[Vision2020] 6-5-17 Intercept Article Based on Reality Winner's Leaked NSA Document
Ted Moffett
starbliss at gmail.com
Tue Nov 7 19:26:29 PST 2017
Vision2020 Post: Ted Moffett
***** Original material contained herein is Copyright 2000 through life
plus 70 years, Ted Moffett. Do not copy, forward, excerpt, or reproduce
outside the Vision2020.Moscow.com <http://vision2020.moscow.com/>
forum without the express written permission of the author.*****
---------------------------------------
First two paragraphs pasted-in below:
https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/
Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days Before 2016
Election
<https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/>
June 5 2017, 12:44 p.m.
Matthew Cole <https://theintercept.com/staff/matthewcole/>, Richard Esposito
<https://theintercept.com/staff/richardesposito/>, Sam Biddle
<https://theintercept.com/staff/sambiddle/>, Ryan Grim
<https://theintercept.com/staff/ryangrim/>
*Russian military intelligence* executed a cyberattack on at least one U.S.
voting software supplier and sent spear-phishing emails to more than 100
local election officials just days before last November’s presidential
election, according to a highly classified intelligence report obtained by
The Intercept.
The top-secret National Security Agency document, which was provided
anonymously to The Intercept and independently authenticated, analyzes
intelligence very recently acquired by the agency about a months-long
Russian intelligence cyber effort against elements of the U.S. election and
voting infrastructure. The report, dated May 5, 2017, is the most detailed
U.S. government account of Russian interference in the election that has
yet come to light.
&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-body"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;img
class="gmail-print-only" src="
https://cdn01.theintercept.com/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/russianhackerreport-2-1496693195-article-header.jpg"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-thumb-credit-block"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-thumb-credit"&amp;amp;amp;gt;Photo Illustration:
The
Intercept&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-content-block-outer"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-GridContainer
gmail-Post-scroll-container"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-GridRow"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-content-block"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-Post-content-block-inner"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-LanguagePosts"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-LanguagePosts-item"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;a
class="gmail-LanguagePosts-item-link" href="
https://theintercept.com/2017/06/06/exclusivo-relatorio-secreto-da-nsa-mostra-hacking-russo-dias-antes-da-eleicao-americana/"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;font
color="#0066cc"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="gmail-text"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span&amp;amp;amp;gt;Leia
em
português&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span&amp;amp;amp;gt;
&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="gmail-Icon gmail-Icon--Arrow_02_Right gmail-icon-TI_Arrow_02_Right"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/font&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-PostContent"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;u&amp;amp;amp;gt;Russian
military intelligence&amp;amp;amp;lt;/u&amp;amp;amp;gt;
executed a cyberattack on at least one U.S. voting software supplier and
sent spear-phishing emails to more than 100 local election officials just
days before last November’s presidential election, according to a highly
classified intelligence report obtained by The
Intercept.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
top-secret National Security Agency document, which was provided
anonymously to The Intercept and independently authenticated, analyzes
intelligence very recently acquired by the agency about a months-long
Russian intelligence cyber effort against elements of the U.S. election and
voting infrastructure. The report, dated May 5, 2017, is the most
detailed U.S. government account of Russian interference in the election
that has yet come to
light.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;While
the document provides a rare window into the
NSA’s understanding of the mechanics of Russian hacking, it does not
show the underlying “raw” intelligence on which the analysis is
based. A U.S. intelligence officer who declined to be identified
cautioned against drawing too big a conclusion from the
document because a single analysis is not necessarily
definitive.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;a
class="gmail-DocumentPreview" href="
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3766950-NSA-Report-on-Russia-Spearphishing.html#document/p1"
target="_blank"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;img
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-image" src="
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3766950/pages/NSA-Report-on-Russia-Spearphishing-p1-normal.gif"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-meta"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-icon-block"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="gmail-Icon gmail-Icon--Eye gmail-icon-TI_Eye"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-text-block"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-title"&amp;amp;amp;gt;NSA Report on
Russia
Spearphishing&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="gmail-DocumentPreview-pagecount"&amp;amp;amp;gt;5
pages&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
report indicates that Russian hacking may have penetrated further into U.S.
voting systems than was previously understood. It states unequivocally
in its summary statement that it was Russian military intelligence,
specifically the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, or
GRU, that conducted the cyber attacks described in the
document:&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;blockquote&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;Russian
General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate actors … executed cyber
espionage operations against a named U.S. company in August 2016, evidently
to obtain information on elections-related software and hardware solutions.
