[Vision2020] Correction: Re: Kucinich Introduces Impeachment Articles AgainstCheney

Ted Moffett starbliss at gmail.com
Sat Sep 8 18:18:14 PDT 2007


My meaning was probably clear, but my text below has a glaring error in this

"...our military effort was refocused to invade a nation where Al Queda
never found sanctuary, given the enmity between (not "because" as it reads)
Saddam and Bin Laden.

Ted Moffett

On 9/7/07, Ted Moffett <starbliss at gmail.com> wrote:
> All-
> Research?  Who does research, outside their professional life, in our
> specialized world where career and money dominate?  As if, before supporting
> a military invasion of another nation, citizens have an obligation to
> investigate beyond the sound bites of political leaders?  Iraq has WMDs that
> threaten the US with a "mushroom cloud over America," says the chief
> executive?  Must be true.  Politicians don't lie, do they?  Especially born
> again devout religious political leaders.  Iraq has ties to Al Queda?  Why
> of course!  Just don't ask why Bin Laden slipped away during the US
> invasion of Afghanistan, now in hiding in Afghanistan/Pakistan, in an area
> known as a sanctuary for Islamic militants, while the bulk of our military
> effort was refocused to invade a nation where Al Queda never found
> sanctuary, given the enmity because Saddam and Bin Laden.  And if someone
> questions the honesty of a political leader who happens to be a
> "conservative" (though G. W. Bush makes a mockery of many essential
> conservative values), just call them a "left winger."  That will put them in
> their place.  As if deception and falsehoods uttered to justify taking the
> US to war is an issue that should not arouse the opposition of all beyond
> partisanship, regardless of political/economic orientation or religion.
> It appears Bush/Cheney got away with it, their grand deception to scare
> monger the US public and the US Congress into invading and occupying Iraq,
> given the lack of public and congressional will to hold them accountable,
> the astonishing disinterest in facing the gravity of the implications of the
> president and vice president manipulating the public into war based on half
> truths, distortions, omissions of critical facts, and out right fabrications
> (yellow cake uranium supplied to Iraq evidence based on forged documents,
> with Ambassador Wilson and Valerie Plame attacked for their exposure of this
> fraud).
> Note that article three of Kucinich's articles of impeachment against
> Cheney focuses on military threats against Iran.  We shall find out how
> serious these threats are.
> The author of the book below provides ample documentation of distortions
> and deceptions involved in pushing for the invasion of Iraq:
> ------------------
> *Our Nation Betrayed: The Iraq WMD Intelligence Deception
> Garland Favorito
> *
> Although many reasons have been given for the March 19, 2003 invasion of
> Iraq, the invasion was based on one single overriding concern as explained
> by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, on May 28, 2003: "For
> bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction,
> because it was the one reason everyone could agree on". However, since no
> significant evidence of those weapons was found, President Bush and Congress
> recently agreed to investigate the so-called intelligence "failure". But
> like many Congressional investigations, this one has been set up to avoid
> answering key questions while wasting millions of taxpayer dollars that do
> not even exist because of huge budget deficits. The focus of the
> investigation was limited so that it addresses only the gathering of
> intelligence but not how forthright the administration presented
> intelligence to Congress, the U.N. or the American public. The Bush
> administration is also appointing all committee members so the investigation
> can hardly be independent. In addition, the scope was expanded to include
> intelligence on other countries such as Libya, Syria and North Korea and the
> time frame was pushed into 2005 so that the findings would not impact the
> 2004 election. Since the Congressional investigation has been corrupted, I
> have produced the following analysis of the exact intelligence known PRIOR
> to the invasion and what the investigation will never reveal to the American
> public.
> The following general points are key to understanding the Iraq WMD
> intelligence deception:
> 1. Public testimony by the U.N. weapons inspectors at the U.N. Security
> Council just 12 days BEFORE the Iraq invasion rebutted all U.S. and
> British weapons charges against Iraq, which is why most of the rest of the
> world opposed the U.S. and British led invasion;
> 2. U.S. intelligence conclusions prior to October 2002 about Iraqi weapons
> of mass destruction were very consistent with the conclusions of the U.N.
> weapons inspectors, corroborating the fact that Iraq was not an imminent
> threat to U.S. security;
> 3. In October 2002, the CIA produced a declassified National Intelligence
> Estimate with false key judgments about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in
> spite of dissents from several other U.S. intelligence agencies;
> 4. No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq after the U.S. and
> British led invasion in March 2003 and the evidence also corroborated U.N.
