[Vision2020] Bombing Civilians In Iraq
Tbertruss@aol.com
Tbertruss@aol.com
Sun, 13 Jun 2004 03:14:45 EDT
--part1_19c.25612ea4.2dfd58e5_boundary
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By DOUGLAS JEHL and ERIC SCHMITT, The New York Times
WASHINGTON (June 12) -- The United States launched many more failed=20
airstrikes on a far broader array of senior Iraqi leaders during the early d=
ays of the=20
war last year than has previously been acknowledged, and some caused=20
significant civilian casualties, according to senior military and intelligen=
ce=20
officials.
=20
AP
Smoke bellows from a building hit during coalition forces air raid in Baghda=
d=20
in March 2003.
=20
Only a few of the 50 airstrikes have been described in public. All were=20
unsuccessful, and many, including the two well-known raids on Saddam Hussein=
and=20
his sons, appear to have been undercut by poor intelligence, current and for=
mer=20
government officials said.
The strikes, carried out against so-called high-value targets during a=20
one-month period that began on March 19, 2003, used precision-guided munitio=
ns=20
against at least 13 Iraqi leaders, including Gen. Izzat Ibrahim, Iraq's No.=20=
2=20
official, the officials said.
General Ibrahim is still at large, along with at least one other top officia=
l=20
who was a target of the failed raids. That official, Maj. Gen. Rafi Abd=20
al-Latif Tilfah, the former head of the Directorate of General Security, and=
=20
General Ibrahim are playing a leadership role in the anti-American insurgenc=
y,=20
according to a briefing document prepared last month by the Defense Intellig=
ence=20
Agency.
The broad scope of the campaign and its failures, along with the civilian=20
casualties, have not been acknowledged by the Bush administration.
A report in December by Human Rights Watch, based on a review of four=20
strikes, concluded that the singling out of Iraqi leadership had "resulted i=
n dozens=20
of civilian casualties that the United States could have prevented if it had=
=20
taken additional precautions."
The poor record in the strikes has raised questions about the intelligence=20
they were based on, including whether that intelligence reflected deception=20=
on=20
the part of Iraqis, the officials said. The March 19, 2003, attempt to kill=20=
Mr.=20
Hussein and his sons at the Dora Farms compound, south of Baghdad, remains a=
=20
subject of particular contention.
A Central Intelligence Agency officer reported, based primarily on=20
information provided by satellite telephone from an Iraqi source, that Mr. H=
ussein was=20
in an underground bunker at the site. That prompted President Bush to=20
accelerate the timetable for the beginning of the war, giving the go-ahead t=
o strikes=20
by precision-guided bombs and cruise missiles, senior intelligence officials=
=20
said.
But in an interview last summer, Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, of the Air=20
Force, who directed the air campaign during the invasion, acknowledged that=20
inspections after the war had concluded that no such bunker existed. Various=
=20
internal reviews by the military and the C.I.A. have still not resolved the=20=
question=20
of whether Mr. Hussein was at the location at all, according to senior=20
military and intelligence officials, although the C.I.A. maintains that he w=
as=20
probably at Dora Farms.
One possibility, a senior intelligence official and a senior military office=
r=20
said, is that Mr. Hussein was above ground in one of the houses that were no=
t=20
destroyed in the raid.
In the raid, the Air Force primarily used deep-penetrating munitions because=
=20
of their ability to destroy an underground bunker. The person who was the=20
primary source of the information about the bunker was killed in the raid,=20
according to intelligence officials, but had described it using an Arabic wo=
rd,=20
manzul, that could have been translated either as place of refuge or as bunk=
er.
A C.I.A. officer who relayed that report from a base in northern Iraq=20
translated the word as bunker, said a senior intelligence official, who conf=
irmed a=20
detailed report that first appeared in "Plan of Attack," a book by the=20
journalist Bob Woodward.
A Warning Sign
=20
AP
An Iraqi worker walks in the rubble of a communications building reportedly=20
destroyed in an overnight missile attack in Bagdhad March 2003.
=20
In retrospect, the failures were an early warning sign about the thinness of=
=20
American intelligence on Iraq and on Mr. Hussein's inner circle. Some of the=
=20
officials who survived the raids, including General Ibrahim, have become=20
leaders of what the Defense Intelligence Agency now believes has been a plan=
ned=20
anti-American insurgency, several intelligence officials said.
