[Vision2020] Response to Joe, Donovan [More]
Joe Campbell
philosopher.joe at gmail.com
Sat May 21 06:10:39 PDT 2011
It's not a proof, sorry. You just keep making the same claim over and over
again. Maybe it would be clearer that you're not proving this, just making
the claim, if you wrote out the proof. What are the premises for the
conclusion that "If God is omniscient, no one has free will." Or you could
give a conditional proof: Suppose, for the sake of argument that God is
omniscient. Now lay out clearly the steps that get you from this assumption
to the claim that no one has free will. Along the way be sure to define your
terms: "Free will" =df. etc.
I can help you get started. Here is one of your claims: "If *all* acts of
humankind are predetermined including mental acts, then there can be no
freedom of choice or so-called free will." Prove that this claim is true by
conditional proof. I'll grant the assumption that "all acts of humankind are
predetermined [in the sense that God knows them to be true]." You show how
the consequence -- "there can be no freedom of choice or so-called free
will" -- follows from the assumption. You might think it is contained below
but it isn't. You just keep repeating the conditional; you have not
established it.
On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 9:28 AM, Art Deco <deco at moscow.com> wrote:
> I am not proving anything about some alleged God except that as described
> by some, such a God is logically impossible. I have taken traditional
> definitions and assertions based on those definitions and shown that they
> lead to a contradiction -- an impossible state of affairs.
>
> Your question below was/is answered by 6 - 11 in last post. I see no need
> to repeat it. These sections demonstrate under the assumptions of
> omnipotence and omniscience humankind cannot choose in any manner other than
> what God ordained/determined at the moment of creation. There are no
> choices that God did not intentionally and *knowingly* determine from the
> beginning. Hence, there is no such thing as free will under the assumption
> of God's omnipotence -- all actions of the will and their consequences
> where known and determined by God at the beginning, else it would be false
> to say God is omniscient, i.e. God knows *everything*.
>
> Please read 6 - 11 below for an expanded description of why this is so.
>
> We are stuck here:
>
>
> "However, again if you want to refute the arguments in my analysis of the
> Problem of Evil, then do it by showing a mistake in their logical structure,
> not by changing the context of the assertions or by changing the meaning of
> words that I have taken pains from the beginning to make clear, and meanings
> which as far as I know are the traditional meanings used by philosophers and
> theologians. Such tactics are like someone changing the definition of a
> topological space in order to refute a theorem in topology,"
>
> I have clearly defined what omniscient means and the implications of this
> definition; I believe this definition to be the traditional definition, and
> hence I am not interested in pursuing a dialog where someone keeps trying to
> change the definition in order to allow free will, omniscience, etc to be
> compatible. This dialog makes me feel like being at Subway when asked "What
> do you want on that?" and I reply "Everything except hot peppers," but the
> server continues to ask whether I want each and every particular possible
> addition to the sandwich under construction.
>
> Other Vision 2020 readers can see and decide for themselves what has
> occurred in this dialog, if they are interested.
>
> I am more interested in the exposing the phonies and their motivation in
> pursuing a clearly logically impossible definition of some alleged God than
> dealing with those that either cannot, do nor wish to understand or pretend
> that they have not understood what I have written.
>
>
> w.
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Joe Campbell <philosopher.joe at gmail.com>
> *To:* Art Deco <deco at moscow.com>
> *Sent:* Friday, May 20, 2011 6:07 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [Vision2020] Response to Joe, Donovan [More]
>
> Let's just stick to one thing at a time. Let's see if you can prove just
> one part of your story: given that God knows everything -- meaning
> everything that is true, will be true, or was true -- then no one has free
> will. You keep saying it. Prove it. We'll go from there.
>
> On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Art Deco <deco at moscow.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> [Sigh!]
>>
>>
>>
>> When I wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> "However, again if you want to refute the arguments in my analysis of the
>> Problem of Evil, then do it by showing a mistake in their logical structure,
>> not by changing the context of the assertions or by changing the meaning of
>> words that I have taken pains from the beginning to make clear, and meanings
>> which as far as I know are the traditional meanings used by philosophers and
>> theologians. Such tactics are like someone changing the definition of a
>> topological space in order to refute a theorem in topology,"
>>
>>
>>
>> I thought that this request would be respected. Unfortunately this
>> didn't happen.
