[Vision2020] Biden's Secret Diplomacy: Change You Can Believe In

[No Weatherman]

Biden's Secret Diplomacy
By Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov
FrontPageMagazine.com

Here before us is a Soviet archival document,* a top secret report by
a communist apparatchik who had received a delegation of US Senators
led by Joseph Biden in 1979. After describing routine arms control
discussions, it quotes Biden as telling the Soviets off-record that he
did not really care about the persecution of Russian dissidents. He
and other Senators might raise human rights issues with their Soviet
counterparts, but only to be seen by the public as defenders of human
rights, not to have those problems really solved. They would happily
take no for an answer.

Vadim V. Zagladin, the then deputy head of the International
Department of the CPSU Central Committee (the organization formerly
known as the Comintern), wrote in the report:

"The delegation did not officially raise the issue of human rights
during the negotiations. Biden said they did not want 'to spoil the
atmosphere with problems which are bound to cause distrust in our
relations.' However, during the breaks between the sessions the
senators passed to us several letters concerning these or those
'refuseniks'."

Refuseniks were one of the best known groups of oppressed citizens in
the USSR at that time: thousands of Jews who were refused exit
permissions to emigrate to Israel on various trumped-up pretexts.

"Unofficially, Biden and [Senator Richard] Lugar said that, in the end
of the day, they were not so much concerned with having a problem of
this or that citizen solved as with showing to the American public
that they do care for 'human rights'. They must prove to their voters
that they are 'effective in fulfilling their wishes'. In other words,
the collocutors directly admitted that what is happening is a kind of
a show, that they absolutely do not care for the fate of most
so-called dissidents.

"In the same conversation, Biden asked us to ensure that senators'
appeals on those issues are not left unanswered — even if we just
reply that the letter is received but we cannot do anything."

Like most secret documents of the Cold War years, this report still
remains classified in Russia's official archives. However, a copy is
available in the Gorbachev Foundation Archive in Moscow, where it was
deposited by Mr. Zagladin — who himself works for the Gorbachev
Foundation since the collapse of the USSR. Under pressure from the
Kremlin, the archive had to limit the access to some of its
documentary collections. However, Zagladin's documents (Inventory 3/1)
— including the one quoted above — were still available to researchers
a few years ago, and that is how we obtained copies.

Of course, when people's reputations are at stake, a natural question
is: how far can we believe a document written by a communist? Other
things being equal, if it is Zagladin's word against a word of a U.S.
Senator, one would surely believe the latter. Hopefully, Sen. Biden
and Sen. Lugar will fairly soon provide the public with their own
accounts of that episode, and then we will be able to compare.

Yet, we should not forget that these top secret documents were never
intended to see the light of the day. They were written not for us,
but for a very narrow circle of Zagladin's communist bosses. Indeed,
it was his job to deceive simple mortals; but deceiving the Politburo
would be both pointless and dangerous. After reading and analyzing
hundreds of suchlike reports by Zagladin, one cannot but conclude that
he always portrayed his foreign collocutors as tougher, not softer,
than they really were. That was natural, because that was safer for
Zagladin himself. It was his job to cultivate foreign contacts, which
made him to a degree responsible for their behavior. If he reported
that someone was pro-Soviet and then the man turned out to be
anti-Soviet, Zagladin would be held responsible. That is why he always
preferred to err on the other side.

In any case, diplomacy is not so much about what you mean as how you
are understood. If you go to Moscow sincerely determined to fight like
a lion for human rights, and then leave the enemy with an impression
that you don't care — this is a monumental failure. It hardly matters
what Senators Biden and Lugar actually thought about Soviet human
rights abuses in the first place. If they really cared for human
rights and meant to pressure the Soviets — so much the worse. Be that
as it may, they were understood as the document reads. The message
which the enemy received from them was this: we don't care for those
whom you keep torturing and rotting in prisons, but we would
appreciate if you help us improve our public image.

There was more to it than simply the betrayal of dissidents; for this
involved the question of the Senators' own independence. Indeed, they
should have known that every Soviet official who dealt with
high-ranking foreigners would see them not as partners, but as
potential targets for recruitment, potential collaborators or
fellow-travelers. On such occasions, the Soviets always searched for a
way to corrupt you. The worst thing you could do was to show the enemy
that you depend on him in any way. For any Western politician, telling
the Soviets that his public image depends on their good will was the
first step to becoming an agent of influence, de facto if not de jure.