> weapons inspectors conclusions that no such weapons or programs had existed
> in Iraq since 1998;
> 5. Many Bush administration officials made dozens of false statements to
> the U.N., Congress and the media about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
> 6. The rationale to invade Iraq under the premise of weapons of mass
> destruction originated in the Project for the New American Century whose
> advocates include key Bush administration personnel Dick Cheney, Donald
> Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Pearle and Richard Armitage;
> 7. No "opposing" Democrats can truthfully say that they were misinformed
> by the Bush administration since all had access to the public U.N. weapons
> inspector testimony and some also had access to U.S. intelligence
> corroborating those U.N. conclusions.
> Detailed evidence for each of these points is provided in the following
> separate sections.
> On March 7, 2003, just a week prior to the U.S. and British led invasion
> of Iraq, the U.N. Security Council received testimony from the heads of
> the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons inspectors concerning any
> weapons of mass destruction possessed by Iraq. Their testimony represented
> the unanimous conclusion of over 100 U.N. weapons inspectors who were on
> site in Iraq for four months just prior to the invasion beginning in
> November, 2002. Unlike the Bush and Blair administrations, these inspectors,
> who were from all over the world, had had no vested interest in invading
> Iraq. They publicly refuted every charge that Secretary of State, Colin
> Powell, made about chemical and biological weapons could not be
> substantiated.
> During his verbal report, Mohammed Elbaradei, the chief U.N. nuclear
> weapons inspector dramatically refuted all Bush and Blair administration
> assertions against Iraq regarding its nuclear program.
> · "The nuclear weapons program is defunct"
> · "There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities or prohibited
> activities";
> · "There is no indication that Iraq is attempting to import enriched
> uranium";
> · "There is no indication that Iraq is attempting to import tubes for
> uranium enrichment".
> · "There is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in
> centrifuge development"
> Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector for chemical and biological
> weapons, indicated that they found nothing to support Bush / Blair claims
> and added.
> · "No evidence so far has been found for mobile biological weapons
> units";
> · "No underground facilities were found for chemical and biological
> weapons (so far)".
> Also contrary to Bush administration claims and reports from our national
> news media of stymied inspections, Elbaradei told the U.N. Security
> Council that:
> · "Iraq has been forthcoming",
> · "Inspections are moving forward" and
> · They have made "important progress".
> Blix corroborated Elbaradei's testimony as he told the council that
> chemical and biological weapons inspections had "few difficulties".
> But perhaps the most remarkable testimony was that of Elbaredei regarding
> documents supplied by the U.S., British and Israeli governments about the
> "agreement between Iraq and Nigeria for the sale of uranium between 1999 and
> 2001" that was purported to be for procurement of enriched uranium.
> Elbaredei stated: "Iraq has provided a comprehensive explanation of its
> relations with Niger". "The IA was able to review correspondence from the
> government of Niger and compare full format contents and signature of that
> correspondence with those of the alleged procurement related documentation".
> "Based on thorough analysis the IA has concluded, with the concurrence of
> outside experts, that these documents which formed the basis for the reports
> of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are, in fact, not
> authentic"
> Thus, the U.S. and British governments had provided falsified documents to
> the U.N. to justify the invasion of Iraq. No wonder, Colin Powell stated
> illogically at the same meeting that: "We must not allow Iraq to shift the
> burden of proof onto the inspectors". The conclusions of the U.N. weapons
> inspectors were further corroborated as being accurate by additional U.S.
> searches on the ground after the Bush / Blair administrations ignored the
> inspectors and invaded Iraq anyway.
> U.S. intelligence conclusions about Iraq weapons of mass destruction prior
> to October 2002 were almost totally consistent with the conclusions of the
> U.N. weapons inspectors. This has been proven by a thorough, recently
> released study of declassified intelligence from the Carnegie Endowment of
> International Peace entitled WMD in Iraq, Evidence and Implications. The
> entire study can be viewed by all at:
> http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/IraqReport3.asp. Portions of the
> study were entered into the Congressional Record at a Senate Armed Services
> Committee hearing on February 4, 2004 to counter a claim by Sec. of Defense,
> Donald Rumsfeld, that intelligence conclusions were consistent between the
> Bush and Clinton administrations. Rumsfeld offered no response to this
> study.
> The study contrasted the March 2003 conclusions of U.N. weapons
> inspectors, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), U.S.
> intelligence prior to the October 2002 NIE and on ground survey results
> compiled after the March 2003 invasion by the Iraq Survey Group. The
> following table illustrates those conclusions on five key charges that were
> made against Iraq:
> March 2003 U.N. 2002 U.S. Intelligence Oct. 2002 NIE Post March 2003
> Survey
> Iraq reconstituted nuclear program after 1998 Probably Not Probably not
> Yes No
> Iraq attempted to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons No Possibly Yes No
> Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from abroad No No Yes No
> Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons Possibly Undetermined Yes No
> Iraq had covert chemical weapons production facilities Undetermined
> Probably Not Yes No
> Iraq had current biological weapons facilities Undetermined Undetermined
> Yes No
> Iraq reconstituted it biological weapons program Undetermined Yes Yes No
> Iraq possessed 7+ mobile biological weapons labs Undetermined Not
> Mentioned Yes Probably Not
> In these examples of key charges against Iraq, U.N. weapons inspectors
> were found to be the most accurate, closely followed by U.S. intelligence
> prior to October 2002. The only consistently inaccurate intelligence
> regarding these charges is the October 2002 NIE, produced by the Central
> Intelligence Agency and entitled Key Judgments from the National
> Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
> Destruction". Details to support this table are provided in the subsequent
> sections.