>>
>>
>>
>> Joe wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> "It depends entirely on how God knows all things. If God predicts the
>> future like we do, then his omnipotence might not yield his knowing all
>> things -- past, present, and future. There are factors -- chaos is one --
>> which might get in the way of his ability to predict. Again, you have to
>> keep an open mind about the idea of an omniscient creature knowing
>> everything there is to know. If the future is unreal in the sense that it
>> has yet to come to pass, there is nothing about it to know."
>>
>>
>>
>> This is again a transparent attempt to bypass what is most likely an
>> unpalatable conclusion, namely, if some alleged God is omnipotent and
>> omniscient, then humankind does not have free will and God is responsible
>> for evil.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the last and earlier posts, I defined the way I was using omniscience:
>>
>>
>>
>> "Earlier, to forestall these kinds of claims, I clearly defined the
>> "omniscience" of the alleged God: "*At all times past, present and
>> future God knows everything, past, present, and future." There are no
>> gaps in God's foreknowledge or knowledge.* I believe that this is the
>> traditional definition used by philosophers and theologians who have
>> discussed this subject. Regardless, this is how I have used the concept
>> of omniscience in this discussion. If you want to show that my analysis
>> is in error, please use words in the same way I have."
>>
>>
>>
>> Perhaps, that was not clear enough. Perhaps some people, like some of
>> the servers at Subway, do not know what "all" or "everything" means. Hence,
>> if Joe is confused, others may be also. So I will draw out some of the
>> obvious conclusions implicit in the definitions I have given so that some of
>> the confusion the words "all" and :everything" may cause might be reduced.
>> At all times henceforth the word "God" means "alleged God."
>>
>>
>>
>> In the formulation of the Problem of Evil under discussion, key terms are
>> defined as follows. I believe that these definitions of terms are not
>> new, but reflect their traditional usage in philosophical and theological
>> dogma and debate.
>>
>>
>>
>> A. *God is omnipotent* (all powerful) means at a minimum God can
>> do/cause/ordain/etc anything (plan, event, sequence of events, creative
>> acts, etc). For the purposes of human communication God can do any set
>> of events which can be expressed in a non-contradictory combination of
>> statements. There may be other things God can do which cannot be
>> formulated by statements which are outside the realm of human communication
>> or outside the realm of possible human knowledge, if so, such powers are not
>> discussable. In short, God can do anything not linguistically
>> contradictory.
>>
>>
>>
>> B. *God is omniscient *(all knowing)* *means at a minimum at all
>> times past, present and future God knows everything, past, present, and
>> future. There are no gaps in God's foreknowledge or knowledge. This
>> knowledge includes knowledge of the universe as we know and exist in it. God
>> has, and always has had complete knowledge of the past and present and has
>> and always has had complete foreknowledge. There are no errors in God's
>> knowledge. God can and does predict everything exactly and correctly and
>> in the correct sequence. Given any conditions/states, God knows what
>> will result from such conditions/states. God's knowledge extends to
>> every conceivable thing in the universe including physical events and mental
>> events. In the case of mental events, God's knowledge and foreknowledge
>> includes all conscious events and states in all human beings including
>> feelings and mental acts, which includes all the mental processes of choice
>> made or experienced by human beings. God knows exactly in all cases what
>> is good and what is evil. God knows, and has always known everything. There
>> isn't anything that God does not know.
>>
>>
>>
>> C. *God is Omnibenevolent* means at a minimum that God is perfectly
>> good, abhors and if it could, would not permit anything evil to exist,
>> including something egregiously evil, to exist, and if it could, would not
>> permit anything which would cause anything evil to exist. [Note the use
>> of the words "anything evil." Only one instance of something evil is
>> needed to refute a claim of omnibenevolence.]
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *The Problem of Evil:*
>>
>>
>>
>> 1. There is a God.
>>
>> 2. God is omnipotent.
>>
>> 3. God is omniscient.
>>
>> 4. God is omnibenevolent.
>>
>> 5. God knowingly and intentionally planned and created the universe
>> and everything in it.
>>
>>
>>
>> 6. Since God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, and
>> created the universe, then God is the cause/determiner of *everything*that happens as a result of its all-knowing and intentional act of creation
>> from the moment of that creation. God was/is/will be in complete control
>> and the determiner of *everything* at all times. To assert there is
>> something that God is not in complete control of (something somehow left to
>> chance) is to deny either God's omnipotence and/or omniscience.
>>
>>
>>
>> 7. Since God is omniscient, God had exact foreknowledge of *
>> everything* that would occur/be determined as a result of its omnipotent
>> act of creation. To say God didn't know exactly to a tee what would
>> occur or be determined as a result of his plan of creation would be to
>> contradict God's omniscience.
