[Vision2020] War Ethics!

Carl Westberg carlwestberg846@hotmail.com
Mon, 10 Mar 2003 13:40:45 -0800


What's starting to concern me is the attitude of people such as D.F. 
Oliveria of the Spokesman-Review.  In a column the other day, he referred to 
celebrities who have been speaking against the war as "next generation Hanoi 
Janes" or something like that.  By extension, I would assume he feels the 
same about non-celebrities who are opposed to this invasion.  Very patriotic 
Americans have a very real problem with a war against Iraq.  I'm of the camp 
that believes an invasion will increase, not decrease the threat of 
terrorism, yet that, in the eyes of people such as Oliveria, makes me 
something less than a patriot.  Shades of the '60s.  At least I haven't seen 
any "America, Love It or Leave It" bumperstickers.  Yet....                  
                                                                             
                                              Carl Westberg Jr.






>From: "Linda Pall" <lpall@moscow.com>
>To: "katetegeilwe rwiza" <rwiza@hotmail.com>, <vision2020@moscow.com>
>Subject: Re: [Vision2020] War Ethics!
>Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 12:54:11 -0800
>
>Dear Ms. Rwiza and Visionaries,
>
>War is the LAST alternative to aggression and international harm. Jonathan 
>Glover is correct.
>
>Take a good look at this past Sunday New York Times editorial page and 
>op-ed page. The lead editorial said it well: now is not the time nor is 
>Iraq the place for the United States to become the aggressor and almost 
>singular enforcer of disarmament. Jimmy Carter and Tom Friedman both wrote 
>movingly and morally about the need for another way other than bombing, 
>killing and abandonment of diplomacy.
>
>I look at my students who are planning for commissioning in the military in 
>the next few months and the thought of placing them anywhere near harm's 
>way before we have done all we can through diplomacy and international law 
>makes me weep.
>
>I remember my friend, May Al-Jibouri, from graduate school at WSU in the 
>late 1970s and know that she and her family are back in Iraq. The thought 
>of May's children and grandchildren (probably now) in harm's way makes me 
>weep.
>
>We who are against war with Iraq on the Bush Administration's terms value 
>our precious military men and women and our precious peace activists who 
>are willing to continue the dialogue about a just war.
>
>Shalom,
>
>Linda Pall
>
>
>
>   ----- Original Message -----
>   From: katetegeilwe rwiza
>   To: vision2020@moscow.com
>   Sent: Monday, March 10, 2003 9:57 AM
>   Subject: [Vision2020] War Ethics!
>
>
>   By Jonathan Glover.
>
>   Wednesday February 5, 2003
>   The Guardian
>
>   I have spent the past few years discussing medical ethics with students 
>who are often doctors or nurses. Their work involves them in life-and-death 
>decisions. Our discussions have reminded me of what many of us experience 
>when we are close to someone in acute medical crisis. When a parent is 
>dying slowly in distress or indignity, or when a baby is born with such 
>severe disabilities that life may be a burden, the family and the medical 
>team agonizes over whether to c! ontinue life support. No one finds such a 
>decision easy or reaches it lightly. What is at stake is too serious for 
>anyone to rush the discussion.
>   It is hard not to be struck by the contrast between these painful 
>deliberations and the hasty way people think about a war in which thousands 
>will be killed. The people killed in an attack on Iraq will not be so 
>different from those in hospital whose lives we treat so seriously. Some 
>will be old; many will be babies and children. To think of just one 
>five-year-old Iraqi girl, who may die in this war, as we would think of 
>that same girl in a medical crisis is to see the enormous burden of proof 
>on those who would justify killing her. Decisions for war seem less 
>agonizing than the decision to let a girl in hospital die. But only because 
>ano! nymity and distance numb the moral imagination.