"It was all just guesswork on where they were," said a senior military=20
officer. Another official, a senior Army officer who served in Iraq, describ=
ed early=20
intelligence on the Iraqi leadership as producing "a lot of dry holes."
A third senior military officer described the quantity of "no kidding,=20
actionable intel" as having been limited, but added, "In a real fight, you g=
o with=20
what you've got."
Senior military officials said they were not sure whether the Iraqis=20
deliberately deceived the United States, in the information that they provid=
ed or that=20
was intercepted. They described the intelligence as problematic at best, but=
=20
said that intelligence agencies were engaged in a hard task.
An unclassified Air Force report issued in April 2003 categorized 50 attacks=
=20
from March 19 to April 18 as having been time-sensitive strikes on Iraqi=20
leaders. An up-to-date accounting posted on the Web site of the United State=
s=20
Central Command shows that 43 of the top 55 Iraqi leaders on the most-wanted=
list=20
have now been taken into custody or killed, but that none were taken into=20
custody until April 13, 2003, and that none were killed by airstrikes.
An explicit account of the zero for 50 record in strikes on high-value=20
targets was provided by Marc Garlasco, a former Defense Intelligence Agency=20=
official=20
who headed the joint staff's high-value targeting cell during the war. Mr.=20
Garlasco is now a senior military analyst for Human Rights Watch, and he was=
a=20
primary author of the December report, "Off Target: The Conduct of the War a=
nd=20
Civilian Casualties in Iraq."
The broad failure rate was confirmed by several senior military officials,=20
including some who served in Iraq or the region during the war, and by senio=
r=20
intelligence officials.
Immediately after the March 19 attack and others, including an April 5 strik=
e=20
aimed at Gen. Ali Hasan al-Majid, a top official known as Chemical Ali for=20
his role in the gassing of Kurds in 1988, top American officials expressed=20
confidence that the strikes had been successful. On April 7, Defense Secreta=
ry=20
Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs o=
f=20
Staff, played a videotape of the strike aimed at General Majid, and Mr. Rums=
feld=20
declared, "We believe that the reign of terror of Chemical Ali has come to a=
n=20
end."
But General Majid survived that raid and others, and was not captured until=20
August. Mr. Hussein was not captured until Dec. 13, and his sons Uday and Qu=
say=20
were at large until they were killed on July 22. General Ibrahim, General=20
Tilfah and perhaps others who were singled out have not yet been captured.
An unclassified analysis prepared last month by the Defense Intelligence=20
Agency and obtained by The New York Times describes Mr. Ibrahim as having "a=
ssumed=20
Saddam's duties" as the titular head of the insurgency after Mr. Hussein's=20
capture. It lists General Tilfah, a cousin of Mr. Hussein, as one of the lea=
ders=20
of former government leaders involved in the insurgency.
The Iraqi officials singled out during the war were all from the top-55=20
"blacklist," which was drafted by the C.I.A. and depicted on playing cards=20
distributed to American troops, military officials said.
Other leaders singled out in repeated strikes included Gen. Abid Hamid=20
Mahmud, Mr. Hussein's secretary and senior bodyguard, who was taken into cus=
tody on=20
June 16, and Mr. Hussein's half brother Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, a presidential=
=20
adviser, according to current and former military officials.
Rules for the Raids
General Moseley, the top Air Force commander during the war who is now the=20
Air Force vice chief of staff, said in the interview last summer that comman=
ders=20
were required to obtain advance approval from Mr. Rumsfeld if any planned=20
airstrike was likely to result in the deaths of 30 more civilians. More than=
50=20
such raids were proposed, and all were approved, General Moseley said.
But raids considered time-sensitive, which included all of those on the=20
high-value targets, were not subject to that constraint, according to curren=
t and=20
former military officials. In part for that reason, the report by Human Righ=
ts=20
Watch concluded, "attacks on leadership likely resulted in the largest numbe=
r=20
of civilian deaths from the air war."
The four case studies examined by the organization included the failed March=
=20
19, 2003, strike on Mr. Hussein and his sons at Dora Farms, which it said=20
killed a civilian. According to Human Rights Watch, a failed April 5 strike=20=
that=20
singled out General Majid in a residential area of Basra killed 17 civilians=
; a=20
failed April 8 strike that was aimed at Mr. Hussein's half brother Watban=20
Ibrahim Barzan in a district of Baghdad killed 6 civilians; and the second r=
aid=20
on Mr. Hussein and one or both of his sons, on April 7 in the Mansur distric=
t=20
of Baghdad, killed an estimated 18 civilians.