>>
>>
>>
>> 8. Since God is omnipotent and omniscient, *everything* that happens
>> in the universe was knowingly and intentionally predetermined from the
>> moment of creation. Therefore, all future acts of humankind, including
>> all mental acts such as the processes of choosing, were predetermined at
>> moment of creation.
>>
>>
>>
>> 9. If *all* acts of humankind are predetermined including mental
>> acts, then there can be no freedom of choice or so-called free will. If
>> there are acts of which God did not have foreknowledge of, then God is not
>> omniscient. If there are acts of which God is not in control of or the
>> determiner of but are somehow left to chance, then God is not omnipotent.
>> Therefore, the appearance of freewill is an illusion/delusion if God is
>> omnipotent and omniscient.
>>
>>
>>
>> 10. *Any* event/act that occurs in the universe was either
>> predetermined at the moment of creation or not. If God is omnipotent and
>> omniscient then God intentionally and knowingly created/determined the
>> universe to be the way it now exists. If there is something, like a
>> human act which is not predetermined, but has been somehow left to chance
>> (an unknown outcome), then God is not omniscient. If there is real
>> choice, and thus an indeterminate gap in God's knowledge, there is not
>> predetermination, and thus God is not omniscient. If there was no gap in
>> God's knowledge/foreknowledge at the moment of creation, then *all *events
>> and acts are therefore knowingly and intentionally predetermined by God.
>>
>>
>>
>> 11. Therefore all acts of humankind including mental acts which
>> include the processes of choice are predetermined and occur regardless of
>> the appearance of choice/freewill, if God is omnipotent and omniscient.
>>
>>
>>
>> 12. If God is omnibenevolent (*perfectly* good), then every act that
>> God has control over or determines would be not be evil or lead to evil.
>> God would not knowingly and/or intentionally perform or allow the
>> performance of any act that was evil or lead to evil. If God is
>> omnibenevolent (*perfectly* good), and thus totally and completely
>> abhorrent to and completely opposed to evil, and this omnipotent, omniscient
>> God was in complete control and the determiner of everything that happens in
>> the universe from the moment of creation, then *nothing* evil would or
>> could ever exist in the universe.
>>
>>
>>
>> 13. Since God is omnipotent, omniscient, and thus is in a position to
>> unequivocally impose its omnibenevolence, then *evil does not and cannot
>> not exist*. Hence, *no* acts by humankind are evil.
>>
>>
>>
>> 14. The rape and murder of a five year old child by a not mentally
>> retarded man is an evil. Such an act has occurred.
>>
>>
>>
>> 15. Therefore, evil unequivocally exists.
>>
>>
>>
>> 16. This contradicts the assertion that God is omnibenevolent. God
>> has caused or an evil event to occur.
>>
>>
>>
>> 17. Therefore, it is logically impossible for an omnipotent,
>> omniscient, omnibenevolent God to exist.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Problem of Evil is an age old dilemma. I make no claim to have
>> discovered or written anything original. My hope is that I have
>> described the Problem of Evil in such a clear and explicit manner so that
>> all but the linguistically challenged or emotionally paralyzed can
>> understand it and understand clearly that there cannot be an omnipotent,
>> omniscient, omnibenevolent God.
>>
>>
>>
>> I believe that it is important to write this. The belief in an
>> omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God is a fundamental tenet of Islam
>> and of most Christian sects. On the basis of this tenet people lives
>> are controlled, not always to their benefit, and their money fleeced from
>> them, especially by Christian sects. Belief in this tenet also impedes
>> the recognition and/or finding of real solutions to human and terrestrial
>> problems, and thus prolonging the misery caused by these problems.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Joe Campbell <philosopher.joe at gmail.com>
>> *To:* Art Deco <deco at moscow.com>
>> *Cc:* Vision 2020 <vision2020 at moscow.com>
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2011 4:26 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [Vision2020] Response to Joe, Donovan [More]
>>
>> Wayne,
>>
>> It depends entirely on how God knows all things. If God predicts the
>> future like we do, then his omnipotence might not yield his knowing all
>> things -- past, present, and future. There are factors -- chaos is one --
>> which might get in the way of his ability to predict. Again, you have to
>> keep an open mind about the idea of an omniscient creature knowing
>> everything there is to know. If the future is unreal in the sense that it
>> has yet to come to pass, there is nothing about it to know.
