[Vision2020] And just something to think about......
Wayne Price
bear at moscow.com
Sat Dec 22 16:38:14 PST 2012
This was sent to me by someone that I hold in high regards and often
disagree with, but listen to and respect their opinions.
The American Revolution against British Gun Control
By David B. Kopel*
Administrative and Regulatory Law News (American Bar Association).
Vol. 37, no. 4, Summer 2012. More by Kopel on the right to arms in the
Founding Era.
This Article reviews the British gun control program that precipitated
the American Revolution: the 1774 import ban on firearms and
gunpowder; the 1774-75 confiscations of firearms and gunpowder; and
the use of violence to effectuate the confiscations. It was these
events that changed a situation of political tension into a shooting
war. Each of these British abuses provides insights into the scope of
the modern Second Amendment.
Furious at the December 1773 Boston Tea Party, Parliament in 1774
passed the Coercive Acts. The particular provisions of the Coercive
Acts were offensive to Americans, but it was the possibility that the
British might deploy the army to enforce them that primed many
colonists for armed resistance. The Patriots of Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, resolved: “That in the event of Great Britain attempting
to force unjust laws upon us by the strength of arms, our cause we
leave to heaven and our rifles.” A South Carolina newspaper essay,
reprinted in Virginia, urged that any law that had to be enforced by
the military was necessarily illegitimate.
The Royal Governor of Massachusetts, General Thomas Gage, had
forbidden town meetings from taking place more than once a year. When
he dispatched the Redcoats to break up an illegal town meeting in
Salem, 3000 armed Americans appeared in response, and the British
retreated. Gage’s aide John Andrews explained that everyone in the
area aged 16 years or older owned a gun and plenty of gunpowder.
Military rule would be difficult to impose on an armed populace. Gage
had only 2,000 troops in Boston. There were thousands of armed men in
Boston alone, and more in the surrounding area. One response to the
problem was to deprive the Americans of gunpowder.
Modern “smokeless” gunpowder is stable under most conditions. The
“black powder” of the 18th Century was far more volatile. Accordingly,
large quantities of black powder were often stored in a town’s “powder
house,” typically a reinforced brick building. The powder house would
hold merchants’ reserves, large quantities stored by individuals, as
well as powder for use by the local militia. Although colonial laws
generally required militiamen (and sometimes all householders, too) to
have their own firearm and a minimum quantity of powder, not everyone
could afford it. Consequently, the government sometimes supplied
“public arms” and powder to individual militiamen. Policies varied on
whether militiamen who had been given public arms would keep them at
home. Public arms would often be stored in a special armory, which
might also be the powder house.
Before dawn on September 1, 1774, 260 of Gage’s Redcoats sailed up the
Mystic River and seized hundreds of barrels of powder from the
Charlestown powder house.
The “Powder Alarm,” as it became known, was a serious provocation. By
the end of the day, 20,000 militiamen had mobilized and started
marching towards Boston. In Connecticut and Western Massachusetts,
rumors quickly spread that the Powder Alarm had actually involved
fighting in the streets of Boston. More accurate reports reached the
militia companies before that militia reached Boston, and so the war
did not begin in September. The message, though, was unmistakable: If
the British used violence to seize arms or powder, the Americans would
treat that violent seizure as an act of war, and would fight. And that
is exactly what happened several months later, on April 19, 1775.
Five days after the Powder Alarm, on September 6, the militia of the
towns of Worcester County assembled on the Worcester Common. Backed by
the formidable array, the Worcester Convention took over the reins of
government, and ordered the resignations of all militia officers, who
had received their commissions from the Royal Governor. The officers
promptly resigned and then received new commissions from the Worcester
Convention.
That same day, the people of Suffolk County (which includes Boston)
assembled and adopted the Suffolk Resolves. The 19-point Resolves
complained about the Powder Alarm, and then took control of the local
militia away from the Royal Governor (by replacing the Governor’s
appointed officers with officers elected by the militia) and resolved
to engage in group practice with arms at least weekly.