> The CIA's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), is more than
> simply inaccurate. It is a collection of false, deceptive and speculative
> judgments with dissenting U.S. intelligence conclusions that were not
> usually mentioned during Congressional testimony. In nearly every case of
> incorrectly stated judgments, the change from an accurate to inaccurate
> judgment occurred when this document was created as shown in the previous
> table. The judgments were found to be false by the U.N. and contradicted
> by other U.S. intelligence agencies, some of whose conclusions were even
> stated in the same document. Here are several examples of the false
> judgments including contradictory findings or statements of dissent from the
> State Dept. Intelligence Bureau (State/INR), Dept. of Energy Intelligence
> (DOE) and U.S. Air Force intelligence and a partially declassified Defense
> Intelligence Agency (DIA) document:
> October 2002 NIE: "Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest
> in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high strength aluminum tubes for
> centrifuge rotors - as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high
> speed balancing machines and machine tools - provide compelling evidence
> that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's
> nuclear weapons program"
> October 2002 NIE State INR Dissent: "The activities we have detected do
> not add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR
> would consider an integrated, comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear
> weapons. INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a
> judgment". The State Dept. Intelligence bureau also concluded "The tubes
> were not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons".
> October 2002 NIE State INR Dissent: "Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum
> tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear
> weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are
> intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical
> experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the
> tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to
> be used for uranium enrichment and find unpersuasive the arguments advanced
> by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose". "The
> very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by the
> Iraqis and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the
> procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE
> assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for
> use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program"
> October 2002 NIE DOE dissent "...the tubes probably are not part of the
> program".
> October 2002 NIE: "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium
> ore and yellow cake"
> October 2002, NIE State/INR dissent: "Claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural
> uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious"
> October 2002 NIE: "In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting
> its nuclear weapons program"
> October 2002 NIE State/INR dissent: "INR is unwilling to speculate that
> such an effort began soon after the departure of U.N. inspectors or to
> project a timeline for completion of activities it does not now see
> happening"
> October 2002 NIE: "Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical
> warfare agents", "...the regime has begun renewed production of mustard,
> sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX", "Iraq probably has stocked at least 100
> metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 (MT) of CW agents - much of it
> added in the last year"
> U.S. Air Force dissent: "The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and
> Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing
> UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological
> warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a
> primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent
> capability"
> October 2002 NIE: "We judge that all key aspects - R&D, production and
> weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most
> elements are larger and more advanced that they were before the Gulf War"
> March 7, 2003 U.N. testimony: "No evidence so far has been found for
> mobile biological weapons units". "No underground facilities were found for
> chemical and biological weapons (so far)"
> October 2002 NIE: "Baghdad has exceeded U.N. range limits of 150 km with
> its ballistic missiles"
> 2002 U.N. Tests: The U.N. found that 13 of 40 Al Samoud 2 missiles
> exceeded the range when NOT equipped with payloads or guidance systems.
> October 2002 NIE: "Iraq would probably attempt clandestine attacks against
> the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival
> of the regime were imminent or unavoidable…" "The Iraqi Intelligence Service
> probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against the U.S.
> and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the U.S. takes action
> against Iraq"
> March 2003 Invasion: Proven false by time and events
> The basis for some of the false intelligence judgments in the October 2002
> NIE may have originated from defectors provided by the Iraqi National
> Congress, led by Ahmed Chalabi who the U.N. knew was not credible. Chalabi
> was placed in charge of the Congress by the Bush administration despite not
> having lived in Iraq since 1956. He was also wanted in Jordan since 1992 to
> serve a 22-year sentence for a 60 million dollar bank fraud resulting from
> the collapse of the Petra bank he founded in 1977.
> Regardless of the source of the judgments, this CIA document falsely
> stated that Iraq was significantly advancing its nuclear, chemical,
> biological and missile weaponry, all of which were blatantly false
> accusations as explained in the previous and subsequent sections. In a
> review of the basic summary text body, I found 20 false judgments, 7
> deceptive assertions and only 6 essentially true statements that could not
> be disputed as false or deceptive. Many of the judgments are also
> speculative rather than being factually based, as you would expect in a
> credible intelligence document. It should be clear to any unbiased observer
> that the extent of false judgments, deceptions and speculations mean that
> this CIA document cannot possibly be an intelligence "failure" or "mistake".