In an e-mail message, Mr. Garlasco described the campaign to attack=20
high-value targets as "abject failure," saying, "We failed to kill the H.V.T=
.'s and=20
instead killed civilians and engendered hatred and discontent in some of the=
=20
population."
Senior military officers said some of the strikes might have failed because=20
the Iraqi leaders were on the move during the war. On occasion, they said,=20
reports from spies or communications intercepts may have given their locatio=
ns=20
accurately, but the strikes may have come too late.
But according to a senior defense official and two former intelligence=20
officials, there were also indications that some intelligence had been wrong=
, and=20
might have reflected deliberate disinformation from Iraqis enlisted as spies=
by=20
the United States or from Iraqis who suspected that American intelligence=20
agencies were listening in on their communications.
According to a former defense official, Iraqi leaders who were singled out=20
included Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sab Hassan, commander of Iraqi Air Defense Forces;=
=20
Brig. Gen. Barzan Abd Ghafur Sulayman Majid, commander of the Special Republ=
ican=20
Guard; Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Iraqi vice president; Brig. Gen. Rukan Razuk=
i=20
Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman, a senior bodyguard to Mr. Hussein; and Watban Ibrahi=
m=20
Barzan and Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hasan, Mr. Hussein's half brothers.
There were conflicting accounts about whether another Iraqi leader who is=20
still at large, Col. Hani Abd al-Latif al-Tilfah, the director of the specia=
l=20
security organization under Qusay Hussein, had been a target in the raids. T=
he=20
colonel, the brother of General Tilfah and another maternal cousin of Mr.=20
Hussein, is listed by the D.I.A. as among the leaders of the insurgency.
Another Iraqi leader from the top 55 list who is still at large and is=20
identified in the D.I.A. report as a leader of the insurgency is Abd al-Baqi=
Abd=20
al-Karim al Abdallah al-Sadun, chairman of the Baath Party regional command=20=
for=20
Diyala. The current and former military officials said they had no indicatio=
n=20
that he had been a target.
Since April 2003, senior American officials have acknowledged that the=20
intelligence reports that placed Mr. Hussein and at least one of his sons in=
the=20
Mansur district of Baghdad had been regarded as less than solid at the time=20=
of=20
that strike. Even now, a senior intelligence official said the C.I.A. believ=
ed=20
that Mr. Hussein was "possibly" at the site in Mansur, which was stuck by fo=
ur=20
2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs.
By contrast, the intelligence reports that preceded the March 19 strike on=20
Dora Farms, which was carried out with four 2,000-pound satellite-guided bom=
bs=20
and more than 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles, were regarded as highly credible,=
=20
according to senior intelligence officials. At the C.I.A., George J. Tenet,=20=
the=20
director of central intelligence, told other administration officials that h=
e=20
was certain that Mr. Hussein had been killed in the raid, citing a report th=
at=20
had been relayed by satellite phone to the C.I.A. officer in northern Iraq b=
y=20
one Iraqi agent on the scene.
Mr. Hussein, since his capture on Dec. 13, has not directly answered when=20
American interrogators have sought to determine whether he was at either loc=
ation=20
at the time of the two strikes, according to two senior government officials=
.
At the Pentagon last October, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone of the Army, directo=
r=20
of the military's Joint Center for Lessons Learned, acknowledged that the=20
intelligence necessary to carry out attacks like these had not measured up t=
o=20
expectations.
"When you take a large country the size of Iraq, with all those sensors and=20
communications, how do you get the right information to the right person who=
=20
needs it in a timely manner?" General Cone said.