The First Continental Congress, which had just assembled in
Philadelphia, unanimously endorsed the Suffolk Resolves and urged all
the other colonies to send supplies to help the Bostonians.
Governor Gage directed the Redcoats to begin general, warrantless
searches for arms and ammunition. According to the Boston Gazette, of
all General Gage’s offenses, “what most irritated the People” was
“seizing their Arms and Ammunition.”
When the Massachusetts Assembly convened, General Gage declared it
illegal, so the representatives reassembled as the “Provincial
Congress.” On October 26, 1774, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress
adopted a resolution condemning military rule, and criticizing Gage
for “unlawfully seizing and retaining large quantities of ammunition
in the arsenal at Boston.” The Provincial Congress urged all militia
companies to organize and elect their own officers. At least a quarter
of the militia (the famous Minute Men) were directed to “equip and
hold themselves in readiness to march at the shortest notice.” The
Provincial Congress further declared that everyone who did not already
have a gun should get one, and start practicing with it diligently.
In flagrant defiance of royal authority, the Provincial Congress
appointed a Committee of Safety and vested it with the power to call
forth the militia. The militia of Massachusetts was now the instrument
of what was becoming an independent government of Massachusetts.
Lord Dartmouth, the Royal Secretary of State for America, sent Gage a
letter on October 17, 1774, urging him to disarm New England. Gage
replied that he would like to do so, but it was impossible without the
use of force. After Gage’s letter was made public by a reading in the
British House of Commons, it was publicized in America as proof of
Britain’s malign intentions.
Two days after Lord Dartmouth dispatched his disarmament
recommendation, King George III and his ministers blocked importation
of arms and ammunition to America. Read literally, the order merely
required a permit to export arms or ammunition from Great Britain to
America. In practice, no permits were granted.
Meanwhile, Benjamin Franklin was masterminding the surreptitious
import of arms and ammunition from the Netherlands, France, and Spain.
The patriotic Boston Committee of Correspondence learned of the arms
embargo and promptly dispatched Paul Revere to New Hampshire, with the
warning that two British ships were headed to Fort William and Mary,
near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to seize firearms, cannons, and
gunpowder. On December 14, 1774, 400 New Hampshire patriots
preemptively captured all the material at the fort. A New Hampshire
newspaper argued that the capture was prudent and proper, reminding
readers that the ancient Carthaginians had consented to “deliver up
all their Arms to the Romans” and were decimated by the Romans soon
after.
In Parliament, a moderate minority favored conciliation with America.
Among the moderates was the Duke of Manchester, who warned that
America now had three million people, and most of them were trained to
use arms. He was certain they could produce a stronger army than Great
Britain.
The Massachusetts Provincial Congress offered to purchase as many arms
and bayonets as could be delivered to the next session of the
Congress. Massachusetts also urged American gunsmiths “diligently to
apply themselves” to making guns for everyone who did not already have
a gun. A few weeks earlier, the Congress had resolved: “That it be
strongly recommended, to all the inhabitants of this colony, to be
diligently attentive to learning the use of arms . . . .”
Derived from political and legal philosophers such as John Locke, Hugo
Grotius, and Edward Coke, the ideology underlying all forms of
American resistance was explicitly premised on the right of self-
defense of all inalienable rights; from the self-defense foundation
was constructed a political theory in which the people were the
masters and government the servant, so that the people have the right
to remove a disobedient servant.
The British government was not, in a purely formal sense, attempting
to abolish the Americans’ common law right of self-defense. Yet in
practice, that was precisely what the British were attempting. First,
by disarming the Americans, the British were attempting to make the
practical exercise of the right of personal self-defense much more
difficult. Second, and more fundamentally, the Americans made no
distinction between self-defense against a lone criminal or against a
criminal government. To the Americans, and to their British Whig
ancestors, the right of self-defense necessarily implied the right of
armed self-defense against tyranny.