> It could only be a deliberate creation of false, deceptive and speculative
> information to justify a planned Iraq invasion.
> President Bush and CIA director Tenet selected David Kay to head the Iraq
> Survey Group for weapons evidence gathering after the invasion. The
> appointment gave them good reason to expect a report consistent with the
> October 2002 NIE and favorable to the administration charges against Iraq.
> Kay was one of the only U.S. weapons inspectors who supported the charges
> against Iraq right up until the March 2003 invasion. He frequently opposed
> former U.N. weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, who stated facts that have
> now been proven to be true about how Iraq was not a threat to U.S.
> security.
> Although David Kay is frequently referred to now as a CIA analyst, his
> relationship with the CIA was not so publicly well known when he was a U.N.
> weapons inspector in 1998. Although supposedly an impartial inspector, Kay
> was actually working for the CIA, which likely explains why his conclusions
> at that time conflicted with most other U.N. weapons inspectors. Kay was
> ultimately responsible for getting the U.N. weapons inspectors kicked out
> of Iraq in December 1998 after his U.S. team passed bombing target
> information back to the Clinton administration. President Bill Clinton
> subsequently bombed Iraq on December 18, 1998 in a futile attempt to avoid
> his own impeachment the day before the House vote.
> In his January 20, 2004 State of the Union address President Bush
> referenced the October 2, 2003 testimony of David Kay before the House and
> Senate Intelligence Committees. Bush cleverly stated: "already the Kay
> report identified dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program
> activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the
> United Nations". This is a very deceptive statement since Kay's testimony
> had already closed the door on three of the four investigative areas
> regarding weapons of mass destruction.
> In regards to nuclear weapons Kay testified: "We have not uncovered
> evidence that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build
> nuclear weapons or produce fissile material". In regards to chemical weapons
> Kay testified: Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told
> ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program
> after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale
> capability to develop, produce and fill new CW munitions was reduced, if not
> completely destroyed…". In regards to CIA claims of missiles exceeding their
> range limits, Kay testified: "We have not discovered documentary or material
> evidence to corroborate those claims".
> Kay gave the most favorable report possible for the administration under
> the circumstances by leaving the door open on some potential biological
> activities and equipment as stated by President Bush. These involved CCHF
> and Brucella agents, a special type of botulinuum B and trailers that were
> the "strongest evidence to date" of biological weapons according to the May
> 28, 2003 CIA/DIA report entitled Iraqi Mobile Biological Agent Production
> Plants. However, after DIA engineers determined that the trailers were used
> for hydrogen weather balloons and Kay's team found that Iraq never
> weaponized any of the agents, Kay was forced to conclude that there were no
> biological weapons either. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee in
> his January 28, 2004 testimony that: "It turns out that we were all wrong,
> probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing".
> Kay's opening statement was actually more accurate: "…we were almost all
> wrong and I certainly include myself here". In reality, several U.S.
> intelligence agencies, such as the State/INR, DIA, DOE and Air Force
> intelligence got it right as explained in the previous section. Kay, who had
> access to the intelligence from these agencies and was well acquainted with
> fellow U.N. weapons inspectors who contradicted his views, has little
> excuse for being "all wrong" prior to the invasion. His complete reversal
> after the invasion could be attributed to less pressure from the Bush
> administration, which had already accomplished its objectives in the
> invasion or more pressure from his team of inspectors in demanding a
> forthright survey. But perhaps the most important point of all in Kay's
> testimony is that he further corroborated the findings of U.N. weapons
> inspectors in that Iraq not only had no weapons or programs of mass
> destruction but also had none of significance since the U.N. inspectors
> left in 1998.
> *
> Despite U.N testimony just prior to the invasion, many officials in the
> Bush administration continued to emphatically state that they KNEW Iraq had
> various types of weapons capabilities, were conducting specific activities
> to support weapons programs or were an imminent threat to U.S. security.
> The evidence indicates that these officials have made false or deceptive
> statements or produced misleading reports regarding Iraq weapons of mass
> destruction, Iraq links to terrorism or Iraq's cooperation with weapons
> inspectors. They include President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick
> Cheney, Secretary Of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin
> Powell, CIA Director George Tenet, National Security Advisor Condoleezza
> Rice, General Tommy Franks, Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clark, White House
> Press Secretary Ari Fleischer and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
> Douglas Feith. Here are some over two-dozen examples of false or deceptive
> information disseminated by Bush administration officials along with the
> contradictory findings that illustrate those deceptions:
> Donald Rumsfeld - Senate Armed Services Committee testimony and public
> statements - Sept 19, 2002: (Saddam) "amassed large clandestine stockpiles
> of chemical weapons and that we know he continues to hide chemical and
> biological weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every
> 12-24 hours and placing them in residential neighborhoods". Rumsfeld stated
> five times to the committee variations of: "We know Iraq has weapons of mass
> destruction"
> DIA - Iraq: Key WMD facilities and Operational Support Study- September
> 2002. "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and
> stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has or will establish its
> chemical warfare agent production facilities".