… The actors likely used data obtained from that operation to … launch a
voter registration-themed spear-phishing campaign targeting U.S. local
government
organizations.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;This
NSA summary judgment is sharply at odds with Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s &amp;amp;amp;lt;a href="
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/putin-russian-state-has-never-been-involved-in-hacking-239014"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;font
color="#0066cc"&amp;amp;amp;gt;denial&amp;amp;amp;lt;/font&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;
last week that Russia had interfered in foreign elections: “We never
engaged in that on a state level, and have no intention of doing so.”
Putin, who had previously issued blanket denials that any such Russian
meddling occurred, for the first time floated the possibility that
freelance Russian hackers with “patriotic leanings” may have been
responsible. The NSA report, on the contrary, displays no doubt that the
cyber assault was carried out by the
GRU.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA analysis does not draw conclusions about whether the interference had
any effect on the election’s outcome and concedes that much remains unknown
about the extent of the hackers’ accomplishments. However, the report
raises the possibility that Russian hacking may have breached at least some
elements of the voting system, with disconcertingly uncertain
results.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence were both
contacted for this article. Officials requested that we not publish or
report on the top secret document and declined to comment on it. When
informed that we intended to go ahead with this story, the
NSA requested a number of redactions. The Intercept agreed
to some of the redaction requests after determining that the
disclosure of that material was not clearly in the public
interest.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
report adds significant new detail to the picture that emerged from
the unclassified intelligence assessment about Russian election meddling
released by the Obama administration in January. The January
assessment presented the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusions but
omitted many specifics, citing concerns about disclosing sensitive sources
and methods. The assessment concluded with high confidence that the Kremlin
ordered an extensive, multi-pronged propaganda effort “to undermine public
faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm
her electability and potential
presidency.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;That
review did not attempt to assess what effect the Russian efforts had
on the election, despite the fact that “Russian intelligence obtained and
maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral
boards.” According to the Department of Homeland Security, the assessment
reported reassuringly, “the types of systems we observed Russian
actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote
tallying.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA has now learned, however, that Russian government hackers, part of a
team with a “cyber espionage mandate specifically directed at U.S. and
foreign elections,” focused on parts of the system directly connected to
the voter registration process, including a private sector manufacturer of
devices that maintain and verify the voter rolls. Some of the company’s
devices are advertised as having wireless internet and Bluetooth
connectivity, which could have provided an ideal staging point for further
malicious actions.&amp;amp;amp;lt;a href="
https://theintercept.imgix.net/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/gru-chart-russia-hacking-election-1496684832.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;q=90"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;br
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-img-wrap gmail-align-bleed gmail-full-bleed gmail-width-auto"
style="width: auto;"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;a href="
https://theintercept.imgix.net/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/gru-chart-russia-hacking-election-1496684832.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;q=90"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;img
class="gmail-aligncenter gmail-size-large gmail-wp-image-131424"
style="width: 1831px; margin-left: -576px;"
alt="gru-chart-russia-hacking-election-1496684832" src="
https://theintercept.imgix.net/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/gru-chart-russia-hacking-election-1496684832.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;q=90"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p
/&amp;amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;amp;lt;p class="gmail-caption
gmail-overlayed"&amp;amp;amp;gt;Attached to the secret NSA report
is an overview chart detailing the Russian government’s spear-phishing
operation, apparently missing a second page that was not provided to The
Intercept.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;
&amp;amp;amp;lt;p class="gmail-caption gmail-source