>   Questions about wa r are not so different from other life-and-death 
>decisions. War kills many people, but each person has a life no more to be 
>lightly destroyed than that of a child in hospital. This moral seriousness 
>of killing is reflected in the ethics of war. If a war is to be justified, 
>at least two conditions have to be met. The war has to prevent horrors 
>worse than it will cause. And, as a means of prevention, it has to be the 
>last resort. Killing people should not be considered until all alternative 
>means have been tried - and have failed.
>   Those supporting the proposed war on Iraq have claimed that it will 
>avert the greater horror of terrorist use of biological or nuclear weapons. 
>But this raises questions not properly answered. It is not yet clear 
>whether Iraq even has these weapons, or whether their having them would be 
>more of a threat than possession by other countries with equally horrible 
>regimes, such as North Korea. No good evidence has been produced of any 
>link to terrorist groups. Above all, there is no evidence of any serious 
>exploration by the American or British governments of any means less 
>terrible than war. Is it impossible to devise some combination of diplomacy 
>and continuing inspection to deal with any possible threat? Is killing 
>Iraqis really the only means left to us?
>   The weak answers given to these questions by the two governments 
>proposing war explain why the! y have persuaded so few people in the rest 
>of Europe, or even in this country. It is heartening how few are persuaded 
>by claims about intelligence too secret to reveal, or by the attempts to 
>hurry us into war by leaders who say their patience is exhausted. We would 
>never agree to remove the baby's life support on the basis of medical 
>information too confidential for the doctor to tell us. Still less would we 
>accept this because the doctor's patience has run out. It really does seem 
>that this time many of us are thinking about war with something like the 
>same seriousness.
>   There is an extra dimension to the decision about this particular war. 
>The choice made this time may be one of the most important decisions about 
>war ever made. This is partly because of the great risks of even a 
>"successful" war. The defeat even of Saddam Hussein's cruel dictatorship 
>may contribute to long-term enmity and c! onflict between the west and the 
>Islamic world. In what is widely thought in the Islamic world to be both an 
>unjustified war and an attack on Islam, an American victory may be seen as 
>an Islamic humiliation to be avenged. This war may do for our century what 
>1914 did for the 20th century. And there is an ominous sense of our 
>leaders, as in 1914, being dwarfed by the scale of events and sleepwalking 
>into decisions with implications far more serious than they understand.
>   The other reason for the special seriousness of the decision about this 
>war has to do with the dangerous post-September 11 world we live in. That 
>day showed how much damage a low-tech terrorist attack can do to even the 
>most heavily armed country. The US was like a bull, able to defeat any 
>other bull it locked horns ! with, but suddenly unable to defend itself 
>against a swarm of bees. Al l countries are vulnerable to such attacks. 
>Combining this thought with the proliferation of biological weapons, and 
>possibly of portable nuclear weapons, suggests a very frightening world.
>   This dangerous world is often seen as part of the argument in support of 
>the war. If we don't act now, won't the problem, as Tony Blair said, "come 
>back to haunt future generations"? But further thought may raise doubts 
>about whether the dangerous world of terrorism and proliferation really 
>counts for the war rather than against it.
>   The frightening world we live in is like the "state of nature" described 
>by Thomas Hobbes. What made life in the state of nature "solitary, poor, 
>nasty, brutish and short" was the strength of the reasons people had to 
>fight each other. There was no ruler to keep the peace. So everyone knew 
>the strong would attack the weak for their possessions. But the instability 
>was worse than this. My fear of attack by you gives me a reason for a 
>pre-emptive strike ! against you before you get strong enough to start. But 
>my reason for a pre-emptive strike against you in turn gives you a reason 
>for a pre-emptive strike against me. And so the spiral of fear and violence 
>goes on. Hobbes thought the only solution was the creation of Leviathan, a 
>ruler with absolute power. Such a ruler could impose a peace otherwise 
>unobtainable. The dangers of tyranny and injustice are outweighed by the 
>dangers of a world where no one has power to impose peace.