> DOD private briefing to Sen. Bill Nelson of Florida according to Nelson's
> 2/4/2002 Senate Armed Services Committee testimony:: "I was told not only
> that (Iraq) had weapons of mass destruction .... but there were also
> unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could be put on ships off the Eastern
> Seaboard and flown over Eastern Seaboard cities with weapons of mass
> destruction". "However, I was not told that there was a dispute in the
> intelligence community over the veracity of that information". "...it was
> Air Force intelligence that specifically discounted that, ... it was not
> true". "...Why was I not told that there was this disagreement in the
> intelligence community instead of being told that it was gospel truth that
> those UAVs could be flown over Eastern Seaboard cities?" DOD requested to
> answer in a closed session even though Nelson's question and the answer
> should not be classified.
> Douglas Feith - Letter to Senate Intelligence Committee Chairs - October
> 27, 2003: (Stated still classified connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda)
> DOD statement on news reports of Al Qaeda and Iraq connection - November
> 15, 2003: (Referencing Feith Oct. 27 letter) "News reports that the Defense
> Department recently confirmed new information with respect to contacts
> between Al Qaeda and Iraq are inaccurate". "The classified annex was not an
> analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and Al
> Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions"
> U.N. Monitoring Group on Al Qaeda - June 2003: "Nothing has come to our
> notice that would indicate links…"
> Colin Powell - U.N. Security Council address - February 5, 2003: "Saddam
> Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so
> determined that he has made repeated attempts to acquire high-specification
> aluminum tubes from 11 different countries even after the inspections
> resumed" "We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is
> attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines to enrich
> uranium"
> Mohammed Elbaredei - U.N. Security Council testimony- March 7, 2003: "The
> nuclear weapons program is defunct". "There is no indication of resumed
> nuclear activities or prohibited activities". There is no indication that
> Iraq is attempting to import enriched uranium"; "There is no indication that
> Iraq is attempting to import tubes for uranium enrichment". "There is no
> indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge
> development"
> Colin Powell U.N Security Council Address - February 5, 2003: "We have
> first hand descriptions of biological weapons on wheels and rails", "We know
> that Iraq has at least 7 of these mobile biological facilities", "There can
> be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to
> rapidly produce more, many more"
> Hans Blix - U.N. Security Council testimony- March 7, 2003: "No evidence
> so far has been found for mobile biological weapons units"; "No underground
> facilities were found for chemical and biological weapons…"
> Colin Powell - Address to U.N. Security Council - February 5, 2003: "The
> issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors
> to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to
> put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we as a council, we as the United
> Nations, say 'Enough is Enough' "
> Mohammed Elbaredei, Hans Blix - U.N. Security Council testimony - March 7,
> 2003: "Iraq has been forthcoming", "inspections are moving forward", they
> have made "important progress" and have had "few difficulties".
> Colin Powell - U.N. Security Council address- February 5, 2003: " "Our
> conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and
> 500 tons of chemical weapons agent".
> David Kay - Congressional Intelligence Committee testimony - October 2,
> 2003: "Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG
> that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program
> after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale
> capability to develop, produce and fill new CW munitions was reduced, if not
> completely destroyed…".
> Condoleezza Rice - NBC Meet the Press - February 16, 2003: "We have
> sources who tell us that the Iraqis, through their intelligence efforts, are
> working very hard to frustrate the inspectors"
> Colin Powell - Center for Strategic and International Studies speech -
> March 5, 2003: "Inspections will amount to little more than casting at
> shadows unless Iraq lifts the fog of denial and deception that prevents
> inspectors from seeing the true magnitude of what they are up against"
> Mohammed Elbaredei, Hans Blix - U.N. Security Council testimony - March 7,
> 2003: "Iraq has been forthcoming", "inspections are moving forward", they
> have made "important progress" and have had "few difficulties".
> *
> George W. Bush - State of the Union - January 28, 2003: "Evidence from
> intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people now in
> custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists including
> members of Al Qaeda.
> George W. Bush - Radio Address - February 8, 2003: "Saddam Hussein has
> longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks".
> George Tenet - Senate Testimony - February 11, 2003: "Iraq is harboring
> senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close
> associate of Osama Bin Laden.