06-12-04 17:49 EDT
Copyright =A9 2004 The New=20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------=
--
--
V2020 Post by Ted Moffett
=20
--part1_19c.25612ea4.2dfd58e5_boundary
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<HTML><FONT FACE=3Darial,helvetica><HTML><FONT SIZE=3D2 PTSIZE=3D10 FAMILY=
=3D"SANSSERIF" FACE=3D"Arial" LANG=3D"0"><IMG SRC=3D"http://cdn.news.aol.co=
m/aolnews_providers/24_article_logo" WIDTH=3D"133" HEIGHT=3D"21" BORDER=3D"0=
" DATASIZE=3D"733"><BR>
By DOUGLAS JEHL and ERIC SCHMITT, The New York Times<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
WASHINGTON (June 12) -- The United States launched many more failed airstrik=
es on a far broader array of senior Iraqi leaders during the early days of t=
he war last year than has previously been acknowledged, and some caused sign=
ificant civilian casualties, according to senior military and intelligence o=
fficials.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<P ALIGN=3DCENTER><IMG SRC=3D"http://cdn.news.aol.com/aolnews_photos/05/01/=
20040612175909990009" WIDTH=3D"230" HEIGHT=3D"190" BORDER=3D"0" DATASIZE=3D"=
4712"><BR>
AP<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<P ALIGN=3DLEFT>Smoke bellows from a building hit during coalition forces ai=
r raid in Baghdad in March 2003.<BR>
<BR>
Only a few of the 50 airstrikes have been described in public. All were unsu=
ccessful, and many, including the two well-known raids on Saddam Hussein and=
his sons, appear to have been undercut by poor intelligence, current and fo=
rmer government officials said.<BR>
<BR>
The strikes, carried out against so-called high-value targets during a one-m=
onth period that began on March 19, 2003, used precision-guided munitions ag=
ainst at least 13 Iraqi leaders, including Gen. Izzat Ibrahim, Iraq's No. 2=20=
official, the officials said.<BR>
<BR>
General Ibrahim is still at large, along with at least one other top officia=
l who was a target of the failed raids. That official, Maj. Gen. Rafi Abd al=
-Latif Tilfah, the former head of the Directorate of General Security, and G=
eneral Ibrahim are playing a leadership role in the anti-American insurgency=
, according to a briefing document prepared last month by the Defense Intell=
igence Agency.<BR>
<BR>
The broad scope of the campaign and its failures, along with the civilian ca=
sualties, have not been acknowledged by the Bush administration.<BR>
<BR>
A report in December by Human Rights Watch, based on a review of four strike=
s, concluded that the singling out of Iraqi leadership had "resulted in doze=
ns of civilian casualties that the United States could have prevented if it=20=
had taken additional precautions."<BR>
<BR>
The poor record in the strikes has raised questions about the intelligence t=
hey were based on, including whether that intelligence reflected deception o=
n the part of Iraqis, the officials said. The March 19, 2003, attempt to kil=
l Mr. Hussein and his sons at the Dora Farms compound, south of Baghdad, rem=
ains a subject of particular contention.<BR>
<BR>
A Central Intelligence Agency officer reported, based primarily on informati=
on provided by satellite telephone from an Iraqi source, that Mr. Hussein wa=
s in an underground bunker at the site. That prompted President Bush to acce=
lerate the timetable for the beginning of the war, giving the go-ahead to st=
rikes by precision-guided bombs and cruise missiles, senior intelligence off=
icials said.<BR>
<BR>
But in an interview last summer, Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, of the Air For=
ce, who directed the air campaign during the invasion, acknowledged that ins=
pections after the war had concluded that no such bunker existed. Various in=
ternal reviews by the military and the C.I.A. have still not resolved the qu=
estion of whether Mr. Hussein was at the location at all, according to senio=
r military and intelligence officials, although the C.I.A. maintains that he=
was probably at Dora Farms.<BR>
<BR>
One possibility, a senior intelligence official and a senior military office=
r said, is that Mr. Hussein was above ground in one of the houses that were=20=
not destroyed in the raid.<BR>
<BR>
In the raid, the Air Force primarily used deep-penetrating munitions because=
of their ability to destroy an underground bunker. The person who was the p=
rimary source of the information about the bunker was killed in the raid, ac=
cording to intelligence officials, but had described it using an Arabic word=
, manzul, that could have been translated either as place of refuge or as bu=
nker.<BR>
<BR>
A C.I.A. officer who relayed that report from a base in northern Iraq transl=
ated the word as bunker, said a senior intelligence official, who confirmed=20=
a detailed report that first appeared in "Plan of Attack," a book by the jou=
rnalist Bob Woodward.<BR>
<BR>
<B>A Warning Sign</B><BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<P ALIGN=3DCENTER><IMG SRC=3D"http://cdn.news.aol.com/aolnews_photos/05/00/=
20040612175909990008" WIDTH=3D"375" HEIGHT=3D"216" BORDER=3D"0" DATASIZE=3D"=