Today, it is a fact rather than a possibility that the next U.S.
administration will have to lead the free world in the Second Cold
War. Respectively, the staunchest critics of Russia's authoritarianism
from recent years — Senators McCain and Biden — are now at the center
stage of the electoral campaign. Yet, fighting and winning this new
Cold War will require more than just rhetoric. In order to work out
correct strategies and tactics, it is more important than ever to
analyze the lessons and mistakes of the first Cold War.

The story told in the Soviet archival document is merely an example of
the much more general weakness of the West. In fact, Biden and Lugar,
even as portrayed in Zagladin's report, were by far not the worst.
Many other documents from Zagladin's collection reveal extraordinary
tales of deception and treachery, for he supervised the more recent
version of the Comintern network, the Soviet fifth column in the West
— valuable fellow-travelers, sympathizers and secret collaborators.
Clearly, Senators Biden and Lugar were no part of it. It is just that,
rather typically for Western politicians and diplomats in those times,
they saw the arms control as the top priority. To them, human rights
really remained a sore, embarrassing issue which — to use Biden's own
expressions — only "spoiled the atmosphere," "caused distrust," and
hampered progress on much more important problems of global security.
The right way to deal with human rights was through "quiet diplomacy"
somewhere on the margins of arms control talks.

What they failed to understand was that the human rights were — and
still are — the cornerstone of East-West relations, for that is where
the fundamental difference between the two worlds lies. The Soviet
regime, like its present successor in Russia, simply could not survive
without persecution of dissidents, whereas the free world naturally
could not tolerate brutal human rights abuses — hence the existential
hostility between them, which could not be solved by negotiations or
agreements. As the late Andrei Sakharov rightly wrote, the external
aggressiveness of the regime was naturally connected with internal
repression. One naturally follows the other, so you cannot separate
security from human rights.

This simple truth was internationally acknowledged in the 1975
Helsinki Accords, where the problems of European security, cooperation
and human rights were explicitly linked. That was quite a
controversial treaty, where a huge concession was made to the Soviets:
it practically legalized their post-war territorial expansion. In
exchange, Moscow was obliged to observe human rights, a provision it
never intended to follow. Among other things, the agreement provided
for the right of independent public monitoring of its implementation.
So the Russian dissidents then organized independent public groups to
that end, led by Prof. Yuri Orlov, only to be arrested and imprisoned
for anti-Soviet propaganda. That was a decisive moment. If the West
failed to hold the Soviets to account, the Helsinki Accords would
prove pointless, and the whole détente policy would prove to be mere
appeasement.

So, here is one of the Western protests about this. On July 5, 1983,
Bruno Kraisky, the then Chancellor of Austria, wrote to the Soviet
dictator Yuri Andropov:

"I have been asked, on many occasions, by my friends and
acquaintances, to petition you about Yuri Orlov, a Soviet citizen who
is imprisoned since early 1977. [ . . . ] Naturally, my intentions are
very far from intervening in Soviet internal affairs. If I address you
with such a request, this is only because of compassion and my firm
hope for your generosity. I suppose it would have a positive effect if
you made a generous gesture in this case precisely at the time of
growing tensions which, as I know, both you and I very much want to
relax."

A cover note by Andropov's aide recommends to leave this unanswered,
and below is a handwritten resolution by Andropov himself: "I agree."
Of course, they were quite right: at the time when international
agreements warranted demands, what else could they do with such a
humble plea but throw it away?

That is what "quiet diplomacy" really was and, of course, it never
brought any positive results. What it did was to corrupt Western
politicians, gradually turning them into collaborators rather than
partners.

Yet another example of this kind is the document about Jacques
Chaban-Delmas, once a hero of the war-time French Resistance, who in
1980 was the President of France's National Assembly. He happened to
be in Moscow on an official visit when another human rights scandal
erupted in January 1980: Andrei Sakharov, the famous dissident
physicist, was extra-judicially exiled to Gorky. Chaban-Delmas
immediately interrupted his visit and flew back to France, where he
won much applause for his firmness.