> U.N. Monitoring Group on Al Qaeda - June 2003: "Nothing has come to our
> notice that would indicate links…"
> Dick Cheney - Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention - August
> 26, 2002: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has
> weapons of mass destruction", "We now know that Saddam has resumed his
> efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Many of us are convinced that Saddam
> will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon"
> Dick Cheney - NBC's Meet the Press - September 8, 2002: "We do know with
> absolute certainty that he is using his procurement system to acquire the
> equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon"
> George W. Bush - Address on Iraq - October 7, 2002: "Iraq has attempted to
> purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas
> centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons"
> George W. Bush - Address to the Nation on War with Iraq - March 17, 2003:
> "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that
> the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal
> weapons ever devised"
> George W. Bush - Address to Iraq - October 7, 2002: "Iraq has attempted to
> purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas
> centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons"
> Mohammed Elbaredei - U.N. Security Council testimony- March 7, 2003: "The
> nuclear weapons program is defunct". "There is no indication of resumed
> nuclear activities or prohibited activities". There is no indication that
> Iraq is attempting to import enriched uranium"; "There is no indication that
> Iraq is attempting to import tubes for uranium enrichment". "There is no
> indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge
> development"
> Colin Powell - Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002: "There is no doubt that
> he has chemical weapons stocks"
> George W. Bush - Address on Iraq October 7, 2002: "We know that the regime
> has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas,
> sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas" (repeated with 500 tons in January 28,
> 2003 State of the Union)
> George W. Bush - Radio Address - February 8, 2003: "We have sources that
> tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to
> use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not
> have."
> Donald Rumsfeld - Press Conference - March 30, 2003: "We know where they
> are. They are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad." referring to the
> 100-500 metric tons of chemical weapons which have never been found.
> Hans Blix - U.N. Security Council testimony- March 7, 2003: "No
> underground facilities were found for chemical and biological weapons…"
> George W. Bush - United Nations Address Sept 12, 2002: Right now Iraq is
> expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of
> biological weapons
> Hans Blix - U.N. Security Council testimony- March 7, 2003: "No evidence
> so far has been found for mobile biological weapons units"; "No underground
> facilities were found for chemical and biological weapons…"
> Tommy Franks - Pentagon Press Briefing - March 22, 2003: "There is no
> doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass
> destruction. As this operation continues, those weapons will be identified,
> found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them." -
> Victoria Clark - Pentagon Press Briefing - March 22, 2003: "One of our top
> objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites:"
> Colin Powell - (Response to U.N. Weapons Inspectors Testimony) - Mar 8,
> 2003: "So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons
> of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? I think our judgment has
> to be clearly not."
> Ari Fleisher - White House Press Briefing - December 2, 2002: "If he
> declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again
> misleading the world."
> Ari Fleisher - White House Press Briefing - January 9, 2003: "We know for
> a fact that there are weapons there."
> Ari Fleisher - White House Press Briefing - March 21, 2003: "Well, there
> is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons
> of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly ... all this will
> be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it
> takes"
> David Kay - Senate Armed Services Committee testimony - October 2, 2003:
> "We were all wrong…"
> The only rational explanation that President George W. Bush could possibly
> offer to justify so many false statements or deceptive reports by people in
> his administration is that they were deceived by the October 2002 National
> Intelligence Estimate produced by the CIA. However, the President has been
> very supportive of Director Tenet throughout the ordeal of trying to explain
> all the discrepancies. Perhaps the best indicator to determine whether the
> deception originated solely from the CIA or from the Bush administration in
> general can be found in the Project For the New American Century (PNAC).
> PNAC, is a very powerful non-profit organization founded in 1997 on
> principles that include "American global leadership", "national leadership
> that accepts the United States' global responsibilities" and "America's
> unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to
> our security, our prosperity, and our principles". The 25 signatures on the
> statement of principles include Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul
> Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Steve Forbes and Gary Bauer.
> www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
> PNAC began advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein shortly after its
> inception. In its open January 26, 1998 letter to President Bill Clinton the
> authors wrote: "Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which
> depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners and
> upon the cooperation of Saddam Hussein, is dangerously inadequate. The only
> acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be
> able to use, or threaten to use, weapons of mass destruction. In the near
> term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is
> clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his
> regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign
> policy". "We urge you to articulate this aim, and to turn your
> Administration's attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's
> regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic,
> political and military efforts". Some of the 18 signatures included Donald
> Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Richard Armitage and co-founder
> William Kristol. http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
> (Note: PNAC's power is illustrated by another open letter to Bill Clinton
> dated September 20, 1998, advocating the overthrow of Yugoslavian president
> Slobodan Milosevic in advance of the March 24, 1999 attack. It stated: "We
> are certain, however, that after seven years of aggression and genocide in
> the Balkans, the removal of Milosevic represents the only genuine
> possibility of a durable peace".