gmail-pullright"&amp;amp;amp;gt;Graphic:
NSA&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;h3&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
Spear-Phishing
Attack&amp;amp;amp;lt;/h3&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;As
described by the classified NSA report, the Russian plan was simple: pose
as an e-voting vendor and trick local government employees into opening
Microsoft Word documents invisibly tainted with potent malware that could
give hackers full control over the infected
computers.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;But
in order to dupe the local officials, the hackers needed access to an
election software vendor’s internal systems to put together a convincing
disguise. So on August 24, 2016, the Russian hackers sent spoofed emails
purporting to be from Google to employees of an unnamed U.S. election
software company, according to the NSA report. Although the document does
not directly identify the company in question, it contains references to a
product made by VR Systems, a Florida-based vendor of electronic voting
services and equipment whose products are used in eight
states.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
spear-phishing email contained a link directing the employees to a
malicious, faux-Google website that would request their login credentials
and then hand them over to the hackers. The NSA identified seven “potential
victims” at the company. While malicious emails targeting three of the
potential victims were rejected by an email server, at least one of the
employee accounts was likely compromised, the agency concluded. The NSA
notes in its report that it is “unknown whether the aforementioned
spear-phishing deployment successfully compromised all the intended
victims, and what potential data from the victim could have been
exfiltrated.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;VR
Systems declined to respond to a request for comment on the specific
hacking operation outlined in the NSA document. Chief Operating Officer Ben
Martin replied by email to The Intercept’s request for comment with the
following
statement:&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;blockquote&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;Phishing
and spear-phishing are not uncommon in our industry. We regularly
participate in cyber alliances with state officials and members of the law
enforcement community in an effort to address these types of threats. We
have policies and procedures in effect to protect our customers and our
company.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;Although
the NSA report indicates that VR Systems was targeted only with
login-stealing trickery, rather than computer-controlling malware, this
isn’t necessarily a reassuring sign. Jake Williams, founder of computer
security firm Rendition Infosec and formerly of the NSA’s Tailored Access
Operations hacking team, said stolen logins can be even more dangerous than
an infected computer. “I’ll take credentials most days over malware,” he
said, since an employee’s login information can be used to penetrate
“corporate VPNs, email, or cloud services,” allowing access to internal
corporate data. The risk is particularly heightened given how common it is
to use the same password for multiple services. Phishing, as the name
implies, doesn’t require everyone to take the bait in order to be a success
— though Williams stressed that hackers “never want just one” set of stolen
credentials.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;div
class="gmail-img-wrap gmail-align-center gmail-width-fixed" style="width:
1000px;"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;a href="
https://theintercept.imgix.net/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/nsa-russia-hacking-election-3-1496690296.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;q=90"&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;img
class="gmail-aligncenter gmail-size-article-large gmail-wp-image-131468"
alt="nsa-russia-hacking-election-3-1496690296" src="
https://theintercept.imgix.net/wp-uploads/sites/1/2017/06/nsa-russia-hacking-election-3-1496690296.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;q=90&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;w=1000&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;h=729"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/a&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p
/&amp;amp;amp;gt; &amp;amp;amp;lt;p
class="gmail-caption"&amp;amp;amp;gt;A detail from a top-secret NSA
report on a Russian military intelligence operation targeting the U.S.
election infrastructure.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;
&amp;amp;amp;lt;p class="gmail-caption
gmail-source"&amp;amp;amp;gt;Image:
NSA&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;In
any event, the hackers apparently got what they needed. Two months later,
on October 27, they set up an “operational” Gmail account designed to
appear as if it belonged to an employee at VR Systems, and used
documents obtained from the previous operation to launch a second
spear-phishing operation “targeting U.S. local government organizations.”