11420"><BR>
AP<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<P ALIGN=3DLEFT>An Iraqi worker walks in the rubble of a communications buil=
ding reportedly destroyed in an overnight missile attack in Bagdhad March 20=
03.<BR>
<BR>
In retrospect, the failures were an early warning sign about the thinness of=
American intelligence on Iraq and on Mr. Hussein's inner circle. Some of th=
e officials who survived the raids, including General Ibrahim, have become l=
eaders of what the Defense Intelligence Agency now believes has been a plann=
ed anti-American insurgency, several intelligence officials said.<BR>
<BR>
"It was all just guesswork on where they were," said a senior military offic=
er. Another official, a senior Army officer who served in Iraq, described ea=
rly intelligence on the Iraqi leadership as producing "a lot of dry holes."<=
BR>
<BR>
A third senior military officer described the quantity of "no kidding, actio=
nable intel" as having been limited, but added, "In a real fight, you go wit=
h what you've got."<BR>
<BR>
Senior military officials said they were not sure whether the Iraqis deliber=
ately deceived the United States, in the information that they provided or t=
hat was intercepted. They described the intelligence as problematic at best,=
but said that intelligence agencies were engaged in a hard task.<BR>
<BR>
An unclassified Air Force report issued in April 2003 categorized 50 attacks=
from March 19 to April 18 as having been time-sensitive strikes on Iraqi le=
aders. An up-to-date accounting posted on the Web site of the United States=20=
Central Command shows that 43 of the top 55 Iraqi leaders on the most-wanted=
list have now been taken into custody or killed, but that none were taken i=
nto custody until April 13, 2003, and that none were killed by airstrikes.<B=
R>
<BR>
An explicit account of the zero for 50 record in strikes on high-value targe=
ts was provided by Marc Garlasco, a former Defense Intelligence Agency offic=
ial who headed the joint staff's high-value targeting cell during the war. M=
r. Garlasco is now a senior military analyst for Human Rights Watch, and he=20=
was a primary author of the December report, "Off Target: The Conduct of the=
War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq."<BR>
<BR>
The broad failure rate was confirmed by several senior military officials, i=
ncluding some who served in Iraq or the region during the war, and by senior=
intelligence officials.<BR>
<BR>
Immediately after the March 19 attack and others, including an April 5 strik=
e aimed at Gen. Ali Hasan al-Majid, a top official known as Chemical Ali for=
his role in the gassing of Kurds in 1988, top American officials expressed=20=
confidence that the strikes had been successful. On April 7, Defense Secreta=
ry Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chief=
s of Staff, played a videotape of the strike aimed at General Majid, and Mr.=
Rumsfeld declared, "We believe that the reign of terror of Chemical Ali has=
come to an end."<BR>
<BR>
But General Majid survived that raid and others, and was not captured until=20=
August. Mr. Hussein was not captured until Dec. 13, and his sons Uday and Qu=
say were at large until they were killed on July 22. General Ibrahim, Genera=
l Tilfah and perhaps others who were singled out have not yet been captured.=
<BR>
<BR>
An unclassified analysis prepared last month by the Defense Intelligence Age=
ncy and obtained by The New York Times describes Mr. Ibrahim as having "assu=
med Saddam's duties" as the titular head of the insurgency after Mr. Hussein=
's capture. It lists General Tilfah, a cousin of Mr. Hussein, as one of the=20=
leaders of former government leaders involved in the insurgency.<BR>
<BR>
The Iraqi officials singled out during the war were all from the top-55 "bla=
cklist," which was drafted by the C.I.A. and depicted on playing cards distr=
ibuted to American troops, military officials said.<BR>
<BR>
Other leaders singled out in repeated strikes included Gen. Abid Hamid Mahmu=
d, Mr. Hussein's secretary and senior bodyguard, who was taken into custody=20=
on June 16, and Mr. Hussein's half brother Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, a president=
ial adviser, according to current and former military officials.<BR>
<BR>
<B>Rules for the Raids</B><BR>
<BR>
General Moseley, the top Air Force commander during the war who is now the A=
ir Force vice chief of staff, said in the interview last summer that command=
ers were required to obtain advance approval from Mr. Rumsfeld if any planne=
d airstrike was likely to result in the deaths of 30 more civilians. More th=
an 50 such raids were proposed, and all were approved, General Moseley said.=
<BR>
<BR>
But raids considered time-sensitive, which included all of those on the high=
-value targets, were not subject to that constraint, according to current an=
d former military officials. In part for that reason, the report by Human Ri=
ghts Watch concluded, "attacks on leadership likely resulted in the largest=20=
number of civilian deaths from the air war."<BR>
<BR>