>>
>> Maybe there is a sense of omniscience in which God doesn't come to know
>> anything any particular way; God simply knows all things. I can see how one
>> might want to yearn for a God that knows everything ever was true, is true,
>> or will be true. But a God who only knows all that is true is good enough
>> for me. Thus, I honestly don't think that theism and omniscience entails
>> that God has universal predictability. Nor would I deny that God has
>> universal predictability.
>>
>> But suppose he does have universal predictability? Does that mean that no
>> one has free will? You write: "In this context, asserting there is
>> freewill or real choice by humankind means that the chooser can choose to do
>> something not completely determined or predicted by an omnipotent,
>> omniscient God, an obvious contradiction." Again, why suppose that the
>> free act has to be unpredictable? I can predict quite a lot about your
>> future behavior. I'm sure you wife can predict even more. It seems like, the
>> more one gets to know you the easier it is to predict your future behavior.
>> Even if God is just very good at drawing inferences, he's going to be able
>> say a lot about what you'll do in the future. But he is better than anyone
>> at drawing inferences. Since I don't see how my predictions of your behavior
>> undermine your freedom, I'm not sure why God's predictions would undermine
>> them. That I predict that you will do A is no assurance that you're doing A
>> was not up to you. I don't see the contradiction.
>>
>> On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 1:21 PM, Art Deco <deco at moscow.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Joe writes:
>>>
>>> "First, determinism does not entail predictability." & "Nor does
>>> predictability ensure determinism."
>>>
>>> For ordinary mortals, this is true. Events may be completely determined,
>>> but not enough is known to predict them with 100% accuracy, for example, the
>>> weather.
>>>
>>> However, in the context of the Problem of Evil, these claims are
>>> irrelevant:
>>>
>>> An alleged omnipotent, omniscient God is a God that knows everything can
>>> predict with 100% accuracy all outcomes, events, etc. In this case 100%
>>> error free predictability means that everything is determined -- it is bound
>>> to happen, it can happen only in the manner ordained and thus predicted by
>>> God, especially in this context where this alleged God knew everything that
>>> would happen henceforth in its creation at the moment of creation
>>> (foreknowledge).
>>>
>>> Similarly, in this context if everything was ordained and thus determined
>>> by an omnipotent, omniscient God, then that God can predict everything with
>>> 100%, error free accuracy.
>>>
>>> Simply, in the context of an alleged omnipotent, omniscient God,
>>> "determined" entails "predictability" by that God and "predictability"
>>> entails "determined."
>>>
>>> In this context, asserting there is freewill or real choice by humankind
>>> means that the chooser can choose to do something not completely determined
>>> or predicted by an omnipotent, omniscient God, an obvious contradiction.
>>>
>>> What others may have said, including big name philosophers, at this point
>>> is irrelevant to the simple arguments presented. If you want to refute
>>> these argument, then do it by showing a mistake in logical structure, not by
>>> changing the context of the assumptions and assertions or by changing the
>>> meaning of words that I have taken pains from the beginning to make clear.
>>>
>>> You offer the following:
>>>
>>> "C) God created the world fully determined and humans have free will.
>>> Further the world is chaotic and God is unable to predict the outcome of
>>> the world in complete detail even though it is fully determined. You are
>>> likely correct that on this model you'd have to reject God's omniscience but
>>> there would be an explanation of his "ignorance," e.g. the chaotic nature of
>>> the universe.
>>>
>>> D) God created an undetermined world and humans have free will. Since the
>>> world is undetermined he is unable to predict the outcome of the world in
>>> complete detail. In this option God is still omniscient since the future is
>>> unsettled; God still knows all that is true it is just that propositions
>>> about the future are neither true nor false, so he doesn't know those."
>>>
>>> Earlier, to forestall these kinds of claims, I clearly defined
>>> the "omniscience" of the alleged God: *"At all times past, present and
>>> future God knows everything, past, present, and future."* There are no
>>> gaps in God's foreknowledge or knowledge. I believe that this is the
>>> traditional definition used by philosophers and theologians who have
>>> discussed this subject. Regardless, this is how I have used the concept of
>>> omniscience in this discussion. If you want to show that my analysis is in
>>> error, please use words in the same way I have.
>>>
>>> In the context of the Problem of Evil including an omnipotent, omniscient
>>> God the creator.
>>>
>>> In C above "God is unable to predict the outcome of the world in
>>> complete detail even though it is fully determined" means that God's
>>> foreknowledge at the moment of creation is denied. As you point out, this
>>> is contradictory to God's omniscience since foreknowledge is part of the
>>> definition/conditions of omniscience.
