to a leading anti-American Shiite cleric, 
>a rare example of cooperation across Iraq's sectarian divide that has 
>alarmed U.S. officials for its potential to bolster festering resistance to 
>the American occupation, senior U.S. and Iraqi officials say.
>
>The ties mark one of the first signs of coordination between 
>anti-occupation elements of the Sunni minority, the traditional rulers of 
>the country, and its Shiite majority, seen by U.S. officials as the key to 
>stability in postwar Iraq.
> 
>The extent of the cooperation remains unclear between Ahmed Kubeisi, a 
>Sunni cleric from a prominent clan in western Iraq, and Moqtada Sadr, the 
>30-year-old son of a revered Shiite ayatollah assassinated in 1999. But 
>ideologically and practically, it represents a convergence of interests 
>between the two figures, who were left out of the Iraqi Governing Council 
>named last month and, in their own communities, have emerged as influential 
>if still minority voices of opposition to the four-month-old occupation.
> 
>Supporters of the two clerics acknowledged cooperation, but denied there 
>was any financial support.
> 
>U.S. officials say they are especially worried that such cooperation will 
>strengthen Sadr. U.S. officials were taken by surprise by the young 
>cleric's rise to prominence and have remained publicly dismissive of his 
>influence. But they privately acknowledge his support among the poorest and 
>most alienated in cities such as Baghdad and Basra -- a constituency that 
>has long played a role in Iraqi politics -- and express frustration over 
>their inability to curb his influence at a time of growing criticism of 
>U.S. reconstruction efforts.
> 
>"This is a political challenge, and it is a distraction, and it keeps the 
>show from getting on the road," said a senior U.S. official in Baghdad, who 
>spoke on condition of anonymity. "We cannot afford the distraction."
> 
>Kubeisi, a charismatic speaker and respected religious scholar, enjoys 
>support in conservative Sunni regions as a political and spiritual leader. 
>Since the fall of the Sunni-led Baath Party, he has emerged as one of a 
>handful of figures seeking to speak on behalf of the Sunni community, which 
>has been left largely leaderless and adrift since the war.
> 
>The senior official said reports of financial support from Kubeisi to Sadr 
>-- widely circulating among Iraqi officials -- came from U.S. intelligence 
>in Iraq. According to one report, Kubeisi provided Sadr with $50 million, 
>though the official cautioned that it was "unevaluated intelligence."
> 
>"He's getting a lot of money from Sunnis. I can't put a figure on it, but 
>it's really a lot of money," he said.
> 
>Maj. Rick Hall, the executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 
>said the support was confirmed to him by Iraqi sources, though he had no 
>specific figure. He called the reports "very reliable."
> 
>"We feel very confident" that Sadr had meetings with Kubeisi and "we 
>believe reports we are told are true, reports of him receiving financing," 
>Hall said at the Marines' base in Najaf, one of Iraq's holiest Shiite 
>cities.
> 
>A senior official with the 25-member Governing Council, who spoke on 
>condition of anonymity, described the financing as "100 percent true" and 
>said it was common knowledge among Iraqi politicians and parties on the 
>council.
> 
>U.S. officials declined to say where the money was coming from, but the 
>Iraqi official said he believed it came from private individuals in the 
>Persian Gulf, whose conservative, Sunni Muslim states have viewed with 
>anxiety the prospect of a Shiite-dominated government in neighboring Iraq. 
>By supporting the most radical Shiite elements, he said, they hope to 
>prevent a united Shiite front in the contest for postwar power.
> 
>U.S. and Iraqi officials offered different assessments of how Sadr's group 
>may have spent the money. At least some of it, they said, appears to have 
>gone to supporters, part of the social welfare that has proved remarkably 
>effective with Islamic groups elsewhere in the Arab world.
> 
>Hall said he believes it has been used in part to bring supporters from 
>Baghdad and other Sadr strongholds to the Friday prayers in Kufa, near 
>Najaf. The senior Iraqi official said he believed money was going to 
>powerful tribes in southern Iraq, long a key source of support for the 
>competing ayatollahs who vie for influence and supporters from their base 
>in Najaf.
> 
>The U.S. and Iraqi officials said they believe Kubeisi has also encouraged 
>followers from the restive cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in western Iraq -- 
>the region where he draws his greatest support -- to attend Sadr's Friday 
>sermons in Kufa.
> 
>Those sermons, which have at times drawn tens of thousands of supporters 
>over the past month, have served as a key public venue for Sadr. Wearing a 
>white funeral shawl to signify his willingness to sacrifice himself, he has 
>railed against the Governing Council, calling it a tool of the U.S. 
>occupation that should be dissolved, and repeatedly urged the creation of a 
>religious army, albeit unarmed.
> 
>Mustafa Yaacoubi, a spokesman for Sadr, denied the reports that Sadr has 
>received money from Kubeisi. He said the group raises its funds entirely 
>from religious taxes and then, only from inside Iraq. Another spokesman, 
>Adnan Shahmani, has put the taxes at $65,000 a month.