The four case studies examined by the organization included the failed March=
19, 2003, strike on Mr. Hussein and his sons at Dora Farms, which it said k=
illed a civilian. According to Human Rights Watch, a failed April 5 strike t=
hat singled out General Majid in a residential area of Basra killed 17 civil=
ians; a failed April 8 strike that was aimed at Mr. Hussein's half brother W=
atban Ibrahim Barzan in a district of Baghdad killed 6 civilians; and the se=
cond raid on Mr. Hussein and one or both of his sons, on April 7 in the Mans=
ur district of Baghdad, killed an estimated 18 civilians.<BR>
<BR>
In an e-mail message, Mr. Garlasco described the campaign to attack high-val=
ue targets as "abject failure," saying, "We failed to kill the H.V.T.'s and=20=
instead killed civilians and engendered hatred and discontent in some of the=
population."<BR>
<BR>
Senior military officers said some of the strikes might have failed because=20=
the Iraqi leaders were on the move during the war. On occasion, they said, r=
eports from spies or communications intercepts may have given their location=
s accurately, but the strikes may have come too late.<BR>
<BR>
But according to a senior defense official and two former intelligence offic=
ials, there were also indications that some intelligence had been wrong, and=
might have reflected deliberate disinformation from Iraqis enlisted as spie=
s by the United States or from Iraqis who suspected that American intelligen=
ce agencies were listening in on their communications.<BR>
<BR>
According to a former defense official, Iraqi leaders who were singled out i=
ncluded Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sab Hassan, commander of Iraqi Air Defense Forces;=20=
Brig. Gen. Barzan Abd Ghafur Sulayman Majid, commander of the Special Republ=
ican Guard; Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Iraqi vice president; Brig. Gen. Rukan=20=
Razuki Abd al-Ghafar Sulayman, a senior bodyguard to Mr. Hussein; and Watban=
Ibrahim Barzan and Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hasan, Mr. Hussein's half brothers.<BR=
>
<BR>
There were conflicting accounts about whether another Iraqi leader who is st=
ill at large, Col. Hani Abd al-Latif al-Tilfah, the director of the special=20=
security organization under Qusay Hussein, had been a target in the raids. T=
he colonel, the brother of General Tilfah and another maternal cousin of Mr.=
Hussein, is listed by the D.I.A. as among the leaders of the insurgency.<BR=
>
<BR>
Another Iraqi leader from the top 55 list who is still at large and is ident=
ified in the D.I.A. report as a leader of the insurgency is Abd al-Baqi Abd=20=
al-Karim al Abdallah al-Sadun, chairman of the Baath Party regional command=20=
for Diyala. The current and former military officials said they had no indic=
ation that he had been a target.<BR>
<BR>
Since April 2003, senior American officials have acknowledged that the intel=
ligence reports that placed Mr. Hussein and at least one of his sons in the=20=
Mansur district of Baghdad had been regarded as less than solid at the time=20=
of that strike. Even now, a senior intelligence official said the C.I.A. bel=
ieved that Mr. Hussein was "possibly" at the site in Mansur, which was stuck=
by four 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs.<BR>
<BR>
By contrast, the intelligence reports that preceded the March 19 strike on D=
ora Farms, which was carried out with four 2,000-pound satellite-guided bomb=
s and more than 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles, were regarded as highly credibl=
e, according to senior intelligence officials. At the C.I.A., George J. Tene=
t, the director of central intelligence, told other administration officials=
that he was certain that Mr. Hussein had been killed in the raid, citing a=20=
report that had been relayed by satellite phone to the C.I.A. officer in nor=
thern Iraq by one Iraqi agent on the scene.<BR>
<BR>
Mr. Hussein, since his capture on Dec. 13, has not directly answered when Am=
erican interrogators have sought to determine whether he was at either locat=
ion at the time of the two strikes, according to two senior government offic=
ials.<BR>
<BR>
At the Pentagon last October, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone of the Army, directo=
r of the military's Joint Center for Lessons Learned, acknowledged that the=20=
intelligence necessary to carry out attacks like these had not measured up t=
o expectations.<BR>
<BR>
"When you take a large country the size of Iraq, with all those sensors and=20=
communications, how do you get the right information to the right person who=
needs it in a timely manner?" General Cone said.<BR>
<BR>
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06-12-04 17:49 EDT<BR>
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Copyright =A9 2004 <A HREF=3D"http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/c=
opyright.html">The New </A><BR>
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V2020 Post by Ted Moffett<BR>
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