>>>
>>>
>>> In D above "God still knows all that is true it is just that
>>> propositions about the future are neither true nor false, *so he doesn't
>>> know those*" acknowledges that there is something that an omniscient God
>>> with complete foreknowledge doesn't know. This is a contradiction. If the
>>> future is undetermined and unsettled, God is not omniscient.
>>>
>>> D is curious in other ways. It assumes that an omniscient God's
>>> knowledge is propositional. There can be many ways of knowing which are not
>>> propositional. For example, my dog Star knows that when I say "Come and get
>>> your vitamin" that if she comes I will give her a dog vitamin. It would be
>>> hard to argue that Star's knowledge is propositional in the same way human
>>> knowledge is propositional since so far as is known, Dogs only have phatic
>>> language communication skills. Knowing how to dunk a basketball is not
>>> propositional knowledge. An omnipotent, omniscient God cannot be restricted
>>> to one way of knowing.
>>>
>>>
>>> There is no doubt that the concept of free will can have many meanings.
>>> Some of these meanings may (and have) lead to meaningful research about how
>>> much fee choice really exists.
>>>
>>> However, again if you want to refute the arguments in my analysis of the
>>> Problem of Evil, then do it by showing a mistake in their logical structure,
>>> not by changing the context of the assertions or by changing the meaning of
>>> words that I have taken pains from the beginning to make clear, and meanings
>>> which as far as I know are the traditional meanings used by philosophers and
>>> theologians. Such tactics are like someone changing the definition of a
>>> topological space in order to refute a theorem in topology.
>>>
>>>
>>> Wayne A. Fox
>>> 1009 Karen Lane
>>> PO Box 9421
>>> Moscow, ID 83843
>>>
>>> waf at moscow.com
>>> 208 882-7975
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Joe Campbell <philosopher.joe at gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Art Deco <deco at moscow.com>
>>> *Cc:* Vision 2020 <vision2020 at moscow.com>
>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2011 7:41 AM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [Vision2020] Response to Joe, Donovan [More]
>>>
>>> A few points.
>>>
>>> First, determinism does not entail predictability. Chaotic systems, for
>>> instance, may be determined yet not predictable. Nor does predictability
>>> ensure determinism. I make predictions all the time about a variety of human
>>> behavior and so do you. That in and of itself does not mean that human
>>> behavior is determined. So you can't use "determinism" and "predictability"
>>> as if they mean the same thing. They don't. One is a metaphysical thesis
>>> about the structure of the universe; the other is an epistemological thesis.
>>> See this article for support of these claims:
>>>
>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
>>>
>>> Second, you can't just assume that free will is incompatible with
>>> determinism. Some people (Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, G.E. Moore,
>>> myself) believe that determinism is compatible with free will, that the very
>>> same event may be determined from the beginning of time and still (if it is
>>> an act) be free. You yourself pointed out the pitfall of thinking of free
>>> will as indeterminism, for undetermined events are random and randomness is
>>> not the same as freedom. Well if randomness can't get you free will, it is
>>> hard to see how the opposite -- determinism -- can take free will away.
>>>
>>> My own view is that the thesis of determinism as absolutely nothing to do
>>> with free will. If we think the two are linked it is pretty easy to show
>>> that no one has free will. Too easy. This was the point of my thought
>>> experiment. We need a better conception of "free will" than the one we get
>>> by contrasting it with determinism. That in a nutshell is what most of my
>>> own philosophical research is concerned with doing: providing us with a
>>> better understanding of what it means for a human act -- or any act -- to be
>>> free.
>>>
>>> Putting these two points together, I think that there are more options
>>> available than the two that you sketch out below. Here are some of the other
>>> options:
>>>
>>> C) God created the world fully determined and humans have free will.
>>> Further the world is chaotic and God is unable to predict the outcome of the
>>> world in complete detail even though it is fully determined. You are likely
>>> correct that on this model you'd have to reject God's omniscience but there
>>> would be an explanation of his "ignorance," e.g. the chaotic nature of the
>>> universe.
>>>
>>> D) God created an undetermined world and humans have free will. Since the
>>> world is undetermined he is unable to predict the outcome of the world in
>>> complete detail. In this option God is still omniscient since the future is
>>> unsettled; God still knows all that is true it is just that propositions
>>> about the future are neither true nor false, so he doesn't know those.