> www.newamericancentury.org/balkans_pdf_04.pdf. Like Iraqi weapons of mass
> destruction, the charges of genocide were known by many to be false at the
> time of the initial bombing campaign. There were roughly a couple of dozen
> deaths in Kosovo during 1999 before the bombing began and the March 25, 1999
> Senate Armed Services briefing given by the Clinton administration indicated
> that a third of the deaths in 1998 were Serbians who were normally aligned
> with Milosevic. Many of these deaths occurred from a civil war between the
> Yugoslavian government and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was
> backed by both the CIA and Osama Bin Laden, who was working with U.S.,
> British, German and Canadian intelligence agencies to arm, train and equip
> the KLA at the same time he was accused of the African embassy bombings. On
> August 14, 2001, under the guise of "environmental concerns", NATO "defense"
> forces confiscated the Trepca mining complex from the Yugoslavian people for
> a French, Swedish and American based partnership named ITT Kosovo.)
> After the letter to Bill Clinton did not result in action against Iraq,
> Kristol, Rumsfeld, Perle, and Wolfowitz signed and sent another open letter
> on May 29,1998 to Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott and Speaker of the
> House, Newt Gingrich. That letter again advocated the overthrow of the Iraqi
> leader: " U.S. policy should have as its explicit goal removing Saddam
> Hussein's regime from power and establishing a peaceful and democratic Iraq
> in its place". On September 20, 2001, just 9 days after the 9/11 attacks,
> PNAC members drafted yet another letter, this time to President George W,
> Bush, stating: "But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the
> attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors
> must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in
> Iraq".
> It is astounding that PNAC members would continually advocate the removal
> of Saddam Hussein even while there was almost no evidence of weapons of mass
> destruction in Iraq and no links between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11
> attacks. In fact, the evidence presented in the previous sections show that
> Iraq actually had no such weapons when PNAC continually advocated the
> removal of Saddam Hussein in 1998 on the false weapons of mass destruction
> premise. The PNAC documents clearly identify some of the men behind this
> false premise became key officials in the Bush administration. These include
> Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former
> Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle, Deputy Secretary of Defense
> Paull Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Since
> these men were all appointed as high-level officials of the Bush
> administration, it is clear that the CIA was not sole source of deception
> regarding Iraq. The CIA merely gave the President the exact report that the
> these administration officials wanted when it handed over the blatantly
> false October 2002 NIE.
> Several Democrats, including presidential candidates who assisted the Bush
> administration in the invasion, have implied that Bush officials misinformed
> them or that they otherwise oppose what the Bush administration did. Sen.
> John Kerry voted for the resolution to allow George W. Bush to invade Iraq
> at his discretion and then claimed Bush "did not do it right". Former House
> Speaker Dick Gephart co-authored the resolution and got many Democrats in
> the House to vote for it. Sen. John Edwards, a member the Senate
> Intelligence Committee, had access to previously mentioned U.S.
> intelligence indicating Iraq was not an imminent threat to American security
> but voted to allow the Bush administration to invade anyway. Sen. Joe
> Lieberman also voted for the measure and still claims Saddam Hussein was a
> threat to America despite overwhelming evidence presented in this and other
> documents.
> All of these individuals had access to the March 7, 2003 public testimony
> of the head U.N. weapons inspectors representing over 100 inspectors who
> were onsite for over four months just prior to the invasion. The inspectors
> specifically refuted every charge that the U.S. government made against
> Iraq in regards to nuclear weapons and testified that every charge the U.S.
> made against Iraq regarding chemical and biological weapons was
> unsubstantiated. Any one of these four Democrats mentioned could have
> pointed this out BEFORE the invasion and took a stand against it but none
> did. Therefore, they are also culpable for what the invasion has done to
> both Iraq and America. None can honestly claim that they were misinformed,
> particularly John Kerry, the Skull and Bones fraternity brother of George W.
> Bush.
> The extent of false statements and deception by so many high level Bush
> administration officials naturally raises the question as to what would be
> their motives for going to such an extreme to invade Iraq. The key to
> answering such as question is to determine who benefits from the invasion.
> Defining the exact motives that these individuals may have had is outside
> the scope of this analysis. However, the following obvious potential motives
> should be evaluated by anyone who chooses to perform such a further
> investigation. These include:
> · Oil - Iraq has the second largest untapped oil reserves in the world,
> which fell under the firm control of Bush administration officials, several
> of whom, such as Dick Cheney and Condoeezza Rice, previously held key
> positions in the oil business;
> · Contracts - Dick Cheney was the former CEO of Haliburton whose parent
> company Kellogg, Brown and Root is allocated to receive up to 2.3 billion
> dollars in grants for reconstruction and oil servicing contracts after the
> Iraq and Afghanistan invasions;
> · Investments - Former President George H.W. Bush and several of his
> colleagues, such as Frank Carlucci, who signed the PNAC letter on
> Yugoslavia, have undisclosed amounts of investments in private funds of the
> Carlyle Group which, in turn, invests secretly in aerospace and defense
> companies who profit by supplying U.S. military equipment and replenishing
> it during times of conflict;
> · Zionism - Key participants of the Iraqi invasion, Donald Rumsfeld,
> Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith are four of 25 Zionists
> appointed to key Bush administration posts as identified by Free American
> magazine. Perle, Wolfowitz and Feith had been previously reprimanded,
> investigated or fired, respectively, for leaking classified information to
> representatives of the Israeli government. Zionists place allegiance to
> Israel over and above allegiance to the U.S. interests. Israel has
> considered Iraq one of its greatest adversaries ever since Saddam Hussein
> removed known Zionists from the Iraqi government when the Revolutionary
> Command Council granted him power in 1979.
