<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
<meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 14 (filtered medium)">
<!--[if !mso]><style>v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
</style><![endif]--><style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:Calibri;
panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
{font-family:Tahoma;
panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:purple;
text-decoration:underline;}
p
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
margin-right:0in;
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:0in;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
p.MsoAcetate, li.MsoAcetate, div.MsoAcetate
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text Char";
margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:8.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";}
p.MsoListParagraph, li.MsoListParagraph, div.MsoListParagraph
{mso-style-priority:34;
margin-top:0in;
margin-right:0in;
margin-bottom:0in;
margin-left:.5in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
span.BalloonTextChar
{mso-style-name:"Balloon Text Char";
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-link:"Balloon Text";
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";}
span.EmailStyle21
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:windowtext;}
span.apple-converted-space
{mso-style-name:apple-converted-space;}
span.EmailStyle23
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle24
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle25
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";
color:#1F497D;}
span.EmailStyle26
{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
{mso-style-type:export-only;
font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
{page:WordSection1;}
/* List Definitions */
@list l0
{mso-list-id:2091348878;
mso-list-type:hybrid;
mso-list-template-ids:-67724336 67698703 67698713 67698715 67698703 67698713 67698715 67698703 67698713 67698715;}
@list l0:level1
{mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level2
{mso-level-number-format:alpha-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level3
{mso-level-number-format:roman-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:right;
text-indent:-9.0pt;}
@list l0:level4
{mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level5
{mso-level-number-format:alpha-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level6
{mso-level-number-format:roman-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:right;
text-indent:-9.0pt;}
@list l0:level7
{mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level8
{mso-level-number-format:alpha-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:left;
text-indent:-.25in;}
@list l0:level9
{mso-level-number-format:roman-lower;
mso-level-tab-stop:none;
mso-level-number-position:right;
text-indent:-9.0pt;}
ol
{margin-bottom:0in;}
ul
{margin-bottom:0in;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">
<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang="EN-US" link="blue" vlink="purple"><br />
<br />
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"> Good issue. Couple comments:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">1.<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"">
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style="color:#1F497D"> Did the Court decline to hold the evidentiary hearing despite a clear statutory requirement to hold one or did the plaintiff fail to schedule the hearing with the Court? I suspect the latter especially
if there was a breach of contract claim where the parties may have been focusing their attention. I don’t see a circuit court judge unilaterally scheduling an evidentiary hearing on such a complaint in the absence of a party bringing it to court’s attention
and scheduling it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">2.<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"">
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style="color:#1F497D"> With respect to the evidentiary hearing vs. reference to “trial” later in the statute, I don’t believe that the evidentiary hearing functions as the sole adjudicatory procedure in an action filed under
Fla. Stat. s. 713.346. The early evidentiary hearing is expressly offered as a means by which the plaintiff might qualify for some extraordinary
<b>prejudgment</b> remedies such as a “temporary injunction” or “prejudgment attachment”. The evidentiary hearing doesn’t mean that there is no later trial of an action filed under this statute; it just provides an evidentiary and procedural basis for the
issuance of the extraordinary “prejudgment” relief spelled out at subsection (4).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">3.<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"">
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style="color:#1F497D"> In order to prevail in this statutory action, I believe it is incumbent on the plaintiff to both plead and prove the existence of an “undisputed obligation” due from defendant to plaintiff. That’s
a high bar and for this reason this statutory action seems to be rarely invoked. Subsection (4) appears to expressly require proof of “each allegation of the complaint” which would include the allegation of an undisputed debt. If plaintiff fails to prove
the existence of the undisputed debt, then Plaintiff would not prevail in the action and defendant would appear to be entitled to recover prevailing party attorney’s fees.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoListParagraph" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style="color:#1F497D"><span style="mso-list:Ignore">4.<span style="font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"">
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style="color:#1F497D"> The combination of the high bar of pleading and proving undisputed debt with the risk of plaintiff being obligated to pay defense atty’s fees is enough to keep most practitioners from invoking this
statute.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><b><span style="color:#1F497D">Michael R. Gibbons (<a href="http://lowndes-law.com/our-people/michael-r-gibbons"><span style="color:black">Bio</span></a>)<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><b><span style="color:#1F497D">Shareholder</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">215 N. Eola Drive<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">Orlando, FL 32801<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">Phone: 407-418-6378<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">Fax: 407-843-4444<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">email:
<a href="mailto:michael.gibbons@lowndes-law.com"><span style="color:black">michael.gibbons@lowndes-law.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green">website:
<a href="http://www.lowndes-law.com/"><span style="color:black">http://www.lowndes-law.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt;text-align:justify;text-autospace:none">
<span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:green"> <img border="0" width="93" height="89" id="Picture_x0020_1" src="cid:image003.jpg@01D0A79A.0D7D44E0"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif""> clc-discussion-bounces@lists.flabarrpptl.org [mailto:clc-discussion-bounces@lists.flabarrpptl.org]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Justin Zinzow<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, June 15, 2015 4:47 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> clc-discussion@lists.flabarrpptl.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [CLC-Discussion] Payment of "Undisputed Sums" which the court Ultimately finds to be disputed--Remedy & Prevailing Party Fees<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Good afternoon: We have run across an interesting issue. I will start by framing the issue and would appreciate any insights those on this distribution
list can provide. This might also be an area ripe for legislative clarification.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">The Issue: When a 713.346, Florida Statutes action is brought by a subcontractor against a general and the court fails to hold the summary hearing but finds
at trial that the general had a bona fide dispute (but then also found the general breached the contract), is the general who withheld payment because of the bona fide dispute entitled to prevailing party fees under 713.346?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">We have been engaged as counsel following a trial loss by our client’s former trial counsel. The complaint which commenced the lawsuit was brought by a
subcontractor against the general. It contained a count under 713.346, Florida Statutes over allegedly undisputed sums, and a count for breach of contract.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">The Judge never held the summary hearing required by 713.346. Instead, the Judge let everything go to trial. The court found that the sums were disputed
by the general and that it was a close call, but ultimately ruled in favor of the subcontractor on both counts. It appears the Judge erred in ruling for the subcontractor on 713.346 because the sums were disputed. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Who should be entitled to fees, if anyone, under 713.346?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">In
<i>Astaldi Const. Corp.</i> the Fifth District Court of Appeal, interpreting section 255.071, Florida Statutes (materially similar to 713.346), held that 713.346 does not provide a mechanism for relief as to disputed sums and indicated that disputed sums must
go to trial. The issue of prevailing party attorney’s fees was not mentioned in the decision, but the court was clearly differentiating between disputed and undisputed claims.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Logic and fairness would suggest that 713.346 provides prevailing party fees to a subcontractor only if withheld sums are undisputed. By doing so it would
act as a penalty to a wrongdoer and as a deterrent to future would-be wrongdoers. But is the reverse also true? If a subcontractor brings a claim under 713.346 knowing the sums are disputed, is the general entitled to prevailing party fees when the court
determines the amount was, in fact, disputed?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">The statute is unclear as to the fee issue. It provides that “The prevailing party in any proceeding under this section is entitled to recover costs, including
a reasonable attorney's fee, at trial and on appeal.” Why is trial mentioned? As per
<i>Astaldi</i>, there is a distinction between an undisputed sums claim that does not go to trial, and a disputed claim which does. Does the statute mention trial and appeal to indicate the court levels, as opposed to an actual trial?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="punctuation-wrap:simple;text-autospace:none"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Justin R. Zinzow<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Board Certified in Construction Law<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Zinzow Law, LLC<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">35111 U.S. Highway 19 North<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Suite 302<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Palm Harbor, FL 34684<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Phone: (727) 787-3121<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D">Fax: (727) 787-3231<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";color:#1F497D"><a href="http://www.zinzowlaw.com/">www.zinzowlaw.com</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<br />
<br />
<p style="font-size:12px">
<b>Notice of Confidentiality:</b> This e-mail communication and the attachment(s) hereto, if any, are intended solely for the information and use of the addressee(s) identified above and may contain information which is legally privileged from disclosure and/or otherwise confidential. If a recipient of this e-mail communication is not an addressee (or an authorized representative of an addressee), such recipient is hereby advised that any review, disclosure, reproduction, re-transmission or other dissemination or use of this e-mail communication (or any information contained herein) is strictly prohibited. If you are not an addressee and have received this e-mail communication in error, please advise the sender of that circumstance either by reply e-mail or by telephone at (800) 356-6818, immediately delete this e-mail communication from any computer and destroy all physical copies of same.
<br /><br />
<b>Replies Filtered:</b> Any incoming reply to this e-mail communication or other e-mail communication to us will be electronically filtered for "spam" and/or "viruses." That filtering process may result in such reply or other e-mail communications to us being quarantined (i.e., potentially not received at our site at all) and/or delayed in reaching us. For that reason, we cannot guarantee that we will receive your reply or other e-mail communications to us and/or that we will receive the same in a timely manner. Accordingly, you should consider sending communications to us which are particularly important or time-sensitive by means other than e-mail.
<br /><br />
[v4.30]
</p>
</body>
</html>