The troubles in New England inflamed the other colonies. Patrick
Henry’s great speech to the Virginia legislature on March 23, 1775,
argued that the British plainly meant to subjugate America by force.
Because every attempt by the Americans at peaceful reconciliation had
been rebuffed, the only remaining alternatives for the Americans were
to accept slavery or to take up arms. If the Americans did not act
soon, the British would soon disarm them, and all hope would be lost.
“The millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in
such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force
which our enemy can send against us,” he promised.
The Convention formed a committee—including Patrick Henry, Richard
Henry Lee, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson—“to prepare a plan
for the embodying, arming, and disciplining such a number of men as
may be sufficient” to defend the commonwealth. The Convention urged
“that every Man be provided with a good Rifle” and “that every
Horseman be provided . . . with Pistols and Holsters, a Carbine, or
other Firelock.” When the Virginia militiamen assembled a few weeks
later, many wore canvas hunting shirts adorned with the motto “Liberty
or Death.”
In South Carolina, patriots established a government, headed by the
“General Committee.” The Committee described the British arms embargo
as a plot to disarm the Americans in order to enslave them. Thus, the
Committee recommended that “all persons” should “immediately” provide
themselves with a large quantity of ammunition.
Without formal legal authorization, Americans began to form
independent militia, outside the traditional chain of command of the
royal governors. In Virginia, George Washington and George Mason
organized the Fairfax Independent Militia Company. The Fairfax
militiamen pledged that “we will, each of us, constantly keep by us” a
firelock, six pounds of gunpowder, and twenty pounds of lead. Other
independent militia embodied in Virginia along the same model.
Independent militia also formed in Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire, Maryland, and South Carolina, choosing their own officers.
John Adams praised the newly constituted Massachusetts militia,
“commanded through the province, not by men who procured their
commissions from a governor as a reward for making themselves pimps to
his tools.”
The American War of Independence began on April 19, 1775, when 700
Redcoats under the command of Major John Pitcairn left Boston to seize
American arms at Lexington and Concord.
The militia that assembled at the Lexington Green and the Concord
Bridge consisted of able-bodied men aged 16 to 60. They supplied their
own firearms, although a few poor men had to borrow a gun. Warned by
Paul Revere and Samuel Dawes of the British advance, the young women
of Lexington assembled cartridges late into the evening of April 18.
At dawn, the British confronted about 200 militiamen at Lexington.
“Disperse you Rebels—Damn you, throw down your Arms and disperse!”
ordered Major Pitcairn. The Americans were quickly routed.
With a “huzzah” of victory, the Redcoats marched on to Concord, where
one of Gage’s spies had told him that the largest Patriot reserve of
gunpowder was stored. At Concord’s North Bridge, the town militia met
with some of the British force, and after a battle of two or three
minutes, drove off the British.
Notwithstanding the setback at the bridge, the Redcoats had sufficient
force to search the town for arms and ammunition. But the main powder
stores at Concord had been hauled to safety before the Redcoats arrived.
When the British began to withdraw back to Boston, things got much
worse for them. Armed Americans were swarming in from nearby towns.
They would soon outnumber the British 2:1. Although some of the
Americans cohered in militia units, a great many fought on their own,
taking sniper positions wherever opportunity presented itself. Only
British reinforcements dispatched from Boston saved the British
expedition from annihilation—and the fact that the Americans started
running out of ammunition and gun powder.
One British officer reported: “These fellows were generally good
marksmen, and many of them used long guns made for Duck-Shooting.” On
a per-shot basis, the Americans inflicted higher casualties than had
the British regulars.
That night, the American militiamen began laying siege to Boston,
where General Gage’s standing army was located. At dawn, Boston had
been the base from which the King’s army could project force into New
England. Now, it was trapped in the city, surrounded by people in arms.