>>>
>>> Of course, this is not really a response to your argument. At most, there
>>> will just be a few more options to consider -- maybe just one more, in fact
>>> -- and likely you'll find that model unsatisfactory in light of the evil in
>>> the world and God's supposed attributes. I don't suppose to have a solution
>>> to the problem of evil! I just think that fully stating the argument is
>>> difficult and that it isn't obvious that God's existence is inconsistent
>>> with the existence of evil.
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 17, 2011 at 5:12 PM, Art Deco <deco at moscow.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Joe,
>>>>
>>>> I just can't follow your argument, nor your thought experiment. I
>>>> suspect that we are using different definitions of "free will" and
>>>> "determinism."
>>>>
>>>> Let's start with the word "determinism" in an effort to clarify.
>>>> [Note: "God" in the following means "alleged God."]
>>>>
>>>> Suppose you had a perfect die throwing machine, a machine that tossed a
>>>> die in a completely controlled micro-environment. This machine was set to
>>>> hold and to toss the die in the exact same way each time. Barring some
>>>> anomaly in what in what are called for the sake of expediency the "laws of
>>>> nature" -- in this case physics -- the result will always be the same. The
>>>> outcome is "determined." Given the constancy of the "laws of physics", no
>>>> other outcome is possible. Betting on the outcome would be a sure bet; a
>>>> bet that is never lost. The outcome is complete predictable without a
>>>> chance of error.
>>>>
>>>> If, however, the "laws of physics" were not constant, but were subject
>>>> to an occasional anomaly, then there would be some randomness, and there
>>>> would not be any sure bet. There would be errors in predictions.
>>>>
>>>> In short, I am using the word "determined" to mean always completely
>>>> predicable without error or chance of error.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Given the above, the issue of determinism and freewill in the context of
>>>> the Problem of Evil can then be characterized thusly:
>>>>
>>>> A. Did God when creating the universe, plan it down to the very last
>>>> detail and then executed that plan exactly? Did God impose upon all things
>>>> a "law of all things" from the beginning such that everything in the
>>>> universe always acts like the die in the perfect die throwing machine -- all
>>>> outcomes, events, etc were/are completely predictable (known) to God. If
>>>> so, that is what I mean by "determinism" in the context of the Problem of
>>>> Evil. There is no outcome that God, being omniscient, did not know
>>>> (predict) would happen. There is no randomness in the system.
>>>>
>>>> Or
>>>>
>>>> B. Did God when creating the universe leave an element of randomness
>>>> in its plan of the universe, and did not attend to every last detail,
>>>> randomness say in the form of human "freewill," so that not all outcomes
>>>> were completely predictable (known) by God.
>>>>
>>>> If the later, then there are random events of which God would not have
>>>> been cognizant of at the moment of creation or before they occurred, and
>>>> therefore God would not be omniscient at the moment of creation or at
>>>> anytime before any of these random events occur.
>>>>
>>>> Simpler:
>>>>
>>>> A. Did God plan everything, and being omnipotent, everything happens
>>>> that way, and being omniscient, God knows exactly what will happen, and
>>>> hence everything is determined (predictable by God), despite appearances?
>>>>
>>>> or
>>>>
>>>> B. Did God plan almost everything, but left an element of
>>>> chance/randomness in its plan in the form of the freewill of humankind, and
>>>> thus God could not predict everything from the moment of creation, and
>>>> hence God not omniscient?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Simpler yet (like the old Clairol ads):
>>>>
>>>> A. Does He know
>>>>
>>>> or
>>>>
>>>> B. doesn't He know?
>>>>
>>>> If A, then all is determined, regardless of the conscious feeling of
>>>> choice experienced by humankind.
>>>>
>>>> If B, then freewill exists, but God is not omniscient having chosen to
>>>> give up complete predictability.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What is very important in discussing this issue is to distinguish
>>>> between there being actual freewill and there being the appearance of free
>>>> will. There is little doubt that many people believe they are exercising
>>>> free will. That belief may or may not be true. The more we learn about
>>>> human behavior, the more determined (and predictable) it becomes.
>>>>
>>>> God, being omnipotent, could certainly create a universe where people
>>>> believe they were exercising free choice, but in fact, their actions were
>>>> completely determined (predictable) by God at the point of creation.
>>>>
>>>> w.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>> =======================================================
>> List services made available by First Step Internet,
>> serving the communities of the Palouse since 1994.
>> http://www.fsr.net
>> mailto:Vision2020 at moscow.com
>> =======================================================
>>
>
>
> =======================================================
> List services made available by First Step Internet,
> serving the communities of the Palouse since 1994.
> http://www.fsr.net
> mailto:Vision2020 at moscow.com
> =======================================================
>
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