> 
>Taghlib Alusi, a spokesman for Kubeisi, who is currently in the United Arab 
>Emirates, also denied that money had gone to Sadr. "There's no truth to 
>it," he said. Sadr "has a lot of money. There's no need for Sheik Ahmed to 
>give it to him."
> 
>But Alusi acknowledged cooperation between the two, beginning with a 
>meeting in Najaf in late April. He said Sadr had sent a delegation from 
>Najaf to Baghdad two weeks ago to explore greater cooperation. In the 
>interests of sectarian harmony, he said that Kubeisi has encouraged his 
>followers to pray with Shiites, who traditionally worship in separate 
>mosques.
> 
>"We are friendly and we are brothers," he said.
> 
>Beyond their roles as religious officials, Kubeisi and Sadr share little in 
>background. Kubeisi, who had a long, if ambivalent relationship with 
>Hussein, went into exile in the United Arab Emirates in 1999. He returned 
>soon after Baghdad fell on April 9 and then electrified a crowd of Sunni 
>Muslims with a speech that warned U.S. troops their time was limited in 
>Iraq.
> 
>"You are the masters today," he said. "But I warn you against thinking of 
>staying. Get out before we force you out."
> 
>Sadr, the son of Mohammed Sadiq Sadr, who was killed with his two sons by 
>Hussein's government, has inherited at least part of his father's popular, 
>largely youthful following. His group, dominated by junior clerics engaged 
>in grass-roots work and community organizing, remains one of the few 
>mass-based movements in Iraq and draws on the deeply resonant symbols of 
>Shiite suffering and martyrdom. In the past month, he has become 
>increasingly vocal in his opposition to the occupation.
> 
>Both Kubeisi and Sadr have preached unity among Shiites and Sunnis. Those 
>divisions run deep in the history of Iraq, where the Sunni minority has 
>long dominated and Shiites were often brutally repressed by Hussein.
> 
>Both have also run afoul of U.S. authorities. U.S. officials criticized 
>Kubeisi's newspaper, Al Sa'a, when it published a report in June about 
>soldiers raping two Iraqi girls. U.S. officials said the story was false. 
>Last week, soldiers visited Kubeisi's office after the newspaper published 
>a story -- disputed by them -- that said U.S. soldiers had killed six 
>children in Baghdad's Shiite neighborhood of Kadhimiya.
> 
>The senior U.S. official said authorities were also on the verge of closing 
>a religious and anti-Baathist newspaper they said belonged to Sadr. Last 
>month, it published a list of 134 Iraqis, many of them former senior 
>government figures and party officials. The list declared them "tails of 
>Saddam's tyrannical regime and his gang who will be caught by our hands 
>sooner or later" and promised "the worst torture." Yaacoubi denied the 
>newspaper, "The Echo of Sadr," was published by Sadr's group.
> 
>In the broadest terms, the senior U.S. official said he worried that 
>funding from Kubeisi would add to Sadr's ability to organize his 
>supporters, creating what he called an obstacle to U.S. efforts to oversee 
>a new Iraqi government and constitution.
> 
>In Basra, for example, a group linked to Sadr holds one-third of the seats 
>on the local council. While it denied having any hand in riots there 
>earlier this month, it nevertheless supported the protests and warned of 
>more. In a statement, it also accused British troops who control the city 
>of depriving the population of basic services as part of "the enemy's 
>conspiracies and imperialist schemes."
> 
>"He's a populist, a critic and a rabble-rouser and he's gotten awful, awful 
>close to the line," the senior U.S. official said of Sadr. He added, "If 
>the Shiites end up in an eye-gouging, ear-biting dispute among themselves, 
>that's going to be bad for them, and it will certainly retard the progress 
>that is supposed to be accomplished at a time in Iraq when time is 
>important."
> 
>Reluctant to act themselves, U.S. officials have turned to Iraq's most 
>senior Shiite clerics, also known as mujtahids, who have privately 
>dismissed Sadr as a figure with no religious standing but are hesitant to 
>publicly criticize him. Traditionally, the clergy have sought to keep 
>disputes among themselves, projecting an image of unity. Given Sadr's 
>lineage from a long and storied clerical family and his street support, the 
>clerics seem unwilling to pick a fight with a potentially unpredictable and 
>even violent outcome.
> 
>"We're watching him and some of the big mujtahids are watching us and we're 
>both hoping the other does something," said the U.S. official.
> 
>Yaacoubi, the Sadr spokesman, said U.S. officials had no reason to act 
>against the group and accused occupation forces of trying to provoke them, 
>most recently when a helicopter knocked down a religious banner in Baghdad 
>last week. In sermons and statements, aware of the crackdown it might 
>bring, Sadr's followers have assiduously avoided any call to arms.
> 
>"Until now, we can say our office hasn't trespassed any red lines," 
>Yaacoubi said in the group's headquarters in Najaf, which sits along a 
>winding alley near the shrine of Imam Ali, one of Shiite Islam's most 
>revered figures.
> 
>

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