[Vision2020] Credible Doubts: 2002-3 Iraq WMD: Weapons Inspectors Ritter, Blix

[Ted Moffett]

Chas wrote:

 Our mental
> filters sorted the WMD news to match whatever "truth" we had already
> decided.  None of, of course, were in a position to know anything, but
> we spouted our opinions anyway.


My analysis of the WMD threat posed by Iraq and Saddam in late 2002 early
2003 was based on credible statements from Iraq weapons inspectors and those
working in intelligence on this subject.  These sources presented evidence
that there were serious doubts about any significant Iraq WMD capability for
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

The Bush administration depicted the WMD threat from Iraq at a high
probability and immanent (the repeated warnings of the "mushroom cloud over
American" made by Bush, Condi Rice, et. al.), justifying an invasion based
on the dangerous doctrine of pre-emptive war.  It was argued we could not
let diplomacy, weapons inspections, sanctions, economic engagement, military
containment etc. be the approach to the Iraq problem, due to a dangerous
immanent threat to US national security from Iraq WMDs.

The US in 2002 before the invasion was engaging in ongoing military flights
over Iraq air space, conducting bombing runs on military related facilities,
and enforcing the protectorate for the Kurds in the north, so the situation
in early 2003 clearly involved an ongoing military containment of Saddam.
Iraq's military was in a shambles after they were repelled from Kuwait, and
the economic sanctions, weapons inspections and military containment were
keeping Iraq from rebuilding its weapons capabilities.

Of course no one could state with certainty that Iraq was not hiding WMD
capability.  But the Bush administration's push to invade Iraq was based on
"evidence" of various kinds that has been exposed to be fabricated or
sourced from unreliable testimony, questionable evidence that was filtered
through the Bush administration's already assumed goal of invading Iraq, a
goal Bush expressed before the 9/11 attacks:

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/09/60minutes/main592330.shtml

And what happened at President Bush's very first National Security Council
meeting is one of O'Neill's most startling revelations.

"From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a
bad person and that he needed to go," says O'Neill, who adds that going
after Saddam was topic "A" 10 days after the inauguration - eight months
before Sept. 11.

"From the very first instance, it was about Iraq. It was about what we can
do to change this regime," says Suskind. "Day one, these things were laid
and sealed."

As treasury secretary, O'Neill was a permanent member of the National
Security Council. He says in the book he was surprised at the meeting that
questions such as "Why Saddam?" and "Why now?" were never asked.

"It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The
president saying 'Go find me a way to do this,'" says O'Neill. "For me, the
notion of pre-emption, that the U.S. has the unilateral right to do whatever
we decide to do, is a really huge leap."

And that came up at this first meeting, says O'Neill, who adds that the
discussion of Iraq continued at the next National Security Council meeting
two days later.

He got briefing materials under this cover sheet. "There are memos. One of
them marked, secret, says, 'Plan for post-Saddam Iraq,'" adds Suskind, who
says that they discussed an occupation of Iraq in January and February of
2001.
------------------------------
Based on his interviews with O'Neill and several other officials at the
meetings, Suskind writes that the planning envisioned peacekeeping troops,
war crimes tribunals, and even divvying up Iraq's oil wealth.

He obtained one Pentagon document, dated March 5, 2001, and entitled
"Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts," which includes a map of
potential areas for exploration.

"It talks about contractors around the world from, you know, 30-40
countries. And which ones have what intentions," says Suskind. "On oil in
Iraq."
------------------------

Here are two of the well credentialed sources I read in 2002, Iraq
weapons inspector Scott Ritter (former Marine intelligence officer who voted
for Bush in 2000) and UN 2002-3 (in Iraq months before the invasion) weapons
inspection team leader Dr. Hans Blix, which should have led anyone
investigating this subject to doubt the Bush administration claims of a high
probability of significant WMD capability in Iraq that posed a national
security risk to the USA:

Pitt, William R. *War On Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to
Know*2002, Context Books, New York. ISBN
1-893956-38-5<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Booksources&isbn=1893956385>

Quote from former Iraq weapons inspector Scott Ritter:

There's no doubt Iraq hasn't fully complied with its disarmament obligations
as set forth by the Security Council in its resolution. But on the other
hand, since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction capacity has been verifiably eliminated... We
have to remember that this missing 5-10% doesn't necessarily constitute a
threat... It constitutes bits and pieces of a weapons program which in its
totality doesn't amount to much, but which is still prohibited... We can't
give Iraq a clean bill of health, therefore we can't close the book on their
weapons of mass destruction. But simultaneously, we can't reasonably talk
about Iraqi non-compliance as representing a de-facto retention of a
prohibited capacity worthy of war. (page 28)

-------------------

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/02/09/wirq09.xml

Dr Blix headed the UN team searching for Saddam Hussein's weapons from
November 2002 until they were pulled out in March 2003 on the eve of war.

The inspectors warned the UK and US governments that there was no "smoking
gun" evidence of weapons caches. London and Washington were also told that
Iraqi weapons unaccounted for might well no longer exist.

He said the British and American intelligence services placed too much
weight on what Iraqi defectors told them. He also blamed the "spin" then
given to the information.

-------------------

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2004/nf20040326_0596_db028.htm

Blix lays part of the blame for the White House's fervent belief in the
continued existence of Iraqi WMD on intelligence failures, which he
describes as "monumental." But he mainly fingers the arrogance and apparent
resolve of Administration hawks -- including Vice-President Dick Cheney,
Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and weapons
inspector David Kay -- to ignore evidence that didn't support their policy
objectives.
-------------------

Vision2020 Post: Ted Moffett
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