> Additional highly reasonable motives come from Air Force Lt. Col. Karen
> Kwiatkowski, A DOD insider who worked in the Near East South Asia policy
> office from which Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld spun off the notoriously
> deceptive Office of Special Plans, headed by Doug Feith. She suggests:
> · "One of those reasons is that sanctions and containment were working and
> everybody pretty much knew it. Many companies around the world were
> preparing to do business with Iraq in anticipation of a lifting of
> sanctions. But the U.S. and the U.K. had been bombing northern and
> southern Iraq since 1991. So it was very unlikely that we would be in any
> kind of position to gain significant contracts in any post-sanctions Iraq.
> And those sanctions were going to be lifted soon, Saddam would still be in
> place, and we would get no financial benefit."
> · "The second reason has to do with our military-basing posture in the
> region. We had been very dissatisfied with our relations with Saudi Arabia,
> particularly the restrictions on our basing. And also there was
> dissatisfaction from the people of Saudi Arabia. So we were looking for
> alternate strategic locations beyond Kuwait, beyond Qatar, to secure
> something we had been searching for since the days of Carter - to secure the
> energy lines of communication in the region. Bases in Iraq, then, were very
> important - that is, if you hold that is America's role in the world. Saddam
> Hussein was not about to invite us in."
> · "The last reason is the conversion, the switch Saddam Hussein made in
> the Food for Oil program, from the dollar to the euro. He did this, by the
> way, long before 9/11, in November 2000 - selling his oil for euros. The oil
> sales permitted in that program aren't very much. But when the sanctions
> would be lifted, the sales from the country with the second largest oil
> reserves on the planet would have been moving to the euro. The U.S. dollar
> is in a sensitive period because we are a debtor nation now. Our currency is
> still popular, but it's not backed up like it used to be. If oil, a very
> solid commodity, is traded on the euro that could cause massive, almost
> glacial, shifts in confidence in trading on the dollar. So one of the first
> executive orders that Bush signed in May [2003] switched trading on Iraq's
> oil back to the dollar."
> Whatever the motives of these individuals were it is clear that they were
> in direct conflict with the interests of American citizens. The
> unprecedented, preemptive American invasion of a nation that never attacked
> us has resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Iraqis, deaths of 500+
> U.S. soldiers and costs to the American taxpayers that will probably
> exceed 100 billion dollars or over $300 per person. Such an act is a far
> more treasonous and impeachable offense than even the charges leveled
> against former President Bill Clinton for selling dual use technology to the
> Communist Chinese military in exchange for millions of dollars in campaign
> contributions. If we are to maintain a viable federal government, President
> George W. Bush and the officials who orchestrated this deception must be
> held accountable to the American citizens.
> Garland Favorito <garlandf at msn.com>
> Out Nation Betrayed
> www.blackforestpress.com/cat_law_politics.htm
> -----------
> Vision2020 Post: Ted Moffett
> On 9/6/07, deb <debismith at moscow.com> wrote:
> >
> > Yep. As if Pat had done any research, and could have unwittingly entered
> > into entertaining a thought that wasn't right wing, let alone her very
> > own
> > thoughts, ouch, ouch, stop, stop---oooooo spare me the spasms!!! ADVICE:
> > just delete anything from Pat, spare youirself the repeat, and you will
> > feel
> > much better in the am, and she likely will fare better as well without
> > your
> > response... regurgitation of right wing crap is not fun, and she is
> > impelled
> > to do it way too often----that esophogus must be burning----------
> > Debi R-S
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Andreas Schou" < ophite at gmail.com>
> > To: "Pat Kraut" <pkraut at moscow.com>
> > Cc: "vision2020" < vision2020 at moscow.com>
> > Sent: Thursday, September 06, 2007 12:08 PM
> > Subject: Re: [Vision2020] Kucinich Introduces Impeachment Articles
> > AgainstCheney
> >
> >
> > > On 9/6/07, Pat Kraut < pkraut at moscow.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> What a colossal waste of time, money and energy...it is not going to
> > >> happen
> > >> and there is no reason why it should. We have some real issues to
> > work on
> > >> and this is not one of them but it sure helps me know more about who
> > to
> > >> vote
> > >> for this election.
> > >
> > > Pat --
> > >
> > >
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