[Vision2020] Michael Metzler and the Incarnation; philosophical theology

[Joan Opyr]

Nick wrote:

> 800 years ago Thomas Aquinas argued that the only way to talk about 
> religion to non-Christians was to use the common ground of human 
> reason.  His proposal is just as valid today as it was then, and many 
> conservative evangelical theologians such as Norman Geisler agree with 
> Aquinas.  Surprisingly, Aquinas has become favorite reading among some 
> of them.

Then Michael wrote in part and in response to Nick:

> The way you define God and man in your essay seems to beg the 
> question. You have taken what are to me more Hellenistic descriptions 
> of God and man (instead of biblical or creedal language), assumed 
> their static nature, and then used two simple syllogisms to prove that 
> God could not become ‘flesh’ and that flesh could not be taken up by 
> God.  I’d be happy challenging your definitions of God and man . . . 
> I’d also want to make a challenge that is willing to, for the sake of 
> argument, grant your definitions; this is a second way in which your 
> argument seems to beg the question: even if these were successful 
> descriptions of God and man before the incarnation, nothing latent in 
> the definitions themselves logically prohibits God and man to change 
> in nature. From this perspective, the ‘incarnation’ just is the cosmic 
> changing of these ‘categories.’ My quote from McLaren was meant to 
> highlight this.
>  

Dear Nick, Michael, and other brave souls,

For my sins (I trained for many years as a medievalist), if there's one 
thing I know, it's Thomas Aquinas.  From the Summa Theologica, Article 
II:

> I answer that it can be proved in five ways that God exists.
> The first and plainest is the method that proceeds from the point of 
> view of motion. It is certain and in accord with experience, that 
> things on earth undergo change. Now, everything that is moved is moved 
> by something; nothing, indeed, is changed, except it is changed to 
> something which it is in potentiality. Moreover, anything moves in 
> accordance with something actually existing; change itself, is nothing 
> else than to bring forth something from potentiality into actuality. 
> Now, nothing can be brought from potentiality to actual existence 
> except through something actually existing: thus heat in action, as 
> fire, makes fire-wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot 
> actually, and through this process, changes itself. The same thing 
> cannot at the same time be actually and potentially the same thing, 
> but only in regard to different things. What is actually hot cannot be 
> at the same time potentially hot, but it is possible for it at the 
> same time to be potentially cold. It is impossible, then, that 
> anything should be both mover and the thing moved, in regard to the 
> same thing and in the same way, or that it should move itself. 
> Everything, therefore, is moved by something else. If, then, that by 
> which it is moved, is also moved, this must be moved by something 
> still different, and this, again, by something else. But this process 
> cannot go on to infinity because there would not be any first mover, 
> nor, because of this fact, anything else in motion, as the succeeding 
> things would not move except because of what is moved by the first 
> mover, just as a stick is not moved except through what is moved from 
> the hand. Therefore it is necessary to go back to some first mover, 
> which is itself moved by nothing---and this all men know as God.
> The second proof is from the nature of the efficient cause. We find in 
> our experience that there is a chain of causes: nor is it found 
> possible for anything to be the efficient cause of itself, since it 
> would have to exist before itself, which is impossible. Nor in the 
> case of efficient causes can the chain go back indefinitely, because 
> in all chains of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the 
> middle, and these of the last, whether they be one or many. If the 
> cause is removed, the effect is removed. Hence if there is not a first 
> cause, there will not be a last, nor a middle. But if the chain were 
> to go back infinitely, there would be no first cause, and thus no 
> ultimate effect, nor middle causes, which is admittedly false. Hence 
> we must presuppose some first efficient cause---which all call God.
> The third proof is taken from the natures of the merely possible and 
> necessary. We find that certain things either may or may not exist, 
> since they are found to come into being and be destroyed, and in 
> consequence potentially, either existent or non-existent. But it is 
> impossible for all things that are of this character to exist 
> eternally, because what may not exist, at length will not. If, then, 
> all things were merely possible (mere accidents), eventually nothing 
> among things would exist. If this is true, even now there would be 
> nothing, because what does not exist, does not take its beginning 
> except through something that does exist. If then nothing existed, it 
> would be impossible for anything to begin, and there would now be 
> nothing existing, which is admittedly false. Hence not all things are 
> mere accidents, but there must be one necessarily existing being. Now 
> every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessary existence, 
> or has not. In the case of necessary things that have a cause for 
> their necessary existence, the chain of causes cannot go back 
> infinitely, just as not in the case of efficient causes, as proved. 
> Hence there must be presupposed something necessarily existing through 
> its own nature, not having a cause elsewhere but being itself the 
> cause of the necessary existence of other things---which all call God.
> The fourth proof arises from the degrees that are found in things. For 
> there is found a greater and a less degree of goodness, truth, 
> nobility, and the like. But more or less are terms spoken of various 
> things as they approach in diverse ways toward something that is the 
> greatest, just as in the case of hotter (more hot) which approaches 
> nearer the greatest heat. There exists therefore something that is the 
> truest, and best, and most noble, and in consequence, the greatest 
> being. For what are the greatest truths are the greatest beings, as is 
> said in the Metaphysics Bk. II. 2. What moreover is the greatest in 
> its way, in another way is the cause of all things of its own kind (or 
> genus); thus fire, which is the greatest heat, is the cause of all 
> heat, as is said in the same book (cf. Plato and Aristotle). Therefore 
> there exists something that is the cause of the existence of all 
> things and of the goodness and of every perfection whatsoever---and 
> this we call God.
> The fifth proof arises from the ordering of things for we see that 
> some things which lack reason, such as natural bodies, are operated in 
> accordance with a plan. It appears from this that they are operated 
> always or the more frequently in this same way the closer they follow 
> what is the Highest; whence it is clear that they do not arrive at the 
> result by chance but because of a purpose. The things, moreover, that 
> do not have intelligence do not tend toward a result unless directed 
> by some one knowing and intelligent; just as an arrow is sent by an 
> archer. Therefore there is something intelligent by which all natural 
> things are arranged in accordance with a plan---and this we call God.
> In response to the first objection, then, I reply what Augustine says; 
> that since God is entirely good, He would permit evil to exist in His 
> works only if He were so good and omnipotent that He might bring forth 
> good even from the evil. It therefore pertains to the infinite 
> goodness of God that he permits evil to exist and from this brings 
> forth good.
> My reply to the second objection is that since nature is ordered in 
> accordance with some defined purpose by the direction of some superior 
> agent, those things that spring from nature must be dependent upon 
> God, just as upon a first cause. Likewise, what springs from a 
> proposition must be traceable to some higher cause which is not the 
> human reason or will, because this is changeable and defective and 
> everything changeable and liable to non-existence is dependent upon 
> some unchangeable first principle that is necessarily self-existent as 
> has been shown.

