[Vision2020] It's too late to help Rwanda, but what about Sudan?

Joan Opyr auntiestablishment@hotmail.com
Tue, 6 Apr 2004 13:09:09 -0700


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Dear Visionaries:

In the midst of our single-minded (actually, make that single-celled) new=
s media's 24/7 coverage of the disaster in Iraq, you might have missed th=
e fact that Sudan is yet another front in the war on terror, a front to w=
hich we are not paying adequate attention.  If memory serves, Osama bin L=
aden -- remember him, Pat? -- spent some time in the '90s hiding out in S=
udan and building Al Qaeda connections there.  While I would like to give=
 the Bush Administration credit for its stated willingness to broker a pe=
ace deal between the Sudanese government and rebels in the south, I fear =
that this, like the Israeli-Palestinian "Roadmap to Peace," is just so mu=
ch bluster.    =20

Forwarding from The New York Times Op-Ed pages.

Joan Opyr/Auntie Establishment

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Op-Ed Contributor: Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan

April 6, 2004
By SAMANTHA POWER =20

Ten years ago this week, Rwandan Hutu extremists embarked
on a genocidal campaign in which they murdered some 800,000
Tutsis and moderate Hutus - a genocide more efficient than
that of the Nazis. =20

On this anniversary, Western and United Nations leaders are
expressing their remorse and pledging their resolve to
prevent future humanitarian catastrophes. But as they do
so, the Sudanese government is teaming up with Arab Muslim
militias in a campaign of ethnic slaughter and deportation
that has already left nearly a million Africans displaced
and more than 30,000 dead. Again, the United States and its
allies are bystanders to slaughter, seemingly no more
prepared to prevent genocide than they were a decade ago. =20

The horrors in the Darfur region of Sudan are not "like"
Rwanda, any more than those in Rwanda were "like" those
ordered by Hitler. The Arab-dominated government in
Khartoum has armed nomadic Arab herdsmen, or Janjaweed,
against rival African tribes. The government is using
aerial bombardment to strafe villages and terrorize
civilians into flight. And it is denying humanitarian
access to some 700,000 people who are trapped in Darfur. =20

The Arab Muslim marauders and their government sponsors do
not yet seem intent on exterminating every last African
Muslim in their midst. But they do seem determined to wipe
out black life in the region. The only difference between
Rwanda and Darfur, said Mukesh Kapila, the former United
Nations' humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, "is the
numbers of dead, murdered, tortured, raped." =20

A radio exchange between a Sudanese ground commander and a
pilot overhead (taped by a British journalist in February)
captures the aims of the attackers: =20

Commander: We've found people still in the village.


Pilot: Are they with us or against us? =20

Commander: They say they will work with us. =20

Pilot: They're liars. Don't trust them. Get rid of them. =20

And later: =20

Pilot: Now the village is empty and secure for
you. Any village you pass through you must burn. That way,
when the villagers come back they'll have a surprise
waiting for them. =20

The lessons of Rwanda are many. The first is that those
intent on wiping out an inconvenient minority have a habit
of denying journalists and aid workers access and of
pursuing bad-faith negotiations. Thus far the Sudanese
government has pursued both approaches, and Western
officials have been far too trusting of their assurances. =20

A second lesson is that outside powers cannot wait for
confirmation of genocide before they act. In 1994 the
Clinton administration spent more time maneuvering to avoid
using the term "genocide" than it did using its resources
to save lives. In May 1994, an internal Pentagon memo
warned against using the term "genocide" because it could
commit the United States "to actually do something." In the
case of Sudan, American officials need not focus on whether
the killings meet the definition of genocide set by the
1948 Genocide Convention; they should focus instead on
trying to stop them. =20

A third lesson is that even when the United States decides
not to respond militarily, American leadership is
indispensable. This is especially true because Europe
continues to avoid intervening in violent humanitarian
crises. And it remains true despite the Bush
administration's unpopularity abroad. The United States
often takes an all-or-nothing approach: if it doesn't send
troops, it tends to foreclose other policy options. =20