Two days later in Virginia, royal authorities confiscated 20 barrels
of gunpowder from the public magazine in Williamsburg and destroyed
the public firearms there by removing their firing mechanisms. In
response to complaints, manifested most visibly by the mustering of a
large independent militia led by Patrick Henry, Governor Dunmore
delivered a legal note promising to pay restitution.
At Lexington and Concord, forcible disarmament had not worked out for
the British. So back in Boston, Gage set out to disarm the Bostonians
a different way.
On April 23, 1775, Gage offered the Bostonians the opportunity to
leave town if they surrendered their arms. The Boston Selectmen voted
to accept the offer, and within days, 2,674 guns were deposited, one
gun for every two adult male Bostonians.
Gage thought that many Bostonians still had guns, and he refused to
allow the Bostonians to leave. Indeed, a large proportion of the
surrendered guns were “training arms”—large muskets with bayonets,
that would be difficult to hide. After several months, food shortages
in Boston convinced Gage to allow easier emigration from the city.
Gage’s disarmament program incited other Americans to take up arms.
Benjamin Franklin, returning to Philadelphia after an unsuccessful
diplomatic trip to London, “was highly pleased to find the Americans
arming and preparing for the worst events.”
The government in London dispatched more troops and three more
generals to America: William Howe, Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne.
The generals arrived on May 25, 1775, with orders from Lord Dartmouth
to seize all arms in public armories, or which had been “secretly
collected together for the purpose of aiding Rebellions.”
The war underway, the Americans captured Fort Ticonderoga in upstate
New York. At the June 17 Battle of Bunker Hill, the militia held its
ground against the British regulars and inflicted heavy casualties,
until they ran out of gunpowder and were finally driven back. (Had
Gage not confiscated the gunpowder from the Charleston Powder House
the previous September, the Battle of Bunker Hill probably would have
resulted in an outright defeat of the British.)
On June 19, Gage renewed his demand that the Bostonians surrender
their arms, and he declared that anyone found in possession of arms
would be deemed guilty of treason.
Meanwhile, the Continental Congress had voted to send ten companies of
riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to aid the
Massachusetts militia.
On July 6, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of
Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms, written by Thomas Jefferson
and the great Pennsylvania lawyer John Dickinson. Among the grievances
were General Gage’s efforts to disarm the people of Lexington,
Concord, and Boston.
Two days later, the Continental Congress sent an open letter to the
people of Great Britain warning that “men trained to arms from their
Infancy, and animated by the Love of Liberty, will afford neither a
cheap or easy conquest.”
The Swiss immigrant John Zubly, who was serving as a Georgia delegate
to the Continental Congress, wrote a pamphlet entitled Great Britain’s
Right to Tax . . . By a Swiss, which was published in London and
Philadelphia. He warned that “in a strong sense of liberty, and the
use of fire-arms almost from the cradle, the Americans have vastly the
advantage over men of their rank almost every where else.” Indeed,
children were “shouldering the resemblance of a gun before they are
well able to walk.” “The Americans will fight like men, who have
everything at stake,” and their motto was “DEATH OR FREEDOM.” The town
of Gorham, Massachusetts (now part of the State of Maine), sent the
British government a warning that even “many of our Women have been
used to handle the Cartridge and load the Musquet.”
It was feared that the Massachusetts gun confiscation was the
prototype for the rest of America. For example, a newspaper article
published in three colonies reported that when the new British
generals arrived, they would order everyone in America “to deliver up
their arms by a certain stipulated day.”
The events of April 19 convinced many more Americans to arm themselves
and to embody independent militia. A report from New York City
observed that “the inhabitants there are arming themselves . . .
forming companies, and taking every method to defend our rights. The
like spirit prevails in the province of New Jersey, where a large and
well disciplined militia are now fit for action.”
In Virginia, Lord Dunmore observed: “Every County is now Arming a
Company of men whom they call an independent Company for the avowed
purpose of protecting their Committee, and to be employed against
Government if occasion require.” North Carolina’s Royal Governor
Josiah Martin issued a proclamation outlawing independent militia, but
it had little effect.
