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<p><font size="+1">Early excerpts from The Strategy of Peace, by
John F. Kennedy, edited by Allan Nevins<br>
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<p><font size="+1">A New Approach on Foreign Policy: A Twelve-Point
Agenda</font></p>
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<p><font size="+1">In the Senate June 14, 1960</font></p>
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<p><font size="+1">May 17, 1960, marked the end of an era -- an era
of illusion -- the illusion that platitudes and slogans are a
substitute for strength and planning -- the illusion that
personal good will is a substitute for hard, carefully prepared
bargaining on concrete issues -- the illusion that good
intentions and pious principles are a substitute for strong
creative leadership.</font></p>
<p><font size="+1"> For on May 17, 1960, the long-awaited, highly
publicized summit conference collapsed. That collapse was the
direct result of Soviet determination to destroy the talks. The
insults and distortions of Mr. Khrushchev -- the violence of his
attacks -- shocked all Americans and united the country in
admiration for the dignity and self-control of President
Eisenhower. Regardless of party, all of us deeply resented
Russian abuse of this nation and its President -- and all of us
shared a common disappointment at the failure of the
conference. But it is imperative, nevertheless, that we as a
nation rise above our resentment and frustration to a critical
re-examination of the events at Paris and their meaning for
America.</font></p>
<p><font size="+1">. . . .</font></p>
<p><font size="+1">. . . . <br>
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<p><font size="+1">. . . .</font></p>
<p><font size="+1">This is the real issue of American foreign policy
today -- not the ill-considered timing of the U-2, or the
inconsistent statements of our Government, or the débâcle in
Paris, where neither our friends nor our enemies could anticipate
our intentions. The real issue -- and the real lesson of Paris
-- is the lack of long-range preparation, the lack of policy-planning,
the lack of coherent and purposeful national strategy backed by
strength.</font></p>
<p><font size="+1"> This is an issue worthy of a great debate --
a debate by the American people through the media of their
political parties -- and that debate must not be stifled or
degraded by empty appeals to national unity, false cries of
appeasement, or deceptive slogans about "standing up to Khrushchev."
For the issue is not who can best "stand up to Khrushchev" --
who can best swap threats and insults; the real issue is who can
stand up and summon America's vast resources to the defense
freedom against the most dangerous threat it has ever faced.</font></p>
<p><font size="+1"> For if the 1960 campaign should degenerate
into a contest of who can talk the toughest to Khrushchev -- or
which party is the "party of war" or the "party of appeasement"
-- or which candidate can tell the American voters what they
want to hear, rather than what they need to hear -- or who is
"soft on communism," or who can be hardest on foreign aid --
then, in my opinion, it makes very little difference who the
winners are in July and in November -- the American people and
the whole free world will be the losers.</font></p>
<p><font size="+1"> For the next President of the United States
-- whoever he may be -- will find he has considerably more to do
than "stand up" to Khrushchev, balance the budget, and mouth
popular slogans, if he is to restore our nation's relative
strength and leadership.<br>
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<[The excerpts above were taken from the first three pages of a
50 cent paperback titled as above. Fifty-six years later, with few
changes of details, John Kennedy's text seems as applicable today as
then.]><br>
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<br>
Ken<br>
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