It is rather shocking now to read in a secret document what really
happened behind the scenes. After Chaban-Delmas announced he would
leave Moscow, the Soviet dictator Leonid Brezhnev sent an envoy to see
him in the French embassy, an envoy who was none other than Zagladin,
and here is what he reported back to his master:

"Chaban-Delmas received me with emphatic friendliness and hospitality.
He immediately said that he 'asks the Soviet friends to understand his
motives correctly'. He claims that his move was motivated by the only
consideration: to preserve his prestige in the West in order to act in
the interests of détente and Soviet-French friendship in the future.
Such is the public opinion in the West, he continued, that 'no one
would understand me if I went on with the visit. Most important to me
is that I have done the essential part of the job: I had an extremely
important meeting with President Brezhnev and very thoughtful
negotiations in the Supreme Soviet. So, I have completed the working
part of my visit. As for the tourist entertainment, I shall have them
next time. For now, I consciously postpone them for the future's
sake'.

"After listening to my explanation of why the Soviet leadership had to
take the known decisions regarding Sakharov, Chaban-Delmas noted that,
in his impression, Sakharov's actions were certainly punishable
'provided that all of them are legally proved'. So, he continued, one
should emphasize the humanism of Soviet authorities who only moved
Sakharov to another city rather than prosecuted him. [ . . . ]

"I remain your friend and shall act accordingly, the collocutor
continued. [ . . . ] 'The most important thing is to take care of the
future. We have to "survive" the American elections, which are a real
nightmare to all of us. I am going to Washington after the elections
to tell the elected president straightaway that he has to think again
about the problem of U.S. missiles in Europe.' I will say,
Chaban-Delmas continued, that U.S. missiles in Europe are the same as
Soviet missiles on Cuba, and the Americans are wrong when they choose
to ignore this. This should be taken into account when we search for a
solution. I shall engage in that battle without hesitation and I
believe I can make a useful contribution. But the most important thing
is to survive the autumn elections, he concluded.

"He asked to convey to Comrade Brezhnev his cordial gratitude for
hospitable reception he met in the Soviet Union, and particularly for
informing him about Sakharov, which 'demonstrates that the Soviet
leaders trust me and want to see me as a friend.'"

This was a man with spotless reputation, a hero of the Resistance,
from whom one would never expect treachery — no more than from
Senators Biden or Lugar. Indeed, this hardly had much to do with
personalities. What really should be condemned and rejected is the set
of ideas which misguided all of them: the groundless belief in détente
with a totalitarian regime, "influencing" it through "engagement" and
"cooperation," preserving stability at any price, arms control, quiet
diplomacy, "working together" for the sake of global security — all
that nonsense.

Today, it has become compulsory for any politician commenting on
Russia to begin by saying that "nobody wants a new Cold War." In a
sense, this is right. Nobody wants a long and painful global conflict
— and that is exactly where any attempt of détente or appeasement
would lead. The West never chose to have a Cold War, and never would —
it was always imposed on us by the Kremlin aggressors. Like 60 years
ago, the choice we have today is between capitulation and defense.

Nobody wants to repeat the mistakes made in the first Cold War. This
is precisely why, now that Moscow has declared a Second Cold War on
the rest of the world, it should be opposed with strength. This is why
the West should find a way and bring this Cold War to a quick and
bloodless victory. One way to do that — perhaps the only way — is to
put human rights at the top of the agenda; to realize that the people
oppressed by the Kremlin are your natural — and most reliable —
allies; and to give every support to those brave men and women in
Russia who risk their freedom and lives by opposing the authoritarian
regime.

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9-20 April 1979 [?]
The memo by Vadim V. Zagladin, deputy head of the International
Department of the CPSU Central Committee

ON THE BASIC CONTENTS OF TALKS WITH THE US SENATORS
During the official negotiations with the delegation of US senators
led by J. Biden and the unofficial talks with the delegation's head
and some members, our collocutors expressed a number of considerations
of certain interest.

1. J. Biden, the head of the delegation, said that the mutual
understanding that the SALT-2 treaty should be ratified is, basically,
achieved in the Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs. However, four
reservations should be formulated. The contents of those reservations
have already been reported to us by our embassy in Washington.

