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<P>Those decisions are hiding out along with your explanation of why we went to war in Iraq. A team of archivists are busy searching for them.<BR><BR>Sunil</P></DIV>
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<DIV></DIV>From: <I>"Pat Kraut" <pkraut@moscow.com></I><BR>To: <I>"vision2020" <vision2020@moscow.com></I><BR>Subject: <I>Re: [Vision2020] Supreme Court on the Establishment Clause</I><BR>Date: <I>Wed, 17 Aug 2005 10:51:05 -0700</I><BR>>What happened to all the decistions used before that to say that it was OK<BR>>to say prayers before public meetings??<BR>><BR>><BR>>----- Original Message -----<BR>>From: "Melynda Huskey" <melyndahuskey@earthlink.net><BR>>To: <vision2020@moscow.com><BR>>Sent: Tuesday, August 16, 2005 4:04 PM<BR>>Subject: [Vision2020] Supreme Court on the Establishment Clause<BR>><BR>><BR>>Kai,<BR>><BR>>In Abington v. Schempp (1963), the Supreme Court held (in an opinion written<BR>>by Justice Clark):<BR>><BR>>"Second, this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the<BR>>Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion<BR>>over another. Almost 20 years ago in Everson, supra, at 15, the Court said<BR>>that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.<BR>>Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer<BR>>one religion over another." And Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed:<BR>><BR>>" 'There is no answer to the proposition . . . that the effect of the<BR>>religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of<BR>>propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or<BR>>indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in<BR>>part at taxpayers' expense.... This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights<BR>>because it was first in the
forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute<BR>>terms, and its strength is its rigidity.' Id., at 26.<BR>><BR>>"Further, Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and<BR>>Burton, declared:<BR>><BR>>" 'The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official<BR>>establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal<BR>>relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies.<BR>>Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was<BR>>broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to<BR>>create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious<BR>>activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of<BR>>public aid or support for religion.' Id., at 31-32.<BR>><BR>>"The same conclusion has been
firmly maintained ever since that time, see<BR>>Illinois ex rel. McCollum, supra, at pp. 210-211; McGowan v. Maryland,<BR>>supra, at 442-443; Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at 492-493, 495, and we<BR>>reaffirm it now.<BR>><BR>>"While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these<BR>>basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established,<BR>>recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their<BR>>history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the<BR>>consistent interpretation in cases of this Court, seem entirely untenable<BR>>and of value only as academic exercises."<BR>><BR>>Clark also wrote, on the question of letting some people "excuse themselves"<BR>>from participation:<BR>><BR>>"But we held in Speiser that the constitutional vice of the loyalty oath<BR>>procedure
discharged any obligation to seek the exemption before challenging<BR>>the constitutionality of the conditions upon which it might have been<BR>>denied. 357 U. S., at 529. Similarly, we have held that one need not apply<BR>>for a permit to distribute constitutionally protected literature, Lovell v.<BR>>Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, or to deliver a speech, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.<BR>>516, before he may attack the constitutionality of a licensing system of<BR>>which the defect is patent. Insofar as these cases implicate only questions<BR>>of establishment, it seems to me that the availability of an excuse is<BR>>constitutionally irrelevant. Moreover, the excusal procedure seems to me to<BR>>operate in such a way as to discourage the free exercise of religion on the<BR>>part of those who might wish to utilize it, thereby rendering it<BR>>unconstitutional in
an additional and quite distinct respect."<BR>><BR>>Read it all at:<BR>><BR>>http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=374&invol=203<BR>><BR>>Melynda Huskey<BR>><BR>><BR>>_____________________________________________________<BR>> List services made available by First Step Internet,<BR>> serving the communities of the Palouse since 1994.<BR>> http://www.fsr.net<BR>> mailto:Vision2020@moscow.com<BR>>ŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻ<BR>><BR>>_____________________________________________________<BR>> List services made available by First Step Internet,<BR>> serving the communities of the Palouse
since 1994.<BR>> http://www.fsr.net<BR>> mailto:Vision2020@moscow.com<BR>>ŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻŻ<BR></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE></div></html>