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<div class="ad"> </div></div><div id="opinionator"><div align="left"><span class="timestamp published" title="2012-06-10T17:00:09+00:00">June 10, 2012, <span>5:00 pm</span></span><h3 class="entry-title">The Fallacy of the ‘Hijacked Brain’</h3>
<address class="byline author vcard">By <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/peg-o%e2%80%99connor/" class="url fn" title="See all posts by PEG O’CONNOR">PEG O’CONNOR</a></address><div class="entry-content">
<div class="inlineModule"><div class="entry categoryDescriptionModule"><p class="summary"><a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/">The Stone</a> is a forum for contemporary philosophers on issues both timely and timeless.</p>
</div><div class="entry entryTagsModule"><h4>Tags:</h4><p class="meta tags"><a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/addiction/" rel="tag">Addiction</a>, <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/determinism/" rel="tag">determinism</a>, <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/free-will/" rel="tag">free will</a>, <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/philosophy/" rel="tag">Philosophy</a></p>
</div></div><p>Of
all the philosophical discussions that surface in contemporary life,
the question of free will — mainly, the debate over whether or not we
have it — is certainly one of the most persistent.</p><div class="w190 right module"><div class="entry"><blockquote>A popular analogy clouds our understanding of addiction.</blockquote></div></div><p>That
might seem odd, as the average person rarely seems to pause to reflect
on whether their choices on, say, where they live, whom they marry, or
what they eat for dinner, are their own or the inevitable outcome of a
deterministic universe. Still, as James Atlas pointed out last month,
the spate of “can’t help yourself” books would indicate that people are
in fact deeply concerned with how much of their lives they can control.
Perhaps that’s because, upon further reflection, we find that our
understanding of free will lurks beneath many essential aspects of our
existence.</p><p>One particularly interesting variation on this question
appears in scientific, academic and therapeutic discussions about
addiction. Many times, the question is framed as follows: “Is addiction a
disease or a choice?”<br></p><p>The argument runs along these lines: If
addiction is a disease, then in some ways it is out of our control and
forecloses choices. A disease is a medical condition that develops
outside of our control; it is, then, not a matter of choice. In the
absence of choice, the addicted person is essentially relieved of
responsibility. The addict has been overpowered by her addiction.</p><p>The
counterargument describes addictive behavior as a choice. People whose
use of drugs and alcohol leads to obvious problems but who continue to
use them anyway are making choices to do so. Since those choices lead to
addiction, blame and responsibility clearly rest on the addict’s
shoulders. It then becomes more a matter of free will.</p><p>Recent
scientific studies on the biochemical responses of the brain are
currently tipping the scales toward the more deterministic view — of
addiction as a disease. The structure of the brain’s reward system
combined with certain biochemical responses and certain environments,
they appear to show, cause people to become addicted.</p><p>In such
studies, and in reports of them to news media, the term “the hijacked
brain” often appears, along with other language that emphasizes the
addict’s lack of choice in the matter. Sometimes the pleasure-reward
system has been “commandeered.” Other times it “goes rogue.” These
expressions are often accompanied by the conclusion that there are
“addicted brains.”</p><p>The word “hijacked” is especially evocative;
people often have a visceral reaction to it. I imagine that this is
precisely why this term is becoming more commonly used in connection
with addiction. But it is important to be aware of the effects of such
language on our understanding.</p><div class="w592">Leif Parsons</div><p>When
most people think of a hijacking, they picture a person, sometimes
wearing a mask and always wielding some sort of weapon, who takes
control of a car, plane or train. The hijacker may not himself drive or
pilot the vehicle, but the violence involved leaves no doubt who is in
charge. Someone can hijack a vehicle for a variety of reasons, but
mostly it boils down to needing to escape or wanting to use the vehicle
itself as a weapon in a greater plan. Hijacking is a means to an end; it
is always and only oriented to the goals of the hijacker. Innocent
victims are ripped from their normal lives by the violent intrusion of
the hijacker.</p><p>In the “hijacked” view of addiction, the brain is
the innocent victim of certain substances — alcohol, cocaine, nicotine
or heroin, for example — as well as certain behaviors like eating,
gambling or sexual activity. The drugs or the neurochemicals produced by
the behaviors overpower and redirect the brain’s normal responses, and
thus take control of (hijack) it. For addicted people, that martini or
cigarette is the weapon-wielding hijacker who is going to compel certain
behaviors.</p><p>To do this, drugs like alcohol and cocaine and
behaviors like gambling light up the brain’s pleasure circuitry, often
bringing a burst of euphoria. Other studies indicate that people who are
addicted have lower dopamine and serotonin levels in their brains,
which means that it takes more of a particular substance or behavior for
them to experience pleasure or to reach a certain threshold of
pleasure. People tend to want to maximize pleasure; we tend to do things
that bring more of it. We also tend to chase it when it subsides,
trying hard to recreate the same level of pleasure we have experienced
in the past. It is not uncommon to hear addicts talking about wanting to
experience the euphoria of a first high. Often they never reach it, but
keep trying. All of this lends credence to the description of the brain
as hijacked.</p><div class="w190 right module"><div class="entry"> Related <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/">More From The Stone</a><p class="summary">Read previous contributions to this series.</p>
</div></div><p>Analogies
and comparisons can be very effective and powerful tools in
explanation, especially when the objects compared are not overtly and
obviously similar at first glance. A comparison can be especially
compelling when one of the objects is familiar or common and is wrested
from its usual context. Similarities shared between disparate cases can
help to highlight features in each that might otherwise escape notice.