In Sudan, this tendency has been compounded by the
administration's reluctance to risk undermining the peace
process it has spearheaded between Sudan's government and
the rebels in the south. While President Bush is
understandably eager to show he can make peace as well as
war, he must stand up to Sudan's government during these
difficult negotiations. =20

After all, regimes that resort to ethnic killing and
deportation as a tool of statecraft rarely keep their word.
An important predictor of Sudan's reliability as an ally in
the war on terrorism and as a party to the
American-brokered peace accord is its treatment of African
Muslims in Darfur. =20

What would standing up to Sudan entail? The administration
has several options. =20

On the economic and diplomatic front, the United States has
already demonstrated its clout in Sudan, which is desperate
to see American sanctions lifted. So far, Secretary of
State Colin Powell has rightly described the humanitarian
crisis as a "catastrophe." But the White House and the
Pentagon have been mostly mute. President Bush must use
American leverage to demand that the government in Khartoum
cease its aerial attacks, terminate its arms supplies to
the Janjaweed and punish those militia accused of looting,
rape and murder. The president made a phone call last week
to Sudan's president, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, but one
ritual conversation hardly counts as pressure. Mr. Bush
should keep calling until humanitarian workers and
investigators are permitted free movement in the region, a
no-fly zone is declared and the killings are stopped, and
he should dispatch Mr. Powell to the Chad-Sudan border to
signal America's resolve. =20

The Bush administration can't do this alone. Ten thousand
international peacekeepers are needed in Darfur. President
Bush will have to press Sudan to agree to a United Nations
mission - and he will also need United Nations member
states to sign on. The Europeans can help by urging the
Security Council to refer the killings to the newly created
International Criminal Court. Though the United States has
been hostile to the court, this is one move it should not
veto, as an investigation by the court could deter future
massacres. =20

President Clinton has said that one of the greatest
mistakes of his presidency was not doing more to prevent
the Rwandan genocide. When he visited Rwanda in 1998, he
tried to explain America's failure to respond: "It may seem
strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost
members of your family, but all over the world there were
people like me sitting in offices, day after day after day,
who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with
which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."


Today, roughly 1,000 miles north of Rwanda, tens of
thousands of Africans are herded onto death marches, and
Western leaders are again sitting in offices. How sad it is
that it doesn't even seem strange. =20

Samantha Power is the author of "A Problem From Hell:
America and the Age of Genocide," which won the 2003
Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction. =20

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/opinion/06POWE.html?ex=3D1082281043&ei=3D=
1&en=3D37d84e72b4c822b6

Copyright 2004 The New York Times CompanyGet more from the Web.  FREE MSN=
 Explorer download : http://explorer.msn.com