I would argue myself that God is always and everywhere unchanging; it 
is only our understanding that grows (or lessens) or changes over time. 
  The God of the first Genesis creation story is not the same as the God 
of the second, and the God who drowns the world in flood is much like 
the God who torments Job, but not like the God of Isaiah.  This is why 
Jews have not just Torah but the Midrash; we argue not only about God 
but with God.  And sometimes, we win.

What does this mean in terms of the Christian incarnation?  For me, it 
means very little -- I don't believe that God chose to be born of a 
virgin in Bethlehem, taught up and down the coast of Galilee, and died 
by crucifixion in Jerusalem only to be resurrected and born up into 
heaven.  Why, or rather, why not?  Because I don't believe in the 
necessity of redemption via suffering and death.  God doesn't need to 
go to this much trouble to cope with our failings.  The God of Abraham 
made us as we are, handed down 600-odd commandments advising us on how 
to behave morally and ethically, and then, like a good shrink, let us 
go with the option to call upon Him/Her if we need to.  And, just 
speaking for myself, I need to -- often.  This is one of the many 
reasons I light the Sabbath candles.

That said, I don't know that logic need come into Michael's belief in 
or defense of the Christian incarnation.  I believe that, as a 
Calvinist, he cannot play with the definition of God, and that the 
definition of God may not change, but virgin births make no more or 
less sense than talking bushes.  800 years on and we have not moved 
beyond Aquinas' proofs of God.  They are not logical in the classical 
sense.  Aquinas, again:

"So faith presupposes natural knowledge, so grace nature, and 
perfection a perfectible thing.  Nothing prevents a thing that is in 
itself demonstratable and knowable, from being accepted as an article 
of faith by someone that does not accept the proof of it."

An elegant thinker, Aquinas, and one of my favorites.  I enjoyed 
reading the Summa Theologica.  Just don't ask me how I felt about 
Calvin's Institutes.  I'd turn the air (or, rather, the ether) blue.

Joan

Joan Opyr/Auntie Establishment
www.joanopyr.com
  
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