But analogies and comparisons always start to break down at some point,
often when the differences are seen to be greater than similarities.
This, I submit, is the case with understanding addiction as hijacking.</p><p>A
hijacker comes from outside and takes control by violent means. A
hijacker takes a vehicle that is not his; hijacking is always a form of
stealing and kidnapping. A hijacker always takes someone else’s vehicle;
you cannot hijack your own car. That is a type of nonsense or category
mistake. Ludwig Wittgenstein offered that money passed from your left
hand to your right is not a gift. The practical consequences of this
action are not the same as those of a gift. Writing yourself a thank-you
note would be absurd.</p><p>The analogy of addiction and hijacking
involves the same category mistake as the money switched from hand to
hand. You can treat yourself poorly, callously or violently. In such
cases, we might say the person is engaging in acts of self-abuse and
self-harm. Self-abuse can involve acting in ways that you know are not
in your self-interest in some larger sense or that are contrary to your
desires. This, however, is not hijacking; the practical consequences are
quite different.</p><p>It might be tempting to claim that in an
addiction scenario, the drugs or behaviors are the hijackers. However,
those drugs and behaviors need to be done by the person herself (barring
cases in which someone is given drugs and may be made chemically
dependent). In the usual cases, an individual is the one putting
chemicals into her body or engaging in certain behaviors in the hopes of
getting high. This simply pushes the question back to whether a person
can hijack herself.</p><p>There is a kind of intentionality to hijacking
that clearly is absent in addiction. No one plans to become an addict.
One certainly may plan to drink in reckless or dangerous ways, not with
the intention of becoming an addict somewhere down the road. Addiction
develops over time and requires repeated and worsening use.</p><p>In a
hijacking situation, it is very easy to assign blame and responsibility.
The villain is easy to identify. So are the victims, people who have
had the bad luck to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Hijacked
people are given no choice in the matter.</p><p>A little logic is
helpful here, since the “choice or disease” question rests on a false
dilemma. This fallacy posits that only two options exist. Since there
are only two options, they must be mutually exclusive. If we think,
however, of addiction as involving both choice <em>and</em> disease, our
outlook is likely to become more nuanced. For instance, the
progression of many medical diseases is affected by the choices that
individuals make. A patient who knows he has chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and refuses to wear a respirator or at least a mask
while using noxious chemicals is making a choice that exacerbates his
condition. A person who knows he meets the D.S.M.-IV criteria for
chemical abuse, and that abuse is often the precursor to dependency, and
still continues to use drugs, is making a choice, and thus bears
responsibility for it.</p><p>Linking choice and responsibility is right
in many ways, so long as we acknowledge that choice can be constrained
in ways other than by force or overt coercion. There is no doubt that
the choices of people progressing to addiction are constrained;
compulsion and impulsiveness constrain choices. Many addicts will say
that they choose to take that first drink or drug and that once they
start they cannot stop. A classic binge drinker is a prime example; his
choices are constrained with the first drink. He both has and does not
have a choice. (That moment before the first drink or drug is what the
philosopher Owen Flanagan describes as a “zone of control.”) But he
still bears some degree of responsibility to others and to himself.</p><p>The
complexity of each person’s experience with addiction should caution us
to avoid false quandaries, like the one that requires us to define
addiction as either disease or choice, and to adopt more nuanced
conceptions. Addicts are neither hijackers nor victims. It is time to
retire this analogy.<br></p><p><em>Peg
O’Connor teaches philosophy at Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter,
Minnesota. This year she is a recipient of an A.A. Heckman Fellowship
scholarship for study at the Hazelden Pittman Alcohol Archives
collection. </em></p></div></div></div> <br clear="all"><br>-- <br>Art Deco (Wayne A. Fox)<br><a href="mailto:art.deco.studios@gmail.com" target="_blank">art.deco.studios@gmail.com</a><br>