These emails contained a Microsoft Word document that had been “trojanized”
so that when it was opened it would send out a beacon to the “malicious
infrastructure” set up by the
hackers.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA assessed that this phase of the spear-fishing operation was likely
launched on either October 31 or November 1 and sent spear-fishing emails
to 122 email addresses “associated with named local government
organizations,” probably to officials “involved in the management of
voter registration systems.” The emails contained Microsoft Word
attachments purporting to be benign documentation for VR Systems’ EViD
voter database product line, but which were in reality maliciously embedded
with automated software commands that are triggered instantly and invisibly
when the user opens the document. These particular weaponized files used
PowerShell, a Microsoft scripting language designed for system
administrators and installed by default on Windows computers, allowing vast
control over a system’s settings and functions. If opened, the files “very
likely” would have instructed the infected computer to begin downloading in
the background a second package of malware from a remote server also
controlled by the hackers, which the secret report says could have provided
attackers with “persistent access” to the computer or the ability to
“survey the victims for items of interest.” Essentially, the weaponized
Word document quietly unlocks and opens a target’s back door, allowing
virtually any cocktail of malware to be subsequently delivered
automatically.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;According
to Williams, if this type of attack were successful, the perpetrator would
possess “unlimited” capacity for siphoning away items of interest. “Once
the user opens up that email [attachment],” Williams explained, “the
attacker has all the same capabilities that the user does.” Vikram Thakur,
a senior research manager at Symantec’s Security Response Team, told The
Intercept that in cases like this the “quantity of exfiltrated data is only
limited by the controls put in place by network administrators.” Data theft
of this variety is typically encrypted, meaning anyone observing an
infected network wouldn’t be able to see what exactly was being removed but
should certainly be able to tell something was afoot, Williams added.
Overall, the method is one of “medium sophistication,” Williams said,
one that “practically any hacker can pull
off.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA, however, is uncertain about the results of the attack, according to
the report. “It is unknown,” the NSA notes, “whether the aforementioned
spear-phishing deployment successfully compromised the intended victims,
and what potential data could have been accessed by the cyber
actor.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
FBI would not comment about whether it is pursuing a criminal investigation
into the cyber attack on VR
Systems.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;At
a December press conference, President Obama said that he told Russian
President Vladimir Putin in September not to hack the U.S. election
infrastructure. “What I was concerned about in particular was making sure
[the DNC hack] wasn’t compounded by potential hacking that could hamper
vote counting, affect the actual election process itself,” Obama said. “So
in early September, when I saw President Putin in China, I felt that the
most effective way to ensure that that didn’t happen was to talk to him
directly and tell him to cut it out and there were going to be serious
consequences if he didn’t. And in fact we did not see further tampering of
the election
process.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;Yet
the NSA has now found that the tampering continued. “The fact that this is
occurring in October is troubling,” said one senior law enforcement
official with significant cyber expertise. “In August 2016 warnings went
out from the FBI and DHS to those agencies. This was not a surprise. This
was not hard to defend against. But you needed a commitment of budget and
attention.”&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;The
NSA document briefly describes two other election-related Russian hacking
operations. In one, Russian military hackers created an email account
pretending to be another U.S. election company, referred to in the document
as U.S. company 2, from which they sent fake test emails offering
“election-related products and services.” The agency was unable to
determine whether there was any targeting using this
account.&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;p&amp;amp;amp;gt;In
a third Russian operation, the same group of hackers sent test emails
to addresses at the American Samoa Election Office, presumably to determine
whether those accounts existed before launching another phishing attack. It
is unclear what the effort achieved, but the NSA assessed that the Russians
appeared intent on “mimicking a legitimate absentee ballot-related service
provider.” The report does not indicate why the Russians targeted the tiny
Pacific islands, a U.S. territory with no electoral votes to
contribute to the election.&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="sewo7vtb8pyima4"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;span
class="sew926avzfvn2tb"
/&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/p&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/span&amp;amp;amp;gt;&amp;amp;amp;lt;/div&amp;amp;amp;gt;
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