>   Our present international world seems alarmingly like the Hobbesian 
>state of nature. Nations (and perhaps at least as frighteningly, small 
>groups such as al-Qaida) have many motives for attack and our protection is 
>flimsy. The pure Hobbesian solution to this would be a social contract 
>between all such states and groups, giving all power to one to act as 
>absolute ruler. This is unlikely to happen. But there is a naturally 
>evolving equivalent. Sometimes one dominant power emerges, and imposes Pax 
>R! omana or Pax Britannicus or, in our time, Pax Americana. The Hobbesian 
>suggestion is that, as the way out of the law of the jungle, we should 
>welcome the emergence of a superpower that dominates the world.
>   In his book, Perpetual Peace, Immanuel Kant saw that the Hobbesian 
>solution was not the best possible. The Hobbesian ruler has no moral 
>authority. His only claim to impose peace is his strength. Conflict is not 
>eliminated, but suppressed by sheer strength. If the ruler grows weak, the 
>conflict will surface again.
>   This applies to the international world. A superpower with an empire may 
>suppress conflict. But, as Pax Romana and Pax Britannicus remind us, 
>empires fall as well as rise. Such a peace is unlikely to last for ever. 
>And empires act at least partly out of self-interest, so the imposed 
>arrangements may not be just. Palestinians, for instance, may be unhappy to 
>entrust their future to Pax Americana. But absolutely central is the lack 
>of moral authority of anything imposed by force. To put it crudely, no one 
>appointed the ! US, or the US and Britain, or NATO, to be world policeman.
>   Kant's solution was a world federation of nation-states. They would 
>agree to give the federation a monopoly of the use of force. This use of 
>force would have a moral authority derived from its impartiality and from 
>its being set up by agreement. In the present world, the Kantian solution 
>might be a proper UN police force, with adequate access to funds an! d to 
>force of overwhelming strength. There would have to be agreed cri teria for 
>its intervention, together with a court to interpret those criteria and to 
>authorize intervention. There are many problems with this solution. But 
>something like it is the only way of policing the global village with 
>impartiality and authority. It is the only hope of permanently bringing to 
>an end the cycle of violence.
>   A central decision of our time is between these two ways of trying to 
>keep the peace in the global village. In a Hobbesian village, violence is 
>quelled by a posse rounded up from the strongest villagers. It is a Texas 
>cowboy village, or Sicilian village with mafia gangs. In a Kantian village, 
>there is a strong police force, backed up by the authority of law and the 
>courts. The Kantian village may seem utopian. But there are reasons for 
>thinking it is not impossible. In the f! irst half of the 20th century, 
>Europe gave the world colonialism, genocide and two world wars. Then it 
>would have seemed utopian to think of the present European Union. Through 
>pressure of experiencing the alternative, a federation did come about. With 
>luck, Kant's proposal may come about because we see the importance of not 
>experiencing what is likely to be a really terrible alternative.
>   For all its inadequacies, the UN is the embryonic form of the rule of 
>law in the world. This is another reason why the proposed war could be so 
>disastrous. Every time Bush or Blair say they will not be bound by a 
>Security Council veto, without knowing it they are Hobbesians. Never mind 
>moral authority: we, the powerful, will decide what happens. If we want to 
>make a pre-emptive strike, we will do so. And we will listen to the UN 
>provided! it says what we tell it to say.
>   Some of us fear the instability o f a world of unauthorized pre-emptive 
>strikes. We hope our precarious situation may nudge world leaders further 
>towards the rule of law, towards giving more authority and power to the UN. 
>The alternative is terrifying. This gives an extra dimension of menace to 
>the attitude of the American and British governments to this crisis. The 
>erosion of the world's attempt at international authority is something to 
>add to the cruelty and killing of this lawless war we are being asked to 
>support.
>
>   · Jonathan Glover is director of the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at 
>King's College, London, and author of Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th 
>Century.
>
>
>
>
>
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