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<HTML><BODY STYLE=3D"font:10pt verdana; border:none;"><DIV>Dear Visionari=
es:</DIV> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV>In the midst of our single-minded (actua=
lly, make that single-celled) news media's&nbsp;24/7 coverage of the disa=
ster in Iraq, you might have missed the fact that Sudan is yet another fr=
ont in the war on terror, a front&nbsp;to which we are not paying adequat=
e attention.&nbsp; If memory serves, Osama bin Laden -- remember him, Pat=
? -- spent some time in the '90s hiding out in Sudan and building Al Qaed=
a connections there.&nbsp; While I would like to give the Bush Administra=
tion credit for&nbsp;its stated willingness to broker a peace deal betwee=
n the Sudanese government and rebels in the south,&nbsp;I fear that&nbsp;=
this, like the Israeli-Palestinian "Roadmap to Peace,"&nbsp;is just so mu=
ch bluster.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV>Forwardi=
ng from The New York Times Op-Ed pages.</DIV> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV>Joan=
 Opyr/Auntie Establishment</DIV> <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV> <DIV>-----------------=
-------------------------------------------------------------------</DIV>=
 <DIV>Op-Ed Contributor: Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan<BR><BR=
>April 6, 2004<BR>By SAMANTHA POWER <BR><BR>Ten years ago this week, Rwan=
dan Hutu extremists embarked<BR>on a genocidal campaign in which they mur=
dered some 800,000<BR>Tutsis and moderate Hutus - a genocide more efficie=
nt than<BR>that of the Nazis. <BR><BR>On this anniversary, Western and Un=
ited Nations leaders are<BR>expressing their remorse and pledging their r=
esolve to<BR>prevent future humanitarian catastrophes. But as they do<BR>=
so, the Sudanese government is teaming up with Arab Muslim<BR>militias in=
 a campaign of ethnic slaughter and deportation<BR>that has already left =
nearly a million Africans displaced<BR>and more than 30,000 dead. Again, =
the United States and its<BR>allies are bystanders to slaughter, seemingl=
y no more<BR>prepared to prevent genocide than they were a decade ago. <B=
R><BR>The horrors in the Darfur region of Sudan are not "like"<BR>Rwanda,=
 any more than those in Rwanda were "like" those<BR>ordered by Hitler. Th=
e Arab-dominated government in<BR>Khartoum has armed nomadic Arab herdsme=
n, or Janjaweed,<BR>against rival African tribes. The government is using=
<BR>aerial bombardment to strafe villages and terrorize<BR>civilians into=
 flight. And it is denying humanitarian<BR>access to some 700,000 people =
who are trapped in Darfur. <BR><BR>The Arab Muslim marauders and their go=
vernment sponsors do<BR>not yet seem intent on exterminating every last A=
frican<BR>Muslim in their midst. But they do seem determined to wipe<BR>o=
ut black life in the region. The only difference between<BR>Rwanda and Da=
rfur, said Mukesh Kapila, the former United<BR>Nations' humanitarian coor=
dinator for Sudan, "is the<BR>numbers of dead, murdered, tortured, raped.=
" <BR><BR>A radio exchange between a Sudanese ground commander and a<BR>p=
ilot overhead (taped by a British journalist in February)<BR>captures the=
 aims of the attackers: <BR><BR>Commander: We've found people still in th=
e village.<BR><BR><BR>Pilot: Are they with us or against us? <BR><BR>Comm=
ander: They say they will work with us. <BR><BR>Pilot: They're liars. Don=
't trust them. Get rid of them. <BR><BR>And later: <BR><BR>Pilot: Now the=
 village is empty and secure for<BR>you. Any village you pass through you=
 must burn. That way,<BR>when the villagers come back they'll have a surp=
rise<BR>waiting for them. <BR><BR>The lessons of Rwanda are many. The fir=
st is that those<BR>intent on wiping out an inconvenient minority have a =
habit<BR>of denying journalists and aid workers access and of<BR>pursuing=
 bad-faith negotiations. Thus far the Sudanese<BR>government has pursued =
both approaches, and Western<BR>officials have been far too trusting of t=
heir assurances. <BR><BR>A second lesson is that outside powers cannot wa=
it for<BR>confirmation of genocide before they act. In 1994 the<BR>Clinto=
n administration spent more time maneuvering to avoid<BR>using the term "=
genocide" than it did using its resources<BR>to save lives. In May 1994, =
an internal Pentagon memo<BR>warned against using the term "genocide" bec=
ause it could<BR>commit the United States "to actually do something." In =