A Virginia gentleman wrote a letter to a Scottish friend explaining in
America:
We are all in arms, exercising and training old and young to the use
of the gun. No person goes abroad without his sword, or gun, or
pistols. . . . Every plain is full of armed men, who all wear a
hunting shirt, on the left breast of which are sewed, in very legible
letters, “Liberty or Death.”
The British escalated the war. Royal Admiral Samuel Graves ordered
that all seaports north of Boston be burned.
When the British navy showed up at what was then known as Falmouth,
Massachusetts (today’s Portland, Maine), the town attempted to
negotiate. The townspeople gave up eight muskets, which was hardly
sufficient, and so Falmouth was destroyed by naval bombardment.
The next year, the 13 Colonies would adopt the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration listed the tyrannical acts of King
George III, including his methods for carrying out gun control: “He
has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and
destroyed the Lives of our people.”
As the war went on, the British always remembered that without gun
control, they could never control America. In 1777, with British
victory seeming likely, Colonial Undersecretary William Knox drafted a
plan entitled “What Is Fit to Be Done with America?” To ensure that
there would be no future rebellions, “[t]he Militia Laws should be
repealed and none suffered to be re-enacted, & the Arms of all the
People should be taken away, . . . nor should any Foundery or
manufactuary of Arms, Gunpowder, or Warlike Stores, be ever suffered
in America, nor should any Gunpowder, Lead, Arms or Ordnance be
imported into it without Licence . . . .”
To the Americans of the Revolution and the Founding Era, the theory of
some late-20th Century courts that the Second Amendment is a
“collective right” and not an “individual right” might have seemed
incomprehensible. The Americans owned guns individually, in their
homes. They owned guns collectively, in their town armories and powder
houses. They would not allow the British to confiscate their
individual arms, nor their collective arms; and when the British tried
to do both, the Revolution began. The Americans used their individual
arms and their collective arms to fight against the confiscation of
any arms. Americans fought to provide themselves a government that
would never perpetrate the abuses that had provoked the Revolution.
What are modern versions of such abuses? The reaction against the 1774
import ban for firearms and gunpowder (via a discretionary licensing
law) indicates that import restrictions are unconstitutional if their
purpose is to make it more difficult for Americans to possess guns.
The federal Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits the import of any
firearm that is not deemed “sporting” by federal regulators. That
import ban seems difficult to justify based on the historical record
of 1774-76.
Laws disarming people who have proven themselves to be a particular
threat to public safety are not implicated by the 1774-76 experience.
In contrast, laws that aim to disarm the public at large are precisely
what turned a political argument into the American Revolution.
The most important lesson for today from the Revolution is about
militaristic or violent search and seizure in the name of disarmament.
As Hurricane Katrina bore down on Louisiana, police officers in St.
Charles Parish confiscated firearms from people who were attempting to
flee. After the hurricane passed, officers went house to house in New
Orleans, breaking into homes and confiscating firearms at gunpoint.
The firearms seizures were flagrantly illegal under existing state
law. A federal district judge soon issued an order against the
confiscation, ordering the return of the seized guns.
When there is genuine evidence of potential danger—such as evidence
that guns are in the possession of a violent gang—then the Fourth
Amendment properly allows no-knock raids, flash-bang grenades, and
similar violent tactics to carry out a search. Conversely, if there is
no real evidence of danger—for example, if it is believed that a
person who has no record of violence owns guns but has not registered
them properly—then militaristically violent enforcement of a search
warrant should never be allowed. Gun ownership simpliciter ought never
to be a pretext for government violence. The Americans in 1775 fought
a war because the king did not agree.
* Research Director, Independence Institute, and Adjunct Professor of
Advanced Constitutional Law, Denver University, Sturm College of Law.
This is article is adapted from How theBritish Gun Control Program
Precipitated the American Revolution, 6 Charleston L. Rev. 283 (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967702.
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