While commenting on the contents of those reservations, Biden said
they should not worry the Soviet Union because they do not concern the
substance of the treaty. The only reservation which, in his opinion,
may cause our 'displeasure' says that the SALT-2 should not prevent
the US from providing the defence capabilities of their allies. In
practice, the collocutor said, this is a way to confirm the US'
preparedness to keep supplying European NATO members with modern US
weapons, with the exception, naturally, of those types which are
covered by the treaty itself.

The Senate Commission for Foreign Affairs is going to conclude the
consideration of the treaty by the end of September. However, the
Senate itself is starting to work on this problem later, possibly on
the eve of the Christmas.

2. As for the problem of supplying Western Europe with new types of
weapons, including the Pershing missiles etc.;, Biden said that no
final decisions had been taken on this issue yet. Those decisions will
be taken in December. And a lot there, he emphasised, will depend on
the position of the Soviet Union.

During unofficial talks, Biden noted rather cynically that he
personally and other members of the US Senate do not very much care
about the Europeans' concerns. The main area of the US citizens'
interest is the security of the US itself. Nevertheless, the feelings
of our allies also 'concern us', he said. 'We cannot stop supporting
our allies, because if we did that, we would have weakened America's
own security'. Therefore, Biden continued, the Americans will probably
have to solve the question of the supplies of the new types of
armaments to Western Europe positively in principle. In any case, the
majority in the Senate supports that, he said.

Then Biden meaningfully emphasised (and he was actively supported by
Senator Prior here) that if the SALT-2 treaty is ratified before
December, and if the Soviet Union makes some demonstrative steps in
favour of further disarmament progress before the NATO meeting, the
European countries probably may refrain from deploying new types of
American weapons in Europe, or at least, postpone the decisions taken
on this issue.
To our question on what exactly steps are meant here, Prior answered
that, for example, the Soviet government might state it is not going
to increase the number of SS-20 missiles any further.

3. Something that caught our attention was that this time, in both
official and unofficial talks, the senators would raise more questions
about the prospects, about the SALT-3, than the SALT-2. Unofficially,
Biden said that 'the question of the future is more significant to the
more serious senators — although not to all — than the question of the
present treaty. The thing is (he explained) that many in the Senate
consider the present treaty as a kind of an intermediate step, a
booster for the further reduction of the arms race. Many in the US are
very serious about this, believing it is possible to negotiate the
reduction of the level of military confrontation with the Soviet
Union. However, at the same time, many people are uncertain whether
the USSR will agree to further serious steps of that kind.'

Most questions concerned two subjects. Firstly, whether the USSR would
agree to a significant reduction of the number of nuclear missiles at
the next stage (the senators were particularly interested in heavy
missiles in this connection). Secondly, whether the USSR would agree
to the explansion of control and the introduction of 'more effective
methods' (for example, the 'black boxes', which were discussed during
the negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests).

It emerged during that talks that, in spite of all huge work we are
doing about this, many statements of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev were
unknown to the majority of the senators — for example, his statement
that the Soviet Union was not going to make the first nuclear strike
against anyone. The relevant texts were given to them, along with some
other documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

4. It should also be noted that, this time, the delegation did not
officially raise the issue of human rights during the negotiations.
Biden said the did not want 'to spoil the atmosphere with problems
which are bound to cause distrust in our relations.' However, during
the breaks between the sessions the senators passed to us several
letters concerning these or those 'refuseniks'.

Unofficially, Biden and Lugar said that, in the end of the day, they
were not so much concerned with having a problem of this or that
citizen solved as with showing to the American public that they do
care for 'human rights'. They must prove to their voters that they are
'effective in fulfilling their wishes'. In other words, the
collocutors directly admitted that what is happening is a kind of a
show, that they absolutely do not care for the fate of most so-called
dissidents.

In the same conversation, Biden asked us to ensure that senators'
appeals on those issues are not left unanswered — even if we just
reply that the letter is received but we cannot do anything. According
to Biden, letters of this kind — if they are not addressed to the
highest representatives of the Soviet state — sometimes remain
unanswered.