the<BR>case of Sudan, American officials need not focus on whether<BR>the=
 killings meet the definition of genocide set by the<BR>1948 Genocide Con=
vention; they should focus instead on<BR>trying to stop them. <BR><BR>A t=
hird lesson is that even when the United States decides<BR>not to respond=
 militarily, American leadership is<BR>indispensable. This is especially =
true because Europe<BR>continues to avoid intervening in violent humanita=
rian<BR>crises. And it remains true despite the Bush<BR>administration's =
unpopularity abroad. The United States<BR>often takes an all-or-nothing a=
pproach: if it doesn't send<BR>troops, it tends to foreclose other policy=
 options. <BR><BR>In Sudan, this tendency has been compounded by the<BR>a=
dministration's reluctance to risk undermining the peace<BR>process it ha=
s spearheaded between Sudan's government and<BR>the rebels in the south. =
While President Bush is<BR>understandably eager to show he can make peace=
 as well as<BR>war, he must stand up to Sudan's government during these<B=
R>difficult negotiations. <BR><BR>After all, regimes that resort to ethni=
c killing and<BR>deportation as a tool of statecraft rarely keep their wo=
rd.<BR>An important predictor of Sudan's reliability as an ally in<BR>the=
 war on terrorism and as a party to the<BR>American-brokered peace accord=
 is its treatment of African<BR>Muslims in Darfur. <BR><BR>What would sta=
nding up to Sudan entail? The administration<BR>has several options. <BR>=
<BR>On the economic and diplomatic front, the United States has<BR>alread=
y demonstrated its clout in Sudan, which is desperate<BR>to see American =
sanctions lifted. So far, Secretary of<BR>State Colin Powell has rightly =
described the humanitarian<BR>crisis as a "catastrophe." But the White Ho=
use and the<BR>Pentagon have been mostly mute. President Bush must use<BR=
>American leverage to demand that the government in Khartoum<BR>cease its=
 aerial attacks, terminate its arms supplies to<BR>the Janjaweed and puni=
sh those militia accused of looting,<BR>rape and murder. The president ma=
de a phone call last week<BR>to Sudan's president, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-B=
ashir, but one<BR>ritual conversation hardly counts as pressure. Mr. Bush=
<BR>should keep calling until humanitarian workers and<BR>investigators a=
re permitted free movement in the region, a<BR>no-fly zone is declared an=
d the killings are stopped, and<BR>he should dispatch Mr. Powell to the C=
had-Sudan border to<BR>signal America's resolve. <BR><BR>The Bush adminis=
tration can't do this alone. Ten thousand<BR>international peacekeepers a=
re needed in Darfur. President<BR>Bush will have to press Sudan to agree =
to a United Nations<BR>mission - and he will also need United Nations mem=
ber<BR>states to sign on. The Europeans can help by urging the<BR>Securit=
y Council to refer the killings to the newly created<BR>International Cri=
minal Court. Though the United States has<BR>been hostile to the court, t=
his is one move it should not<BR>veto, as an investigation by the court c=
ould deter future<BR>massacres. <BR><BR>President Clinton has said that o=
ne of the greatest<BR>mistakes of his presidency was not doing more to pr=
event<BR>the Rwandan genocide. When he visited Rwanda in 1998, he<BR>trie=
d to explain America's failure to respond: "It may seem<BR>strange to you=
 here, especially the many of you who lost<BR>members of your family, but=
 all over the world there were<BR>people like me sitting in offices, day =
after day after day,<BR>who did not fully appreciate the depth and the sp=
eed with<BR>which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror."<B=
R><BR><BR>Today, roughly 1,000 miles north of Rwanda, tens of<BR>thousand=
s of Africans are herded onto death marches, and<BR>Western leaders are a=
gain sitting in offices. How sad it is<BR>that it doesn't even seem stran=
ge. <BR><BR>Samantha Power is the author of "A Problem From Hell:<BR>Amer=
ica and the Age of Genocide," which won the 2003<BR>Pulitzer Prize for ge=
neral nonfiction. <BR><BR>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/opinion/06POW=
E.html?ex=3D1082281043&amp;ei=3D1&amp;en=3D37d84e72b4c822b6<BR><BR>Copyri=
ght 2004 The New York Times Company<BR></DIV></BODY></HTML><br clear=3Dal=
l><hr>Get more from the Web.  FREE MSN Explorer download : <a href=3D'htt=
p://explorer.msn.com'>http://explorer.msn.com</a><br></p>

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